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Abstract: The term "stage" appears to be used in three general senses in theories of behavioral development: (a) as a metaphor: (b) as a
description of behaviors that undergo age change; (c) as an explanation of age-related changes in behavior. Although most existing
stage models are purely descriptive, a few of them purport to have explanatory power. One such model, Piaget's stages of cognitive
development, is considered in this paper.
To be viewed as potentially explanatory, a stage model must describe some behaviors that undergo age change, posit antecedent
variables believed to cause the changes, and provide procedures whereby the behavioral changes and the antecedent variables can be
independently measured. Piaget's stages seem to satisfy some but not all of these requirements. Piaget's stages describe many age-
related changes in behavior, and some antecedent variables have been proposed. However, procedures do not exist for measuring the
two factors independently. In lieu of such procedures, Piaget has outlined a "program" of five empirical criteria whereby the reality of
his stages can ostensibly be verified. Some objections to these criteria are considered.
The five criteria in Piaget's program are invariant sequence, cognitive structure, integration, consolidation, and equilibration. Three
of the criteria (invariant sequence, integration, and consolidation) lead to the same sorts of empirical predictions (culturally universal
sequences in the acquisition of certain behaviors). Such predictions are subject to the objection that Piagetian invariant sequences are
often measurement sequences. A measurement sequence is said to occur when some late-appearing behavior consists of some earlier-
appearing behavior plus additional things. The cognitive structure criterion is subject to at least three criticisms: First, it yields, at
most, descriptions of behavior; second, these are often nothing more than descriptions of task structure; third, they cannot be regarded
as unique to the given stages for which they are posited. The fifth criterion, equilibration, generates some predictions that might be
considered as prima facie evidence for the existence of stages. However, these predictions conflict with the current data base on
Piaget's stages.
It is concluded that there is no compelling support for Piaget's hypothesis that his cognitive stages do more than describe age-related
changes in behavior. Since explanatory statements involving stages appear with some regularity in Piagetian and neo-Piagetian writ-
ings, there are grounds for supposing this conclusion to be nontrivial.
Keywords: cognitive development, cognitive structure, developmental stages, invariant sequences, Piagetian theory.
The aim of this paper is to generate discussion on a topic that,
has seemingly been frozen in cross section for the past several
years: In what sense or senses is it meaningful to speak of
"stages" of cognitive development? My approach is to pose this
question with reference to the preeminent stage theory of our
time, Piaget's (e.g., 1950, 1970a; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).
Though it will take some space to develop, my basic line of argu-
ment is quite simple. Whereas Piaget's stages are perfectly ac-
ceptable as descriptions of behavior, they have no status as
explanatory constructs. This will, no doubt, seem a thoroughly
unremarkable claim to many readers. But it leads to an interest-
ing conclusion. Statements to the effect that children do or do not
do such and such because they are at some given stage of cogni-
tive development are meaningless - or, more precisely, they are
circular. Since statements of this sort are often made both in Ge-
nevan writings and in neo-Piagetian theorizing, this conclusion
would seem to be nontrivial.
At present, stage model-building a la Piaget is a popular pas-
time in the literature on human cognitive development. I some-
times have the subjective impression that the density of such
models in developmental journals must average about one per
issue. For this reason, it would be rash to hope that many readers
will be favorably disposed toward the arguments presented
below or will be inclined to accept my conclusions. However,
the ultimate fate of these arguments and conclusions is unim-
portant. This paper will have more than served its purpose if it
acts like something of a Rorschach stimulus in reawakening dis-
cussion of the stage question and prompting other writers to
formulate new proposals about how to identify discrete changes
in cognitive development.
General desiderata
One may distinguish three general uses of the stage construct in
theories of behavioral development: aesthetic, descriptive, and
explanatory. In the first case, stages are ideals that do not
necessarily refer to anything definite or measurable in develop-
ment. The term "stage" is used metaphorically because it tends
to evoke certain images in readers. It is common to cite Erikson's
(1950) theory of psychosexual development as an example of this
use of stages. But G. Stanley Hall's model of mental develop-
ment, with its allusions to sociocultural evolution, would do just
as well. Among more recent theories, a case could be made for
the conclusion that Kohlberg's (e.g., 1963, 1968) stages of moral
development are primarily aesthetic. Kohlberg diagnoses these
stages with a projective technique called the Moral Judgment
Scale. However, the diagnosis for any given child is not intended
to imply that certain moral behaviors will be observed in that
child (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Also, the model apparently does
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not predict that all, or even most, children go through all of the
stages (Kurtines & Greif, 1974).
When stages are used descriptively, they refer to precise and
measurable aspects of behavioral development. In this usage,
which is by far the most common of the three, stage is basically a
synonym for behavior, that is, given some feature of behavior
that is known to change within some age range, these changes
are sliced into a small number of chronologically ordered seg-
ments that are called stages. An important characteristic of
descriptive stage models is that they are typically arbitrary. Deci-
sions about how to slice up the stream of behavioral change are
based on external criteria such as economy and elegance. Hence,
there might be several different models that could be posited, all
of which would be equally valid descriptions of changes in the
organism.
Most of the examples cited in Kessen's (1962) earlier exposi-
tion of stage theories fall within the descriptive category. Since
this category is large, it goes without saying that the models in it
vary along a number of dimensions. Apart from the specific be-
haviors being described (cognitive, social, perceptual, etc.),
perhaps the most notable dimension is the degree of abstractness
with which descriptions are formulated. In some cases, stage-
defining behaviors are described very concretely. The stages
reported by Piaget for the development of concepts such as
number (Piaget & Szeminska, 1941), classification (Inhelder &
Piaget, 1964), quantity (Piaget & Inhelder, 1941), ordering (In-
helder & Piaget, 1964), and so on, come immediately to mind.
For example: Stage I of cardinal number means that children
cannot construct one-to-one mappings of the elements of one set
onto the elements of another; Stage II means that one-to-one
mappings can be constructed but children cannot conserve these
mappings mentally when they are perceptually destroyed; Stage
III means that one-to-one mappings can be both constructed and
mentally conserved (Piaget & Szeminska, 1941, Part II). Stages
of this sort represent the concrete end of the descriptive con-
tinuum. We begin to move toward the abstract end when em-
phasis is placed on isolating communalities and patterns in
diverse classes of behavior. These patterns are then used to
define stages. There is more than one way to go about abstracting
such patterns. Factor analysis might be used (e.g., Buss & Royce,
1975), in which case the patterns would be called factors.
Abstract algebra might be used (e.g., Piaget, 1949), in which case
the patterns would be called operations or cognitive structures.
Information processing analysis might be used (e.g., Klahr &
Wallace, 1970), in which case the patterns would be called rules
or rule systems. Regardless of the methodology employed, it is
important to bear in mind that the results are descriptions of be-
havior, albeit rather abstract ones.
The reversibility rules, mental operations, and cognitive struc-
tures that Piaget uses to define his sensorimotor, preoperational,
concrete-operational, and formal-operational stages are the best-
known illustrations of the abstract end of the descriptive con-
tinuum. For sheer elegance and precision, however, modern in-
formation processing models are undoubtedly the state of art.
These models reflect Simon's (1962) characterization of the task
of stage definition as a process whereby "We select certain
instants in the course of . . . dynamic change, take 'snapshots' of
the system at those instants, and use these snapshots as descrip-
tions of the system at a particular stage of development" (1962, p.
130). A rough account of the information processing approach
might run as follows. First, we examine age-related changes in
behavior on a problem-solving task or some family of similar
problem-solving tasks. We look for stable individual differences
in the patterns of behavior elicited by the tasks, which are also
correlated with age. (The patterns tend to succeed each other in
time.) Each isolable pattern is formulated as a system of rules.
The rules are "computational," not in a numerical sense, but in
the sense that they will generate desired behavioral outputs from
given inputs. The final step is to realize the rule models in a
program of some sort, such as General Problem Solver (Newell,
Shaw, & Simon, 1960). A sophisticated realization of the models
would consist of two parts: (a).-programs describing the system of
rules for each behavioral pattern and (b) programs describing
how the program for a given rule system can be obtained by
modifying the structure of the program for some other rule
system.
Finally, there is the explanatory use of stages. To be viewed as
legitimate explanatory constructs, stages must satisfy at least
three criteria. First, they must specify some target behaviors that
undergo age change, that is, they must be descriptive. Second,
they must posit antecedent variables believed to be responsible
for such changes that weld the stages into distinctive entities.
These variables will presumably be in atu rational and
experiential in nature, where variables of the latter sort include
both influences being manipulated by the environment (e.g.,
reinforcement contingencies) and influences being manipulated
by the organism (selective attention, motor activity, etc.). Third,
procedures whereby the antecedent variables can be measured
independently of behavioral changes must also be specified.
This last requirement, which is essential to avoid circularity, is
the litmus test for explanatory stages. It is one thing to describe a
series of behavioral changes and to propose some possible
causes; it is far more difficult to say how the latter may be
measured without measuring the former. But if this is not done,
statements of the form "children do x because they are in stage
S" merely say "children do x." Psychoanalytic theory provides a
textbook illustration. Consider the mother who asks why her
one-year-old son sucks his thumb and is told "because he is in
the oral stage." The oral stage satisfies the first two explanatory
requirements. It describes a class of infantile behaviors centered
on the mouth, and it describes psychodynamic processes
believed to cause these behaviors. But the methods" whereby
oral behaviors and psychodynamic processes might be inde-
pendently measured remain a mystery. Hence, the connection
between orality and psychodynamics is conjectural, and "he
sucks his thumb because he is in the oral stage" is simply a
paraphrase of "he sucks his thumb."
Explanatory stages, unlike descriptive ones, are definitely not
arbitrary. The specific behaviors assigned to a given stage are not
there at the whim of the theorist. The organism now has some-
thing to say about the matter. It is the second and third criteria
that make explanatory stages nonarbitrary. The behaviors in any
given stage go together naturally by virtue of their common an-
tecedents. For this reason, statements of the form "subjects do x
because they are in stage S" are not vapid. They assert that x oc-
curs because the antecedent conditions for S are present (and, by
implication, those for S + 1 are absent).
Since it is far easier to describe behavioral development than it
is to explain it, unambiguous examples of explanatory stages are
not easy to come by. However, there are a few candidates. On the
maturational side, we might consider Coghill's (1929) five-stage
model of motor development in Amblystoma embryos. Each
stage consists of behavioral descriptions (muscular contraction,
flexure, coiling, reversal of flexure, and swimming) together with
descriptions of neurological events whose measurement
procedures are well-defined. Thus, if one asks why certain
embryos contract when their skin is lightly stimulated, the state-
ment "because they are in the flexure stage" has explanatory
power because "flexure stage" refers to antecedent neurological
variables that can be measured independently of contraction. On
the experiential side, we might consider Bijou and Baer's (1963,
1965; Bijou, 1975) three-stage model of human psychological
development. These stages, like Coghill's, have prima facie
explanatory power because they consist of descriptions of both
behavior and of antecedent variables. In this case, the latter are
reinforcement contingencies operating in children's everyday
environments. The second stage in Bijou and Baer's model, the
so-called basic stage, corresponds roughly to the preschool years.
During this age range, children are far less dependent on adults
than during infancy. If one asks why certain children are show-
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ing increased independence from adults, the statement "because
they are in the basic stage" has explanatory power within the
Bijou-Baer theory. The statement says that certain antecedent
events, reinforcement contingencies that parents and other
adults are known to manipulate, have produced the behavioral
effect. It is quite possible to measure the manipulation of these
contingencies in given families by various techniques (parental
interviews, observation of parent-child interaction in controlled
situations, etc.) and to use this information to predict children's
dependence behavior.
This brings us back to Piaget's stages of cognitive develop-
ment and to the question I wish to examine in this paper: Is there
any reason to suppose that these stages have explanatory power?
Piaget's theory presents, I believe, an interesting example of
stages that fall somewhere between pure description and true
explanation.1 On the one hand, Piaget wishes that his stages
should be viewed as more than descriptive conventions: "to the
extent that objectively certain stages exist (and this is indisput-
able in certain fields), they cannot be considered as a product of
subjective cuts arbitrarily made by the research worker in a
rigorously continuous development" (Piaget, 1960, pp. 12-13).
But, on the other hand, his stages do not satisfy all of the criteria
mentioned earlier. There are problems with both the second and
third criteria. Concerning the former, it is true that Piaget has
discussed several general factors responsible for cognitive
growth (e.g., 1970a, pp. 719-726). However, a fine-grained
analysis tying specific changes in given factors to specific stages
has not been undertaken. Concerning the third criterion,
procedures for measuring these factors independently of the be-
haviors that the theory is trying to explain are lacking. This lack
is especially apparent for the factor deemed to be most important
by the theory, equilibration. It should be possible to detect os-
cillations in equilibration and these oscillations should be func-
tionally related to the presence of stage-defining behaviors. In
Piaget's research, however, only age-related changes in behavior
are studied.
Despite these difficulties, it would be premature to conclude
that Piaget's stages are purely descriptive. He has outlined a
"program" whereby, it is said, the reality of cognitive stages can
be established (Piaget, 1960). The program consists of five em-
pirical criteria. Piaget claims (e.g., 1960, pp. 12-13) that if data
consistent with the predictions of the criteria can be obtained,
we may infer that "objectively certain stages exist." I interpret
this claim as follows. Although we may not know the specific an-
tecedent variables that weld a given set of behaviors into a mean-
ingful whole, these variables certainly exist if the predictions of
the criteria can be verified. The task of sorting out the specific
variables that go with each stage then becomes an empirical
question. At first glance, this approach appears to save tremen-
dous amounts of labor. We are allowed, for purposes of explain-
ing behavior, to treat a given set of stages as "objectively certain"
even though we do not yet know what the antecedent variables
are or how to measure them. But if this approach is to work, we
must make a key assumption, namely, the criteria in Piaget's
program are sufficient to establish the existence of stages. Is this
assumption actually justified? Insofar as I know, this question
has not been carefully examined before.
Below, each criterion in Piaget's program is considered in
turn. The principal aim is to determine whether any or all of
them justify the assumption that stages exist. In each case, we
shall want to know whether data consistent with a given criterion
imply that stages have been identified or whether reasonable al-
ternative explanations are available.
The program
The five criteria are these: invariant sequences, cognitive struc-
ture, integration, consolidation, and equilibration. Some of them
are, for Piaget at least, more important than others. In particular,
the first two apparently are regarded as more fundamental than
the last three. There seems to be some consensus that Piagetian
stages must stand or fall primarily on the sequence and structure
criteria. Despite this fact, my approach will be the same for all
five criteria. In each case, I shall ask whether the criterion
provides prima facie grounds for believing that Piagetian stages
constitute natural (i.e., nonarbitrary) groupings of behavioral
traits. Although all five criteria are considered, the treatment of
the last three criteria is very brief by comparison to the treatment
of the first two. The reasons for this unequal weighting are, first,
that the theory seems to rely primarily on the first two criteria
and, second, that criticisms of the last three criteria have already
been raised by other writers (e.g., Wohlwill, 1966).
Major criteria: sequence and structure
Invariant sequence. Judging from views expressed by other
writers (e.g., Beilin, 1971; Kohlberg, 1968; Kurtines & Greif,
1974), this is far and away the most important criterion. We begin
with a fairly typical formulation from Piaget's writings: "The
minimum programme for establishment of stages is the recogni-
tion of a distinct chronology, in the sense of a. constant order of
succession. The average age for the appearance of a stage may
vary greatly from one physical or social environment to another:
for example, if the children of New Guinea, studied by Margaret
Mead, manage to understand, like those of Geneva, certain struc-
tures of Euclidean geometry, they may do so at a much later or
much earlier age. Whether older or younger is of little im-
portance, but one could not speak of stage in this connection, un-
less in all environments the Euclidean structures were es-
tablished after and not before the topological structures" (1960,
p. 13).
These remarks, as well as other formulations of the sequence
criterion (Inhelder, 1956, p. 85; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), are
somewhat misleading. They give the impression that it is the in-
variant succession of the stages whose chronology would be
investigated. But this is clearly an erroneous impression, be-
cause it would smuggle stages into existence before any data are
gathered. Since the sequence criterion is supposed to establish
the existence of stages empirically, its predictions must not be
directly concerned with the stages themselves; otherwise, it is a
circular statement.
What the criterion actually says is that stages may be viewed as
existing in some objective sense to the extent that the behaviors
associated with them emerge in an order that cannot be altered
by environmental factors. This leads to empirical predictions of
the following sort. Suppose we have some set of stages Si, S2,
. . . , Sn and procedures for measuring illustrative behaviors from
each stage. Suppose we also have a sample of subjects from
whatever nominal age range is spanned by the stages. If we
administer tests for the behaviors to our subjects and scale the
data, we should find that they appear in the order specified by
the stages, that is, Si behaviors before behaviors from any of the
n - 1 remaining stages, S2 behaviors after Si behaviors but before
behaviors from the n - 2 remaining stages,. . . , and S,, behaviors
after behaviors from all of the n - 1 preceding stages. Moreover,
this sequence should be culturally universal.
The verification of culture free sequences in concept develop-
ment has been viewed by many (e.g., Beilin, 1971; Kohlberg,
1968; Tanner, 1956) as proof of the existence of stages. Tanner,
for example, has remarked, "If I understand Mile Inhelder and
Professor Piaget correctly, one of the most cogent arguments for
the existence of their developmental stages is that the sequence
of them remains the same even if as a whole they are retarded or
advanced . . . this seems to me a powerful argument in favour of
the existence of mental stages, and of their neurological bases"
(1956, p. 87, my italics). The reason for the acceptance of the
invariant sequence criterion is, I believe, suggested by the
italicized words in Tanner's comment. It is commonly supposed
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that if a sequence of behavioral acquisitions cannot be altered
environmentally, the sequence must be under hereditary con-
trol: "Piaget's primary criterion for the theory of stages, the in-
variant order of structural achievement, to which Piaget accepts
no qualification, suggests, in fact almost requires, an explanation
defined in terms of genetic control" (Beilin, 1971, p. 178). Al-
though Piaget has always resisted the suggestion that his theory
is maturationist, he has acknowledged that, "the stages always
appear in the same order of succession. This might lead us to
assume that some biological factor such as maturation is at work"
(1970a, p. 712).
Although he does not specify any exact maturational variables,
they would presumably be neurological and hormonal events
under the control of genes that are temporally linked to dif-
ferentiation in the central nervous system. Finding the specific
variables is an empirical question. For our purposes, what is im-
portant, is the implicit assumption that the existence of a
culturally universal invariant sequence presupposes well-
defined antecedent events of a maturational variety. According to
this assumption, there is some chronologically ordered set of
maturational events {Mi, M2, . . . , MjJ and some chronologi-
cally ordered set of behavioral events {Bi, B2,. . . , B }^ such that
the two sets mesh as follows:
Each Mj is the class of antecedent variables for the behavior class
Bj. If this assumption is correct, then we can, in principle,
measure these variables independently of behavior for purposes
of establishing functional relationships. Some work along these
lines has already been done for Piaget's concrete-operational
stage (Kraft, Languis, Wheatley, & Mitchell, 1977). The assump-
tion that invariant behavioral sequences imply sequences of an-
tecedent maturational events was popularized by Arnold Gesell
(e.g., Gesell, Thompson, & Amatruda, 1934) and, at first glance, it
seems quite reasonable. If some developmental phenomenon
cannot be altered by environmental influences, what is left but
heredity? We may add to this initial impression the fact that
substantial evidence bearing on maturational control of se-
quences in motor development has accumulated (for a review,
see Carmichael, 1970). It is frequently the case, in lower
vertebrates, that such sequences can be mapped onto matura-
tional sequences in the central nervous system. But is this true in
general? Are there behavioral sequences that do not involve un-
derlying maturational sequences? There are, and it is such se-
quences with which Piaget's stages appear to be primarily
concerned. To begin with, note that any statement to the effect
that some sequence is culturally universal implicitly presumes
that the sequence could have turned out some other way. If not,
the statement is tautologous. If it is impossible even to imagine a
sequence turning out some other way, the sequence property
does not require explanation in terms of antecedent variables
and no research is needed to verify its universality. The fact that
the behaviors are acquired at all clearly does require explana-
tion, but the fact that they are acquired sequentially does not.
If a behavioral sequence is not always "in the organism," in
the sense of antecedent maturational events, where is it? Many
times it is "in the tests," that is, it results from definitional con-
nections between the behaviors being measured and, hence, it is
guaranteed by the nature of our measurement operations. For
this reason, I shall call such sequences measurement sequences.
A measurement sequence occurs whenever each item in the
sequence consists of the immediately preceding item plus some
new things. When behaviors are related in this manner, the only
way that they can be acquired is in an invariant sequence. This is
because, logically, it is impossible to devise valid tests of later
items that do not measure earlier items. Given two items, A and
B, such that B consists of A plus some other things, there are only
three possibilities: (a) children acquire neither A nor B; (b)
children acquire A but not B; (c) children acquire both A and B
and A precedes B. But it is inconceivable that some children ac-
quire only B or that some children acquire both A and B but B
precedes A. If either finding were observed, we would be forced
to conclude that our A measure was prone to false negatives (sub-
jects fail the test even though they have A) or that our B measure
was prone to false positives (subjects pass the test even though
they do not have B) or both.
Two arithmetic skills that children learn in elementary school,
addition of integers and multiplication of integers, provide a
classic example of a measurement sequence. Multiplication is
defined in terms of addition. It is a special type of addition,
namely, adding the same number to itself repetitively. To mul-
tiply, children must know how to add. If addition and multiplica-
tion tests were administered to large samples of elementary
schoolers, we would expect to find children who could do both,
children who could do neither, and children who could add but
not multiply. We would not expect to find children who could
multiply but not add. Arithmetic and algebra provide a plethora
of measurement sequence illustrations (i.e., natural numbers vs.
integers, integers vs. fractions, multiplication vs. factoring, divi-
sion vs. square roots). In each case, the acquisition of the specific
items needs to be explained in terms of antecedent variables, but
the sequential linkage between them does not.
What about Piaget's stages? It is rarely possible to imagine
predicted sequences turning out any other way. This claim is
hardly unique to this writer. One finds, for example, the follow-
ing remarks in a well-known paper by Flavell and Wohlwill:
"Instances of this relation are both numerous and important. For
example, concrete and formal operations are linked in just this
way. Providing one accepts Piaget's characterization of what
these operations consist of, it is logically possible for the child to
be capable of the former and incapable of the latter, but not
conversely. Formal operations are supposed to take products of
concrete operations as their objects, and hence presuppose the
capability to exercise these operations . . . the ability to multiply
or coordinate two relations presupposes the ability to apprehend
the two relations individually; the representation of class hierar-
chies implies the ability to represent a single class; and so on and
on" (1969, p. 86).
A wealth of measurement sequences could be cited from
Piaget's studies. However, it would probably be more useful to
consider a detailed illustration involving the preoperational and
concrete-operational stages. The bulk of Piaget's research on his
theory of cognitive development has been devoted to describing
the behavioral distinctions between these two stages (e.g.,
Flavell, 1963). Detailed investigations of numerical behavior
(Piaget & Szeminska, 1941), classificatory behavior (Inhelder &
Piaget, 1964), spatial behavior (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Piaget,
Inhelder, & Szeminska, 1960), quantitative behavior (Piaget &
Inhelder, 1941), and ordering behavior (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964)
have all been reported. Several different tasks have been
administered within each content area. For example, class inclu-
sion problems, sorting problems, and matrix problems have all
been administered within the classification domain. Age changes
have been reported in terms of sequences of stages, with earlier
ones corresponding to preoperations and later ones to concrete
operations. In most cases, there are at least three stages: Stage
I = preoperations; Stage III = concrete operations; and Stage
II = a transition phase between preoperations and concrete
operations. The stages frequently focus on two major traits - call
them Bi and B2. Stage I is defined as the absence of both; Stage
II is defined as the presence of Bi and the absence of B2; Stage
III is defined as the presence of both. Finally, the traits are
frequently linked by a measurement sequence. An example of
this sort was given earlier: the stages of cardinal number
development. The two focal traits were construction of a one-to-
one mapping and the mental conservation of such a construction
following perceptual deformation. Note that the latter requires
that the subject first be able to construct a correspondence.
Similar statements can be made about one-dimensional vs. two-
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dimensional classification, one-dimensional vs. two-dimensional
ordering, identity vs. conservation, and so on.
Now, suppose that we wish to test the prediction that be-
haviors from the preoperational stage invariably precede be-
haviors from the concrete-operational stage. This would be done
by selecting several skills from several domains, administering
appropriate tests to large samples of preschoolers and ele-
mentary schoolers, and scaling the data. If focal traits emerged in
the predicted order in all or nearly all cases, we would conclude
that the invariant sequence criterion had been satisfied. But
confirmatory data may be guaranteed so long as we administer
valid tests.
To summarize, it is commonly supposed that a culturally
universal sequence in behavioral development implies an un-
derlying sequence of maturational events (e.g., Beilin, 1971;
Gesell, Thompson, & Amatruda, 1934; Tanner, 1956). If this
assumption were true in general, Piaget's claim that the steps in
the behavioral sequence comprise "objectively certain stages"
would not seem unreasonable. The maturational events that
precede each behavioral step could be viewed as the glue that
holds the stage together. Finding the glue for each stage then be-
comes an empirical question. Although the assumption that be-
havioral sequences imply maturational sequences is often true
(e.g., Coghill, 1908, 1909, 1912), it is certainly not true in general.
There is the matter of measurement sequences to contend with.
It is possible to have measurement sequences for which there is
apparently no maturational involvement. For example, I assume
that no one would argue that learning how to multiply integers
and learning how to differentiate polynomials are under matura-
tional control; these skills are culturally transmitted. But their ac-
quisition sequence is culturally universal; no one learns how to
differentiate before learning how to multiply. Examples of this
sort are intended to illustrate why it is difficult to accept the in-
variant sequence criterion for cognitive stages. Other writers
(e.g., Flavell, 1972; Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969) have pointed out
that behaviors belonging to different Piagetian stages are nor-
mally linked by measurement sequences. Examples from the
preoperational and concrete-operational stages were given
earlier. Examples for the sensorimotor and formal-operational
stages have been given by others (e.g., Cornell, 1977; Siegler,
1978).
Note that it has not been suggested that research on measure-
ment sequences is utterly trivial or that nothing can be learned
from such research. We can learn a great deal. But what is gained
is primarily information about measurement procedures. It tells
us something about the construct validity of our tests, and it
provides a potential method for estimating the type and fre-
quency of measurement errors (Brainerd, 1977a). It has also not
been suggested that all behaviors belonging to different Pia-
getian stages are related by measurement sequences - only that
this is often the case. The fact that any sequences of this sort can
be identified entails that the invariant sequence criterion cannot
be accepted as prima facie evidence that "objectively certain
stages exist." If it were accepted, then we would have to view se-
quences such as learning the alphabet before learning how to
write, learning to add before learning how to multiply, learning
to raise numbers to powers before learning how to differentiate,
and so on, as evidence that cognitive stages exist.
Cognitive structure. The structure criterion is second only to'
sequences in overall importance. It specifies that the members of
a set of stages shall each be characterized by a unique comple-
ment of cognitive structures. Piaget states the criterion as
follows: "Inhelder and I, when considering the development of
structures of thought, speak only of stages in connexion with the
formation of total structures. We include as special cases all
structures observable during a given stage which integrate with
the structures of the preceding stage as necessary sub-structures.
In this way the logical operations of the 'stage of formal opera-
tions' (from 11-12 to 14-15 years) constitute a total structure
whose two complementary aspects are the formation of a 'lattice'
(combinatory aspect) and the constitution of a 'group' of four
transformations (double reversibility). However, this general
structure covers, on the one hand, all the operational schemata of
this stage" (1960, pp. 11-12).
To understand what it means to say that each stage has its own
distinct set of cognitive structures, it is clear that we shall first
have to know what a (Piagetian) cognitive structure is. Exactly
how Piaget arrives at these structures has always been something
of a mystery (Flavell, 1963). Below, I give an example of how one
structure is presumably formulated. For now, however, all we
want to know is what these structures are. Two general state-
ments can be made. First, since the only empirical phenomena
studied in Piaget's research are behaviors that undergo age
change, the structures are at most abstractions from behavior.
This point was anticipated some years ago by Bruner: "Are we
any nearer an explanation of the child's solution to a problem to
say that the solution presupposes some kind of grasp of the prin-
ciple of logical implication. Is this not only a more refined and
conceivably more useful way of describing the formal properties
of the behavior observed" (1966, p. 3). Second, the structures are
usually algebraic. Although Piaget uses symbolic logic to
describe some behaviors, most of his structural descriptions are
group-theoretic (Piaget, 1942, 1949). In the remainder of this sec-
tion, we examine, first, a worked illustration of how a Piagetian
structure is presumably isolated and then we consider why such
a model is inadequate to insure that stages exist.
The structure chosen for illustration is one that, from a
mathematical point of view, is among the most tractable of
Piaget's models, namely, the Klein four-group (which Piaget
calls the INRC group). As the example proceeds, it is hoped that
some of the likely principles of structure formulation will be-
come apparent; they will be summarized at the end.
The Klein group, orD2 for short, is a set of four elements under
a binary rule of combination o. The set is usually denoted {/, a, (3,
y} and, usually, o is the successive composition rule, that is, if
(x, y) e {I, a, /3, y}, then statements of the form "x o y" mean "first
do x and then do y" (or the reverse, accordingly as left-hand or
right-hand notation is preferred). D2 satisfies the usual four group
axioms and, like all groups with fewer than six elements, it is
commutative. It is frequently the case in concrete realizations of
D2 that all the elements are operations of some sort. D2 is com-
pletely defined by the abstract table:
I a ft y
I a ft y
oc I y ft
ft y I a
y ft a I
From an algebraic point of view, Piaget's INRC group is a
family of concrete representations ofD2. The general nature of
this family has been described by Parsons (1960) and Flavell
(1963). There is some task T comprised of two variables A and B.
A can take on two mutually exclusive values (a and a) and so can
B (b and b). For any such task, an INRC group may be defined as
follows: I = leave the system as it is; N = change the value of A;
R = change the value of B; C = change the value of both A and B.
Parsons (1960) and Flavell (1963) observed that the class of Pia-
getian representations that satisfy this description may be
divided into two main groups, namely, operations of proposi-
tional logic (logical INRC group) and operations of physical
systems (physical INRC group). In either case, there is a simple
procedure for establishing that a particular INRC group is a
representation of D2. First, construct the following mapping: / —»
I,N -» a,R —» (3, and C —> y. Second, show that the following ta-
ble holds:
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Note that the internal structure of this table is identical to that of
the earlier table for{7,a:,/3,y}.
The so-called snail problem (Piaget, 1970b, Chapter 5)
provides an illustration of these general principles. A snail shell
(variable A) is placed on a narrow strip of cardboard (variable B).
Both are placed on a table that has a line of reference drawn on
its surface. The snail can move toward the line (value a) or away
from it (value a); the cardboard can move, independently of the
snail, toward the line (value b) or away from it (value b). The
INRC group for this system is then defined as above. Piaget
reports that the snail problem is not solved until adolescence, the
nominal age range for the formal-operational stage. There are
many other problems belonging to the INRC family, some
involving logic (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, Part I) and some
involving physical systems (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, Part II),
that are also not solved until adolescence. It is this datum, ap-
parently, that leads Piaget to conclude that the INRC group is a
cognitive structure of the formal-operational stage. Piaget then
proceeds to use the structure to explain the behavior of different
age levels on individual tasks from the INRC family. For
example, consider the following explanation of snail problem
performance: "The child at the level of concrete operations
understands these two pairs of direct and inverse operations but
does not succeed in combining them . . . As soon as the 4-group is
acquired, however, the solution is made easy by the introduction
of compensation without cancellation; that is, reciprocity (R). In
this case we have 7 • R — N • C, in which (7) is the movement of
the snail to the right; (R) the movement of the board to the left;
(N) the movement of the snail to the left; and (C) the movement
of the board to the right" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 143). Note
that the latter portion of the statement is simply a description of
the algebraic structure of the snail problem. This, in turn, sug-
gests that Piaget feels that subjects' solution of given problems
may be explained by describing the problems' structure. Such
explanations seem to require that the subject has, somehow,
"internalized" this structure.
To summarize, the evidence seems to show that Piagetian
cognitive structures are formulated roughly as follows. The main
requirements are a class of tasks that all yield the same structural
representation and are all solved within the age range for a given
stage. We considered D2 as an example. We could just as easily
have considered the grouping structure of the concrete-opera-
tional stage (Piaget, 1942, 1949, 1972). The family of representa-
tions of this structure includes such things as class-inclusion
problems (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964) and duration problems
(Piaget, 1969). Such problems are apparently first solved during
the elementary school years. We might also have considered the
group of displacements of the sensorimotor stage (Piaget, 1954)
and its associated tasks. In each of these cases, the structure in
question starts out as a description of the common properties of
some set of tasks, but it ultimately is used to explain performance
on the same tasks: "Each stage is characterized by an overall
structure in terms of which the main behavior patterns can be
explained" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 153).
This brings us back to stages. What objections, if any, are there
to regarding Piaget's structures as evidence for stages, that is, as
the glue that holds stage-defining behaviors together in a mean-
ingful whole? Assuming that the above account is correct in its
broad outlines, I believe there are three main objections. The
first and most obvious one is what could be termed the be-
havioral isomorphism problem. These structures are, in their
most basic sense, task descriptions. There is no guarantee that
such descriptions correspond in even an approximate way to be-
havior. Certainly, Piaget has not demonstrated that such map-
pings always exist. In fact, he has proposed structures for which
there are no extant tasks, let alone corresponding behaviors. This
objection was, I think, first raised by Flavell with reference to
the grouping structures of the concrete-operational stage: "Does
each grouping operation really have a discoverable opposite
number in ongoing intellectual activity? Do certain groupings
even roughly resemble any frequently occurring operational pat-
tern in middle childhood . . .?" (1963, p. 468) The first objection
to regarding structures as criteria for stages, then, is that a task
description does not necessarily have anything to do with be-
havior.
The second objection is that a behavioral description is not an
explanation. We saw earlier that Piaget uses structures to explain
the "main behavior patterns" associated with given stages. Sup-
pose we assume, for the sake of argument, that a precise mapping
can be established between the structure for a given problem
and aspects of the behavior of subjects who solve the problem.
This might be done for the INRC group, for example, by
considering the following protocol reported for a subject who
solved the snail problem: "Do (9; 11) . . . The snail moved
forwards too, at the same time as the board . . . The card went
hack and the snail forward. Since the snail did this distance and
the plank that, the snail still did this journey on top of the plank
(he puts one measuring strip on top of the other). This piece (the
difference) is the distance the snail did farther than the plank"
(Piaget, 1970b, p. 115). Do seems to be able to explain the struc-
ture of the snail problem in detail. Therefore, the INRC group
has also become a description of Do's behavior. But we cannot
now use the INRC group to explain Do's behavior on pain of cir-
cularity. No functional relationship has been established
between the structure itself and behavior. To do this, we would
require independent measures of the INRC group and behavior
on the snail problem. The second objection, then, is this: A
structural description of behavior does not explain how these be-
haviors originate. This point has been previously raised by
Brunei-(1966).
The third objection seems to me to be the most telling. If state-
ments like "The structure consisting of a group of sensorimotor
operations appears in the period of infancy" (Inhelder, 1956,
p. 76), "The structure of concrete groupements begins in early
childhood" (Inhelder, 1956, p. 76), "The structure of combined
groups and lattices . . . develops between eleven and fourteen
years" (Inhelder, 1956, p. 76), and so on, are to make any sense, it
is obvious that we shall have to be able to regard these structures
as unique to the stages for which they are posited. But it is im-
possible, in principle, to do this. Suppose there is some set of
problems sharing some structural representation and all of them
are solved during the age range for a given stage. What guarantee
do we have that there is not some other set of problems sharing
the same representation that is solved at some earlier or later
age? No matter how large the first class of problems is, we can
never rule out the latter two possibilities entirely. The first one is
especially serious. In Piaget's theory, the structures of each stage
are viewed as elaborations of the structures of previous stages:
"These overall structures are integrative and non-interchange-
able. Each results from the preceding one, integrating it as a sub-
ordinate structure, and prepares for a subsequent one, into which
it is sooner or later itself integrated" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p.
153). Since later structures integrate earlier ones, it might be
argued that a problem class with the structural representation of
an earlier stage might sometimes be solved during a later stage
due to performance factors (e.g., Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969). But
it should never happen that problem classes with the representa-
tions of later stages are solved during earlier stages. Under such
conditions, the structural distinction between stages breaks
down completely.
The objection that structures may not be unique to the stages
for which they are posited is more than idle speculation. Specific
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instances can be cited wherein classes of problems solved at an
earlier stage share the structure of a later stage. These examples
appear to be most numerous for the INRC group, which explains
its selection as an illustration. There appear to be several
problem classes whose members are solved during the concrete-
operational range (elementary school) but share the INRC
representation. I shall give three examples. First, there are
propositional logic problems. Piaget has shown that the sixteen
propositional operations have the INRC structure; a unique
INRC representation can be obtained for each operation (see
Bart, 1971). But recent evidence shows that elementary
schoolers solve a wide variety of problems concerned with these
operations. In fact, the only propositional logic tasks routinely
failed by such children are ones involving invalid forms (for re-
views, see Ennis, 1975; Brainerd, 1978). Second, there are the
conservation problems, which are usually regarded as the sine
qua non of concrete operations. All of the standard conservation
paradigms (number, length, liquid, etc.) conform rather closely
to the earlier description of systems yielding INRC representa-
tions. There are always two variables (the two stimuli), and they
can usually undergo two opposing transformations (the states of
the variables). For example, consider the number conservation
problem, which involves making relative numerousness judg-
ments about two parallel rows of objects. Variable A is one row,
which may be either lengthened (value a) or shortened (value a).
Variable B is the other row, which may also be lengthened (value
b) or shortened (value b). The INRC group is: / = leave the
system as it is; N — change the transformation on A; R = change
the transformation on B; C = change the transformation on both
rows. Similar demonstrations are easily devised for other con-
servation problems. Third, there are the matrix problems used in
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) to study the classification and seda-
tion concepts of the concrete-operational stage. Any matrix
yields D2 representations (Budden, 1972). There are always two
variables, the Row factor and the Column factor. If the matrix is
2 x 2 , the Row and Column factors have two values each and an
INRC group results. But N x N matrices also yield INRC
representations. We merely divide the N Row values into two
mutually exclusive classes (a and a) and do likewise with the N
Column values. The INRC group is then: / — leave the system
unchanged; N = change the Row equivalence class; R = change
the Column equivalence class; C = change the Row and Column
equivalence classes.
In sum, it does not appear that the structure criterion provides
prima facie evidence that a set of stage-defining behaviors forms
a natural grouping. These structures appear to be primarily task
descriptions. When mappings can be effected between the struc-
tures and subjects' performance on the tasks, the structures
merely become abstract descriptions of behavior. Moreover,
these descriptions apparently cannot be regarded as unique to
the stages for which they are posited.
Minor criteria: integratidn^-ponsolidation, and equilibration
Integration. This criterion asserts that each stage presupposes
the immediately preceding one: "The passage from an inferior
stage to a superior stage is equivalent to an integration: The in-
ferior becomes, part of the superior. It is easy to show that
concrete operations serve as a base for the formal operations of
which they are a part. The combinatorial method, for example, is
based on changes of order which are possible during childhood
and later develop into combinatorial operations. Proportions
themselves are operations applied to operations, or operations to
the power of two" (Inhelder, 1956, p. 85).
The integration criterion is sometimes formulated in terms of
structures. That is, it is proposed that the cognitive structures of
any given stage "integrate" those of earlier stages. But, as In-
helder indicates, the standard empirical illustration of integra-
tion involves selecting some behavior from a given stage and
then showing, primarily on logical grounds, that it presupposes
behaviors from earlier stages. Other familiar examples, in addi-
tion to the ones cited by Inhelder, involve the conservation and
spatial concepts of the concrete-operational stage. Piaget
frequently remarks that conservation presupposes ("integrates")
both the identity concepts of the preoperational stage (1968) and
the object permanence concepts of the sensorimotor stage (1954).
Similarly, he states that the Euclidean and projective concepts of
the concrete-operational stage (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Piaget,
Inhelder, & Szeminska, 1960) presuppose ("integrate") the topo-
logical concepts of the preoperational stage (Piaget & Inhelder,
1956).
From an empirical point of view, the integration criterion ap-
pears to be a restatement, in slightly altered language, of the se-
quencing criterion. Therefore, it would be subject to the same
objections as sequencing. The prediction that one would pre-
sumably test to verify the claim that some given stage integrates
the preceding one is that behaviors belonging to the latter in-
variably precede behaviors belonging to the former. But this
again raises the possibility of measurement sequences.
Consolidation. It would perhaps be more revealing to refer to
this as the preparation-achievement criterion. According to the
consolidation criterion, each stage is simulataneously an
achievement phase for its own behaviors and a preparation phase
for those of the next stage: "If the stage n + 1 is really new with
respect to u, then in any stage n it should be possible to distin-
guish an aspect of achievement with respect to the stages going
before and also an aspect of preparation with respect to the
stages coming after" (Piaget, 1960, p. 13-14). Thus, the
sensorimotor stage is an achievement phase for object
permanence and a preparation phase for identity, the preopera-
tional stage is an achievement phase for identity and a prepara-
tion phase for conservation, and the concrete-operational stage is
an achievement phase for conservation and a preparation phase
for propositional logic.
It is unclear what the consolidation criterion's empirical con-
sequences are. For this reason, some writers (e.g., Wohlwill,
1966) have recommended dropping it altogether on grounds of
superfluity. Other writers, notably Pinard and Laurendeau
(1969), disagree. Pinard and Laurendeau believe that it entails
the phenomenon of horizontal decalage. Horizontals decalages
are invariant sequences in behaviors belonging to the same
stage. The classic illustration involves conservation concepts. It
is said (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1941) that conservation of
quantity invariably precedes conservation of weight, which in-
variably precedes conservation of volume.
Assuming it is true that the consolidation criterion implies the
phenomenon of horizontal decalage, this criterion, like integra-
tion, becomes another restatement of the sequencing principle.
There is, it is true, one important difference: The predicted se-
quences are for same-stage concepts rather than different-stage
concepts. But the measurement sequence argument still applies.
It is just as likely that a same-stage sequence is measurement-
based as it is that a different-stage sequence is. This happens, for
example, in the conservation illustration above. The stimulus
materials used in conservation of quantity tests (clay balls) are
also used in conservation of weight tests. In the latter tests,
however, subjects must also know how to operate a pan balance.
This knowledge does not enter into quantity tests.
Equilibration. This is probably the vaguest and most tentative
of the five criteria. Historically, it is a rather recent addition to
Piaget's stage program. It does not appear, for example, in In-
helder's (1956) discussion of stage criteria. Piaget's first
systematic exposition of it seems to be a paper published in 1960.
Piaget views cognitive development as consisting of the attain-
ment of successive states of equilibrium, each more stable than
the last. Each state is temporary and eventually dissolves into
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disequilibrium by a combination of internal and external forces.
Ultimately, however, an equilibrium level is achieved that is
sufficiently stable to resist further change. Piaget (e.g., 1960) says
that his stages correspond to relatively long-lasting levels of tem-
porary equilibrium in the overall process of cognitive growth.
Since the direction of development is toward ever more stable
equilibria, it follows that each successive stage should be more
stable and less subject to perturbation than its predecessor: "the
most general and the most elaborate programme for a theory of
stages doubtless consists of representing the stages in the form of
a series of equilibrium levels, the fields of which would always
be more and more extensive and the mobility always greater, but
whose increasing stability would depend precisely on the
degree of integration and structuration" (p. 14).
As was the case for consolidation, Piaget and his co-workers
have not spelled out the exact empirical consequences of the
equilibration criterion. At first glance, however, it would seem to
require that stages should be divisible into periods of rapid ac-
quisition of the relevant behaviors (achievement phases) al-
ternating with periods of relative quiescence (preparation
phases). The idea that cognitive development is a matter of
achieving and then losing successive equilibrium levels seems,
logically, to demand that new acquisitions should appear in
spurts (Pinard & Laurendeau, 1969). Importantly, I believe there
would be some reason to suppose that Piaget's stages may do
something other than describe behavior if these alternating
periods of change and stability could be verified. Whenever
development is observed to proceed by fits and starts, this fact
suggests either some sort of maturational control, perhaps
hormonal in nature, or major changes in the child's environment
or both. One is reminded, for example, of the spurts in physical
growth noted around pubescence (Tanner, 1970) or the spurts in
linguistic and arithmetical skill that occur upon entering ele-
mentary school. These spurts are preceded and followed by
periods of less rapid change. If it could be shown that the be-
haviors associated with a given Piagetian stage tend to emerge
abruptly at the start of the nominal age for the stage, we might
have reason to suppose that they share common antecedent
variables. We would still be left with the problem of discovering
what the antecedent variables are, but at least we would be do-
ing something other than describing behavior.
Genevan writings occasionally give the impression that, in
fact, children rapidly acquire stage-defining behaviors at the be-
ginning of the appropriate age range. But there is no direct sup-
port for this claim. The data show that the reverse is true. There
has been extensive research on the development of Piagetian
conceptual, skills in recent years, especially those from the
concrete-operational stage. It has not been found that such skills
appear rapidly On the contrary, it is generally conceded that
development is smooth and gradual throughout a stage's age
range (Flavell, 1970; Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969; Pinard &
Laurendeau, 1969). Consider the concrete-operational stage as a
case in point. Inhelder (1956) has suggested that behaviors from
this stage are uniformly absent before age five or six, that they are
rapidly acquired thereafter, and that virtually all of them are
present by age eight. What the available data show is this. First,
many1 concrete-operational behaviors seem to be present during
the preceding stage (preoperations). Examples of these pre-
cocious traits are relational skills such as linear ordering and
transitive inference plus binary classification (for a review, see
Brainerd, 1978, Chapter 5). Second, the majority of concrete-
operational skills appear gradually during the elementary school
years. Here, conservation concepts are the classic illustration.
Some of them (e.g., number and length) appear early, others
(e.g., quantity and mass) appear somewhat later, and still others
(e.g., area) appear very late. Third, there is another group of con-
cepts that does not seem to develop until the age range for the
next stage (formal operations). These late bloomers include such
things as class inclusion (e.g., Brainerd & Kaszor, 1974) and a va-
riety of Euclidean spatial concepts such as horizontality and
distance.
On the whole, then, there is nothing in the data on how
concrete-operational behaviors develop that would suggest clear
lines of demarcation between this stage and either its
predecessor or successor. Concrete-operational behaviors have
already begun to appear during the preoperational stage, and
they are still appearing during the formal-operational stage.
In sum, there is a rather extensive data base on age changes in
Piagetian concepts that does not tend to confirm the idea of suc-
cessive equilibrium levels. The data are sufficiently consistent
on this point that some reviewers have concluded that concept
development is a smooth, continuous process that is not given to
fits and starts. A detailed examination of issues bearing on this
question may be found in two papers by Flavell (1971; Flavell &
Wohlwill, 1969).
Of course, we still wish to know whether the equilibration cri-
terion provides grounds for concluding that a set of stage-
defining behaviors is a natural grouping. The answer appears to
be both yes and no. On the one hand, alternating phases of be-
havioral change and quiescence suggest correlated changes in
antecedent variables. The latter may involve maturational
events, as in the case of the hormonal changes producing the
adolescent growth spurt (Tanner, 1970), or experiential events,
as in the case of starting school, or both. Once alternating states
of change and quiescence have been verified for some given
stage model, it seems reasonable (a) to conclude that the alterna-
tions are being produced by changes in antecedent variables and
(b) to regard these variables, as yet unidentified, as the glue that
holds individual stages together. On the other hand, alternating
states of change and quiescence have not been observed for
Piaget's stages. Smooth behavioral change without noticeable
variations in rate seems to be the rule. However, this does not
preclude the possibility of verifying the equilibration criterion
for some other cognitive stage model.
Epilogue
Piaget's stages fall somewhere between the poles of true expla-
nation and pure description. Although Piaget wishes that his
stages should be regarded as explanations of behavior (e.g.,
Piaget, 1960, pp. 12-13; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 153), he has
not tied them to specific antecedent variables whose measure-
ment procedures are well-defined. However, he has proposed a
program of five criteria whereby the nonarbitrariness of his
stages can ostensibly be ascertained by empirical means. These
criteria were analyzed in the present paper. On the whole, the
analysis did not support Piaget's optimistic view of them. Three
of the criteria (invariant sequence, integration, and consolida-
tion) lead to identical predictions, and they are all subject to the
same objection (measurement sequences). The structure cri-
terion is subject to the objection that those structures posited for
any given stage apparently cannot be regarded as unique to that
stage. Only the fifth criterion in the program, equilibration, leads
to predictions whose verification would convince prudent inves-
tigators that stage-defining behaviors comprise natural group-
ings. But these predictions have not been corroborated for
Piaget's particular stages.
To the extent that the explanatory power of Piaget's stages
hinges on his five criteria, I conclude that there is no compelling
evidence that these stages do anything other than describe be-
havior. This conclusion has at least one important consequence:
It is improper to explain the fact that some children do one thing
and some children do another by saying that their Piagetian
stages differ. It happens that explanations of this sort abound in
the concept development literature. Three examples from
Genevan writings will be given. First, when children are trained
on conservation concepts, some learn very well, some learn
moderately well, and some learn poorly. This finding has been
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explained on the ground that the first group is at the concrete-
operational stage, the second group is in a transition phase
between the preoperational and concrete-operational stages, and
the last group is at the preoperational stage (see Inhelder & Sin-
clair, 1969; Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974; Strauss, 1972).
Second, the appearance of reproductive imagery at about age two
and the appearance of anticipatory imagery at about age seven or
eight have been explained on the grounds that the former results
from entrance into the preoperational stage and the latter results
from entrance into the concrete operational stage (e.g., Piaget &
Inhelder, 1971). Third, the fact that a group of children tends to
remember a picture of a seriated array better six months after
they saw the picture than one week after they saw the picture has
been explained on the ground that more children are in the
concrete-operational stage after six months than after one week
(e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). Other examples of this genre are
given elsewhere (Brainerd, 1977b). The point to bear in mind is
that such statements are not really explanations if Piaget's stages
are purely descriptive.
Although this paper has been concerned with rather recondite
conceptual questions, I should like to close by noting that the
explanatory status of Piaget's stages is a critical issue to educa-
tors. In recent years, a number of early childhood curricula based
on Piaget's theory have been devised and tested (for reviews, see
Brainerd, 1978; Hooper & De Frain, 1974; Lawton & Hooper,
1978). The distinctive feature of these curricula is that they advo-
cate basing instruction on Piaget's hypothesis that cognitive
development is a stage-like process. Their guiding principle is
that children should never be taught anything that exceeds the
limits of their current stage. A variety of diagnostic procedures
have been developed for teachers to use in assessing children's
Piagetian stages. If it is true, as Piaget claims, that his stages are
natural groupings, then instructional practices such as these may
have considerable merit. But if it is true, as the present analysis
suggests, that Piaget's stages are merely descriptive, the ra-
tionale for these practices appears to evaporate.
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NOTE
1. I am assuming that there is no serious objection to regarding Piaget's
stages as adequate descriptive constructs. Though vagarities and ambigui-
ties may sometimes arise, the behavioral meanings of phrases such as
"Stage IV of object permanence," "the concrete-operational stage,"
"Stage III of classification development," and so on, would seem to be
reasonably clear.
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Stages resulting from continuous underlying variables. Brainerd presents
a thought-provoking critique of Piaget's theory from a logical level of analysis
and cites some of the empirical evidence now accumulating that is incom-
patible with Piaget's formulations. We would like to broaden the present dis-
cussion by considering another example of apparent "stage" development
seen in nonhuman primates and in human beings. In this example, the un-
derlying causal factors function as continuous variables, yet often create the
impression of stages at the behavioral level. It is our belief that an analysis of
underlying factors and within-stage variance is more valuable than the study
of stages themselves.
A review of the research on exploration and play in primates (and certain
other mammals) supports the theory that exploration and play are stimulus-
seeking behaviors reinforced by intermediate levels of sensory stimulation
(Baldwin & Baldwin, 1977; in press). Sensory stimulation is a biologically es-
tablished (i.e., primary) reinforcer across the primate order, including human
beings. Generally, the more novel, complex, unpredictable, and intense a
given stimulus input is, the greater the stimulative impact it has on the
perceiver. Both low and high levels of sensory stimulation impact are aver-
sive, but intermediate levels function as positive reinforcers.
Because the world is totally novel to the newborn infant, the infant primate
is easily overstimulated. However, early clinging reflexes keep the infant
close to its mother (a warm, soft, familiar stimulus that does not cause over-
stimulation). Early reflexes, especially alerting, looking, crawling, and finger
movements, expose the infant to mild levels of novel stimuli, which in turn
reinforce the development of operant patterns of exploration. Early explora-
tion consists of touching the mother's body and passively watching the
world. However, the processes of familiarization and habituation serve as
biologically established mechanisms that promote continuous development
of exploration and play activities. As the exploring infant becomes familiar
with its mother's body, it ceases to find novelty and unpredictability there,
hence early exploration eventually leads to aversive understimulation effects
(i.e., boredom). At this point, differential reinforcement effects begin to shape
the infant's behavior toward leaving the mother's body and exploring the en-
vironment away from her, if the infant leaves her to crawl in the branches and
lianas, it will be reinforced by the escape from aversive understimulation and
by the discovery of new sources of rewarding novelty. The infant advances
from the stage of continuous maternal contact to the stage of environmental
exploration. During this period, if the infant is overstimulated while exploring
the environment, it will be reinforced for returning to the familiar, arousal-
reducing stimuli of the mother. For example, if the infant's exploration leads it
into the midst of a rowdy group of playing juveniles, the larger animals'
vigorous and rapid activities will overstimulate the infant, and it will seek out
the low inputs of mother's body to counteract the overstimulation.
After repeated experience while exploring, the infant habituates a step at a
time to higher levels of stimulus input. Figure 1 shows the infant's general
developmental course. As it familiarizes itself with broader ranges of novel,
unpredictable stimuli and habituates to higher levels of stimulus quantity
and intensity, the infant is reinforced for leaving the mother's side and ventur-
ing into ever more stimulating activities. Thus, in many environments, one
sees infants progress through a series of overlapping stages from early ma-
ternal contact, to exploration of the nonsocial environment, to social explora-
tion, then to social play. Within the realm of social play there is often a se-
quence from gentle wrestling play, to chasing and noncontact play, to play













Figure 1 (Baldwin and Baldwin). The individual's optional sensory
stimulation level (stippled area) rises as he familiarizes and habituates
himself with more novel active and complex behaviors. Above the optimal
(positive reinforcement) zone, sensory stimulation is aversively over-
stimulating; below, it is aversively understimulating.
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degree by biological factors. First, the earliest age for each stage cannot be
collapsed beyond certain limits that are determined by the maturation and
growth of muscles, bones, and other behavioral "machinery": premature at-
tempts at an advanced behavior lead to falls, hard knocks, overstimulation,
and other aversive consequences that punish the behavior until the time that
adequate maturation is attained. Second, there are limits to the speed with
which learning can occur and skills can be acquired.
The duration and commonness of the stages of exploration and play can
vary considerably within species, depending on local environmental condi-
tions. For example, monkeys in laboratories tend to progress through the
stages more slowly than conspecifics in more natural and more stimulating
environments. Under some conditions, the sequence may be truncated to the
point that social play does not appear. To understand the variance in stage
development, one needs to turn to the underlying causal variables and de-
termine how behaviors in each stage are conditioned in particular environ-
ments. For example, in many laboratory environments, the cages are stark
and there is little novelty to reinforce the infant for leaving mother's side. In
fact, mother's movements, half-hearted games, and punitive actions may
provide more sensory stimulation than any other part of the environment; they
hence reinforce the infant for continuing early mother-infant interactions to a
much greater extent than do infants in rich sensory environments.
When the underlying developmental mechanisms are known, there is less
incentive to study the stages than to focus on the mechanisms of behavioral
acquisition. When the mechanisms allow a dynamic interaction of both
psychobiological mechanisms (maturation, sensory stimulation, primary
reinforcers, and familiarization-habituation mechanisms) and environmental
determinants (patterns of sensory stimulation and other reinforcers in the en-
vironment), stage theories based on biologically determined chronological
age are less likely to fit the data than theories that intertwine both maturation
and experience (nature and nurture). When development in different environ-
ments is studied, the timing of stages can be quite variable, which dis-
courages global generalizations about the stages themselves and focuses
attention on the underlying causal variables. Unfortunately, stage descrip-
tions often obscure the fact that there can be a great deal of behavioral
variance within any given stage. For example, within the stage of wrestling
play, animals discover countless novel patterns of movement and interaction
not captured by the global concept of "wrestling." A focus on mechanisms
allows one to recognize and explain these variations better than the global
stage concepts do.
Brainerd's epilogue wisely points out that our behavioral theories have an
impact on educational policy. If the reinforcement model of human
psychological development proposed by Bijou and Baer (1963, 1965, op.
cit.) is more valid than Piaget's model, as our data indicate, educators (and
education research) will need to take a very different course than that sug-
gested by the Piagetian model.
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Stages as descriptions, explanations, and testable constructs. Brainerd's
critique of Piaget's stage theory includes assumptions about the status of the
stage construct, comments suggesting that many stage sequences are un-
testable, and several objections to the proposition that stage sequences in-
dicate the progressive elaboration of cognitive structures. The critique is
consequently rather complex and multifaceted, and I will comment on only a
few of the main points. In contrast to Brainerd, I will argue that Piaget's
stages can be legitimately viewed as both descriptive and explanatory, that
hypotheses about stage sequences can often be given a meaningful test,
and that Piaget's claims about the structural component of stages have not
yet been disconfirmed.
There seems no question but that Piaget's stages are descriptive
constructs, for they describe "those structural wholes, of great abstraction
and generality, which correctly identify the essence of organized in-
telligence at its various levels" (Flavell, 1963 op. cit. p. 21). What is in ques-
tion is when a description becomes an explanation. Brainerd argues that all
explanations are of the same form, namely, explanations of an effect in terms
of its causes. However, there are other forms of explanations, one of which
consists of accounting for a particular case by referring to a general prin-
ciple or law (Braithwaite, 1955). As Flavell's statement implies, Piaget's
stages provide the latter type of explanation. They explain any single be-
havior of a child by referring to the general nature of the child's cognition.
While Brainerd recognizes the abstract and general character of Piaget's
stages, he argues that this in itself does not distinguish them from more
specific stage descriptions. This seems an error, for in psychology and in
other sciences, abstract descriptions can function as explanations of
particular instances.
Of course, an abstract description that merely restates what happens in
particular instances is a circular explanation. Although Piaget recognized
the problem of circularity, he seems to have felt that a precise definition of
stages was needed before an evaluation of them as explanatory constructs
could be made. To define his notion of stages, he presented the five criteria
discussed by Brainerd. The criteria may be divided into three sets, cor-
responding to three characteristics of Piaget's definition. First, the stages are
said to be distinct and objective levels of cognitive development. This
characteristic leads to the criterion that there be a sequence of stages, each
of which represents a level of equilibrium, and each of which is both an in-
tegration of separate aspects of previous stages and a preparation for higher
stages. Second, the stages are intended as general descriptions of cogni-
tive-developmental levels, not ones tied to specific experiences. Con-
sequently, stage sequences should be culturally universal. Finally, each
stage is intended as a formal description of the totality of cognitive function-
ing. The criterion that stages form structured wholes is related to this charac-
teristic.
Though the majority of criteria apply to the first characteristic, Brainerd
and most other critics have concentrated on the latter two characteristics, the
universality of the stage sequences and the structured nature of each single
stage. On universality, Brainerd's main criticism is that many behavioral se-
quences are measurement sequences. That is, they reflect the fact that later
items involve earlier items plus some additional things. Therefore Brainerd
argues that it would be logically impossible to have the later stage precede
the earlier stage. However, there are several problems with the criticism.
First, the behaviors said to indicate the earlier and later stages could be
mastered at the same time, and the synchrony would be evidence against the
stage theory. Though Brainerd does not mention this possibility in discuss-
ing the universality criterion, he gives several examples of it when discuss-
ing the criterion that stages consist of structured wholes. Second, it is not
possible to define a measurement sequence solely on the basis of the
characteristics of tasks. For example, Brainerd says that addition and multi-
plication form a measurement sequence because "to multiply, children must
know how to add." But then the rationale for calling addition-multiplication a
measurement sequence implicitly involves a hypothesis about the processes
children use to multiply. Such hypotheses cannot be substantiated by logical
arguments alone. If children learned to multiply by memorizing multiplica-
tion tables, multiplication might be found before addition. The basic point is
one frequently made by Piaget (Inhelder & Piaget, op. cit. 1964, p. 282), that
the child's way of relating different problems may not correspond to the
logical relationship inferred by an adult. Thus an assertion that any particular
sequence is a measurement sequence cannot be confidently made. Finally,
even if some sequences were actually measurement sequences, the
universality criterion might be supported by evidence on other sequences.
On logical grounds, it seems Brainerd was incorrect in saying that the
existence of any measurement sequences entails rejection of the universality
criterion; it is only if all sequences are measurement sequences that the cri-
terion is unworkable.
Brainerd's criticism of the cognitive structure criterion includes three
points. The first, that the structures are sometimes purely task descriptions,
seems valid. The second, that the structures do not explain a child's be-
havior, can be answered by referring to the earlier comments on the meaning
of explanation to Piaget and Brainerd. The final point, that structures may not
be unique to the stages for which they are posited, is one that requires em-
pirical support; but Brainerd's supporting evidence appears to be weak. The
contention that elementary school children can solve logical problems that,
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1978), 2 183https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00073921
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:55:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Commentary I Brainerd:Cognitive stages
according to Piaget, require the adolescent's formal operations can be
countered by noting that the younger child's concrete operations are ade-
quate for solving some logical problems, and these may be the ones that the
younger children do solve (Knifong, 1974). The suggestion that success in
conservation tasks requires formal operations can also be refuted. In the sec-
tion quoted by Brainerd, Piaget states that the crucial element of formal
operations is the ability to use simultaneously both the negative (A/) and re-
ciprocity (R) operations. However, the child does not need to use both opera-
tions to succeed at conservation. One is sufficient. For example, on a number
conservation task, the child could say that the two rows had the same number
to start with, and that the row that is now longer could be shortened (negation
of original transformation), and therefore that there must still be the same
number in the two rows. Though each case requires its own response, these
examples should indicate that conclusive evidence againstthe structure cri-
terion has not yet been given.
Nonetheless, there are serious problems with the stage construct. In fact,
the most common of previous criticisms of Piaget's stages was not men-
tioned by Brainerd. This criticism, which applies to the cognitive structure
criterion, is that there is no evidence that different behaviors that are
manifestations of the same structure are in fact related to one another. More
specifically, the criticism is that different behaviors belonging to the same
stage are acquired at very different times. When empirical research
demonstrated the validity of this criticism, some writers continued to insist on
the importance of simultaneous acquisition as evidence for structured
wholes, though perhaps with more refined tests of the hypothesis (Pinard &
Laurendeau, op. cit. 1969; Wohlwill, 1973). Other writers (Flavell, op. cit.
1971) suggested that simultaneous acquisition of different stage-defining
behaviors was not crucial to the theory. However, if the hypothesis is
abandoned, other evidence must be found to support the claim that stages
are general descriptions of cognitive functioning at some period in develop-
ment. Otherwise, explanations of particular behaviors in terms of stages can
be justifiably criticized as circular. What could be used as evidence that
stages are general descriptions of cognition appears to be the important,
and unanswered, stage question.
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Description, explanation, and circularity. What makes an explanation cir-
cular? More particularly, what makes a stage explanation circular? Brainerd
suggests that a sufficient condition for circularity would be the absence of
procedures for measuring explanatory factors "independently of the be-
haviors that the theory is trying to explain," and regards this requirement as
"the litmus test for explanatory stages."
Although I share Brainerd's suspicions about Piaget's stage system
(particularly in the area of logic: Ennis, 1975op. cit.), I urgethatthis require-
ment is too strict.
Why must there be procedures for the independent measuring of explana-
tory factors? Might not the explanatory factors be hypothetical constructs that
help us make sense of observations? For example, the explanatory factors,
atom, molecule, and gene, were invented by physicists, chemists, and
biologists before there were independent ways of identifying and measuring
these factors. Yet they were explanatory, and the evidence for them
consisted of the descriptive facts that they explained. In the most tempting
interpretation of the independence requirement there were no independent
ways of measuring atoms, molecules, and genes, and thus their use as
explanatory factors violated Brainerd's requirement. Hence the requirement
appears too strict.
Does Brainerd mean his "independent measurement" requirement the way
I just took him to mean it? Must there be a procedure for the separate positive
identification and subsequent measurement of the explanatory factor? That
is, I believe the most likely interpretation of his words. Furthermore, satisfac-
tion of such a requirement would certainly guarantee that we are not dealing
with a tautology, a danger in causal explanation against which Hume long
ago warned us. An example of the satisfaction of his requirement is the
explanation, "The snow storm was caused by the deep low pressure area to
the south of us." In this explanation, the explanatory factor, the deep low
pressure area, is independently measurable by a series of barometers,
instruments that do not measure snowfall. Since employing the requirement
as interpreted does avoid tautologous theories, and since my given in-
terpretation does seem to be the most plausible reading of his words, that is
perhaps the interpretation to attach. If so, then Brainerd is being too demand-
ing of cognitive-developmental theory, since early twentieth-century atomic,
molecular, and genetic theory also failed to satisfy that criterion. [Cf. Hauge-
land et al., this issue.]
However, there is some reason to think that Brainerd intended the criterion
to be less strict. I shall consider this more lenient interpretation and argue
that the new criterion would still be too strict as a requirement for avoiding
circularity (though not too strict as a requirement for a sophisticated theory).
This weaker requirement is that there be at least two different kinds of evi-
dence for the theory. One kind of evidence would be what he calls the
"described behavior." The second kind of evidence need not be inde-
pendent measurement, as demanded by the strict requirement, but rather it
need only be some other kind of evidence that would be explained. Brainerd
suggests this weaker interpretation when, in discussing equilibration, he
says, "I believe there would be some reason to suppose that Piaget's stages
may do something other than describe behavior if these alternating periods
of change and stability could be verified." As I understand it, this is a more
lenient approach, since no mention is made of independent measurability;
rather, another kind of explained evidence (i.e., other than the satisfied be-
havior description) would seem to satisfy Brainerd at least partially. This
other kind of explained evidence would be alternating periods of change and
stability, if they actually occurred.
This more lenient requirement was satisfied by atomic, molecular, and
genetic theory; although the presence of atoms, molecules, and genes was
not independently measurable, there was a variety of evidence that these
posited factors explained. But it still seems too strict as a criterion of expla-
nation. Consider the following dialogue: A: "Why did the boss nearly bite my
head off?" B: "Because she's in a grumpy mood today."
This answer is an explanation at a low level of sophistication, and, in the
standard work contexts with which I am familiar, would not be circular. It
adds two things to the request for explanation: the suggestion that the boss's
behavior was not an isolated incident, and the fact that there is today some
tendency by the boss to be grumpy. It is this tendency that is the explanatory
factor. And the evidence for the presence of this explanatory factor might be
only a series of incidents in which the boss was harsh to someone (this would
be the "described behavior").
This example shows that there can be an explanatory factor, the evidence
for which consists only of particular behavioral results of the operation of that
factor. Such a factor can be generally described as the power or disposition
to produce the sort of behavioral result used as evidence for it. I am not sug-
gesting that one can generalize from a number of instances and have an
explanation, but, rather, I am suggesting that the positing of a force or dis-
position to do a sort of thing can be explanatory. That is, I am not suggesting
that "The boss is usually harsh" (a generalization of behavior) is explanatory;
rather, I am suggesting that "The boss is grumpy" is explanatory. It posits a
factor, grumpiness, that accounts for the unpleasant behavior. 'This must not
be thought to be an empty explanation. It rules out a blunder on the em-
ployee's part as an explanation of the boss's harshness. And it rules out the
harshness as a chance occurrence.
Another instructive example is an oft-challenged answer to the question,
"Why do birds fly south in the winter (in the Northern Hemisphere)?" It is often
alleged that the answer, "Because they have a south-flying migratory in-
stinct," is a circular explanation. But it is not circular at all levels of sophisti-
cation. It does give some information about the responsible factors. It says
that the practice is less a learned behavior than the result of an instinctive
drive. It also rules out the behavior's being a chance occurrence if that is not
already ruled out in the context, and rules out the birds' being influenced by
some intelligent being, perhaps luring them south with created visions of
food just ahead. The presence of the instinct is not implied by the question,
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so the answer represents some progress, albeit not as much as some would
want. In a context in which it was accepted that the practice was instinctual
and in which the intent of the question was to find out why they had this in-
stinct, or what was its neurological base, the reply would be circular. But the
circularity depends upon the assumed facts and the sought-after level of so-
phistication.
A third example is that drawn from psychoanalytic theory, about which
Brainerd says, independent measurement being lacking, '"he sucks his
thumb because he is in the oral stage' is simply a paraphrase of 'he sucks his
thumb.'" That explanation might be defective because it presupposes a
false theory, or because it presupposes an untestable one, but the lack of in-
dependent measurement of the oral stage (in the strict interpretation of "inde-
pendent measurement") should not suffice to disqualify it, as I have already
tried to show. Applying the requirement in the more lenient interpretation (at
least two different kinds of evidence), even if the psychoanalysts had no
other evidence than sucking behavior, the putative explanation need not
reduce to "he sucks his thumb." I would still have been given at least the
following information by the explanation: that the sucking behavior is not
random, that there is some (though currently unidentifiable) internal causal
factor or interaction of factors that is responsible for this identified sucking
behavior (rather than that each instance was induced by some being or crea-
ture outside the child), that examples of the behavior do generally stop ap-
pearing in children sometime, and that the causal factor is inherited (the
sucking behavior is not merely, if at all, the result of teaching). This is more
information than is conveyed by the phrase, "he sucks his thumb." Hence the
reduction is not correct.
Whether the information is informative depends on the context. But we can-
not automatically condemn the explanation as circular. It does convey in-
formation and does indicate an explanatory factor.
If these three putative explanations are, as I contend, explanations in some
context, then Piagetian explanations should not be judged circular on the
ground that they suggest causal factors that so far only account for the kind of
evidence that seems to instantiate the operation of the factor. Admittedly,
explanations of the form I have been discussing are unsophisticated. But
there are grounds for wondering whether our grasp of human development
has yet made otiose explanations as unsophisticated as these.
In sum, the requirement that the explanatory factor be strictly measurable
independently of the explained behavior, and even the more lenient require-
ment that there be some different kind of evidence for it, do not seem war-
ranted. Unsophisticated explanations, though truly explanatory, might vio-
late both the strict and lenient requirements. Piaget's stage explanations thus
should not be automatically discarded on the ground that they violate either
of these requirements.
I have not attempted to exhibit the explanatory features built into much of
the language we call descriptive. That topic, and the related topic, theory-
laden observation terms, would require more space than is here available. If
pursued, the result would be the urging of even more leniency in judgments
about what is to be ruled out as explanatory.
I have only attempted to defend Piaget against the strict or lenient employ-
ment of Brainerd's independence requirement. I have not tried to defend him
against the suggestion that his stage claims are inconsistent with the facts or
against the claim that they are untestable for other reasons.
by Herman T. Epstein
Biology Department, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. 02154
Some additional data relevant to considerations about the existence of
cognitive-developmental stages. It is possible to appreciate Brainerd's
analysis and even not to have found the flaws in it while at the same time be-
ing quite sure that it will turn out to be wrong in its strongest conclusion. The
reason is that there are studies not discussed by Brainerd that seem to me to
contradict his conclusion about the nonexistence of Piagetian stages. I want
to mention just a few of these studies. First, however, I must point out that, for
reasons that do not contradict the stage notion, behaviors can be found to
appear eariier or later than the standard age.
A behavior can be elicited at an age earlier than normal because it is the
maturation of a regulation system for behaviors that is generally responsible
for the appearance of the behavior; it is not at all a great trick to be clever
enough to elicit a behavior prematurely. That a behavior can appear later
than normal is implicit in the finding (Dasen, 1972) that even in developed
countries fewer than half the adults show formal operations, and that not all
even show concrete operations. (This kind of development is presumably the
consequence of an inadequate experiential development of newly created
neural networks.)
The kind of experiment that bears directly on the age-linkage of the stages
is that done by Webb (1974), who studied the appearance of formal opera-
tions in children of ages six to eleven who had IQs of 160; their mental ages
thus range from about ten to about eighteen. His question was whether formal
operations appeared according to mental age, chronological age, or some
more complex reckoning. His results were that no child showed formal
operations until fairly close to age eleven. This result bespeaks an age-
linkage that transcends the claims even of many Piagetians. Brown's (1973)
work shows a similar situation with respect to age of appearance of concrete
operations.
An additional pertinent aspect of Webb's work is that he measured the
maturation of the formal operations stage, finding that the very bright
children reached a highly mature level of that stage in a matter of a few
months, while children of normal IQ took a year or more to reach the same
maturational level. One infers that children of subnormal IQ may not reach a
maturational stage before the onset of the next stage, lest a mixup and
perhaps inhibition of both stages result.
These results can be used to "explain away" many of the contradictions
found for Piagetian stage development. In addition, they point up the need to
be extremely careful about concluding that a stage is being violated when all
that is being measured is one of the maturation substages of the main stage.
It is also pertinent to point out the results of the work of a group in England
(Isaac & O'Connor, 1975), who have found multimodal distributions of perfor-
mances on tests of intelligence and problem-solving. They show five modes,
the first four of which correspond (on the anecdotal level only, thus far) to the
four known major Piagetian stages. This seems to afford the possibility of
inferring that persons who fail to go on to a succeeding stage may just
expand their competence at the current stage in which they are stuck. It is of
related interest that the English group indicates the existence of a fifth
(highest) stage of problem confrontation that is seemingly parallel to the
recently published first indication of a fifth Piagetian stage (Arlin, 1975).
Although I have been dealing with Brainerd's analysis in terms of what he
calls descriptive theories, it is possible to adduce data on the level of his
explanatory theory. It was pointed out by Fodor (1975) that the very existence
of stages implies the inevitability of an externally-given expansion of a
system if it is to go from one stage to another. Thus, my own work (1974 I) has
shown the existence of brain growth stages in human beings, and my best
current information places them at three to ten months of age, and then from
two to four, from six to eight, from ten to twelve or thirteen, from fourteen to
sixteen or seventeen years of age. These are the normally occurring "spurts"
in brain size, and the last four occur without new cell formation, so that we are
perforce talking about increases in neural network complexity. I have also
been able to show correlated spurts in mental age and various other
measures of intelligent behavior (Epstein, 1974 II); the connection with the
traditional ages of onset of the Piagetian stages is quite obvious.
The references above are a sampling of sources of data and insight that
need to be taken into account in evaluating the likelihood of the existence of
intelligence growth stages.
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Structural explanation of developmental change. Two of the most im-
portant issues raised by Brainerd involve the nature of developmental expla-
nation and the sense in which developmental change can be conceptualized
in terms of stages. I will argue, first of all, that he has rejected Piaget's
developmental explanations for the wrong reasons and, second, that the data
on cognitive development require a concept-like stage or phase or level,
even though cognitive development is probably not discontinuous or abrupt.
Nature of developmental explanation. Brainerd seems to argue that the
only proper explanation of cognitive development comes from a causal
theory: What antecedent conditions produce development? He thus
underestimates the usefulness of another class of explanations-structural
theories. (Note also that theories of antecedent conditions are only one type
of causal theory. Structural theories, such as systems analyses, provide
another type of causal explanation. For example, Newton's equation
F = M • A provides a causal explanation for changes in force, even though it
does not specify whether changes in force, mass, or acceleration are an-
tecedent.) In cognitive-developmental psychology, a structural theory aims
to specify a set of behavioral structures for analyzing cognitive performance,
together with a set of transformation rules for specifying how one type of
structure develops or transforms into another (Fischer, 1972; Piaget,
1968/1970). The strongest test of such a structural theory is whether it can
predict both developmental sequences and synchronies in cognitive
development. If a theory can consistently predict novel sequences and
synchronies, then it most certainly does provide an explanation of cognitive
development. In the same sense, the periodic table of elements provides an
explanatory theory in chemistry; the Newtonian equations, such as F = M a A,
are an explanatory theory in physics, and the Mendelian rules for gene com-
bination are an explanatory theory in genetics.
As Brainerd's examples illustrate, Piaget has attempted to formulate a
structural theory to explain cognitive-developmental sequences and syn-
chronies. But the essential argument against Piaget's theory is not that it is
structural rather than causal. The essential argument is that Piaget's
structural analysis does not accurately predict sequences and synchronies.
As Brainerd ably indicates, Piaget's predictions of sequences are often
wrong (Kofsky, 1966; Fischer, 1977) and his predictions of synchronies are
usually wrong (Brainerd, 1978; Flavell, 1971; Jackson, Campos, & Fischer,
1978; Liben, 1975; Fischer, 1977). The problem with Piaget's theory is not
that it fails to explain. The problem is that some of its explanations are ap-
parently false.
The weak predictive ability of Piaget's theory is perhaps less evident than
it should be because the typical methodology used in Piagetian studies does
not directly test for sequence or synchrony. A sequence is typically tested by
looking for differences in mean age for passing tasks in the proposed se-
quence, tested with cross-sectional samples. This is not an adequate test. A
rigorous test of a sequence requires either scalogram analysis with a cross-
sectional sample or longitudinal analysis. Many attempts to subject Piaget's
sequences to these rigorous tests have failed to confirm the sequences
(Kofsky, 1966; Roberts & Corbitt in Fischer, 1977).
The test typically used for synchrony is the correlation coefficient, which is
also an inadequate test as normally used. Any two variables that change with
age will show a significant correlation for a sample that varies in age. For
example, Roberts, Corbitt, and I found a high correlation between a develop-
mental sequence of classification skills in 2- to 7-year-olds and shoe size,
r(58) =.88, p <.001 (Roberts & Corbitt in Fischer, 1977). But who would
want to argue that shoe size and classification share the same structures
and develop in close synchrony? Most of the correlations in the cognitive-
developmental literature that are used to support predictions of synchrony
are substantially lower than this correlation between classification and shoe
size. More rigorous analysis with a stricter criterion indicates that, contrary to
Piaget's predictions, developmental synchrony is a rare event (Flavell, 1971;
Fischer, 1977).
Predicting sequence or synchrony is no easy matter. Even many of the Pia-
getian sequences that Brainerd attributes to measurement artifact have not
been confirmed by rigorous tests. Many cognitive-developmental psycholo-
gists would be more than pleased if it were as easy to predict so-called
measurement sequences as Brainerd implies. He defines measurement se-
quences as developmental scales where every task is composed of the task
immediately preceding it plus something additional. The problem with this
definition is that it assumes that analysis of the skills involved in a task is a
simple matter. Yet investigators have no accepted method of task or skill
analysis, and so in most cases cannot agree a priori on an analysis. Con-
sequently they cannot readily predict developmental sequences, especially
microdevelopmental sequences.
In addition, many studies fail to support the "obvious" analyses of what in-
cludes what in a series of tasks (Kofsky, 1966; Liben, 1975). Indeed, in my
laboratory we have made a number of predictions based on a new system of
skill analysis (Fischer, 1977) that have gone against the seemingly ob-
vious analyses, and so far all such predictions have been confirmed. For
example, in a pretending task with preschool children, a story that involved
three independent agents (dolls) developed before a story that involved just
two independent agents (Watson, 1977). In the development of classification
skills, a task that included a simpler task plus something additional
developed virtually simultaneously with the simpler task, as predicted
(Roberts & Corbitt in Fischer, 1977). Several other studies have produced
similar nonobvious results (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Jackson et al., 1978;
Watson & Fischer, 1977).
Suppose, then, that cognitive-developmental psychologists eventually do
produce a structural theory that can predict and explain sequences and
synchronies. The question still remains: Under what circumstances would a
concept of stage be justifiably retained?
Concept of stage. As Brainerd indicates, the data on cognitive develop-
ment do not support the classic concept of stage as an abrupt, discontinuous
change in performance at a certain age. Nevertheless, the evidence does
seem to support the existence of three different phenomena that justify the
retention of some sort of stage concept.
First, development seems to produce qualitative changes in behavior - the
emergence of new kinds of skills. Piaget, despite his methodological prob-
lems, has documented a large number of instances of such qualitative
changes. Perhaps the most dramatic is his description of how representa-
tional ability develops out of sensorimotor action (1936/1952; see also
Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Watson & Fischer, 1977).
Second, children seem to show an upper limit on their performance at a
given age, an optimal developmental level. That is, for a given child, there
seems to be a point on any specific developmental scale beyond which the
child cannot perform, even with extensive training. This optimal level
probably has some generality across task domains, although a particular
child may have several different optimal levels in different skill areas
(Fischer, in press). The more uniformity there proves to be in optimal levels in
diverse areas, the more justified is a concept of stage.
Third, recent evidence indicates that, at least in infancy, development
seems to produce systematic shifts in populations of skills (Feldman &
Toulmin, 1975) that produce a kind of statistically defined stage (McCall,
Eichom, & Hogarty, 1977; McCall, in press). Across a wide sample of skills,
infants seem to show periods of transition and periods of consolidation that
look very much like a weak form of stage. The changes are not truly abrupt or
discontinuous, but they do seem to show major developmental shifts in a
large number of skills at certain points in development. The shifts do not sup-
port the stages suggested by Piaget (1936/1952) for infancy, but they do cor-
respond at least roughly to the stages or levels suggested by several other
investigators (Uzgiris, 1976; Fischer, 1977).
Given this evidence for stages and given the problems with Brainerd's
analysis of the nature of developmental explanation, I would conclude,
contrary to him, that the problem with Piaget's theory is not that it is structural
but rather that it is wrong in important ways. These difficulties with Piaget's
approach in no way lead to the conclusion that structural theories cannot
explain development or that all concepts of stage or phase or level should be
eliminated from cognitive-developmental psychology.
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Developmental stage: explanans or explanandum? It is hard to argue with
some of the points made in Brainerd's paper. There is in fact a growing feel-
ing in the field that Piaget's stage model of cognitive development is in
serious trouble. Brainerd is correct in saying that "Piaget has proposed
structures for which there are no extant tasks, let alone corresponding be-
haviors." Many Piagetian cognitive acquisitions do seem to appear either
earlier or later in ontogenesis than the stage model should have it, although
how "appearance" should be defined and measured is admittedly a very
difficult problem (Flavell, 1977). Because of these and other difficulties,
Piaget's stage model is proving increasingly less credible to develop-
mental ists and less useful to educators. There is reason to doubt whether
"stages" of the broad, Piagetian "period" variety (e.g., the concrete-opera-
tion period) will figure prominently in future theorizing about cognitive
development. However much we may wish it were otherwise, human cogni-
tive growth may simply be too contingent, multiform, and heterogeneous -
too variegated in developmental mechanisms, routes, and rates-to be ac-
curately characterizable by any stage theory of the Piagetian kind.
This does not mean that developmental psychologists will not continue to
talk about "stages" of a briefer and narrower kind. We may have to give up on
grand and sweeping developmental periods that try to find a single, uniform
"deep structure" description of all the thinking the child does at a given age.
However, we will surely need to keep looking for developmental steps or
levels within a single conceptual domain or subdomain. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe, contra Brainerd, that the steps we find here will be any
more arbitrary or less natural than those found by any other scientist who tries
to capture changes over time, for example, the geologist. One of our major
tasks will continue to be the Piagetian one of simply telling interesting
developmental stories, that is, of finding out what major, "natural-unit-
looking" acquisitions precede and follow what others in appropriately narrow
areas of cognitive functioning. It does not much matter, to me at least,
whether such endeavors be called "descriptive" or "explanatory." (What
exactly does it mean to "explain" cognitive growth?) However characterized,
they are both necessary and very hard to do.
I believe Brainerd fails to distinguish clearly between two explanatory
tasks concerning stages. One task is to determine what explains stages and
the other is to determine what stages explain. The difference can be
illustrated by the different ways that the term "process" (or "underlying
process") gets used in the field of cognitive development. When we speak of
the "process of development," we (vaguely) have in mind trains of events
that help bring something developmentally novel into being. If that some-
thing novel is conceptualized as a stage, then we might want to say that this
process of development helps explain the advent of that stage. To use one of
Brainerd's examples, those antecedent neurological variables comprise the
process of development that explain the advent of the Amblystoma flexure
stage. On the other hand, when we speak of the "process" that underlies a
conservation response, we are invoking a present process to explain the oc-
currence of a present overt behavior pattern. If this process is concep-
tualized as characteristic of a stage (e.g., it consists of concrete-operational
compensatory thinking), then we are talking about what a stage explains
rather than what explains a stage. If the Piagetians are right and their critics
are wrong, Piagetian stages really do explain cognitive performance, that is,
they describe very general and generalizable processes that generate
("explain," in that sense) characteristic observable behaviors. But that does
not mean that the developmental emergence of those "explanatory stages"
itself need have a known explanation. In short, Brainerd seems to be claim-
ing that for a stage to be explanatory the antecedent variables that explain its
provenance should be identifiable and independently measurable. Piaget's
stages already seem nonexplanatory enough without adding this patently un-
necessary requirement.
Finally, most of the points made about measurement sequences are very
similar to those already made in Flavell (1972 op. cit.). It still seems to be,
however, that we should treat what appear to be measurement sequences
very cautiously and conservatively: "Philosophers who have recently dis-
cussed the problem . . . emphasize that the path from logical to develop-
mental priority can be an extremely slippery one, and that psychologists may
follow it only at their peril" (Flavell, 1972, op. cit., p.*331). What looks like a
measurement sequence to one developmental psychologist may not to
another. For instance, I am far from convinced that the conservation of
quantity —> conservation of weight is a measurement sequence (or even if it is
a completely invariant sequence). It is surely not a measurement sequence
for the reason Brainerd gives: ability to conserve weight consists of ability to
conserve quantity plus knowledge of how to operate a pan balance. I think it
would be easy to demonstrate a regular quantity conservation -^weight con-
servation sequence in a sample of children, all of whom were perfectly
competent operators of scale business. I suspect, in fact, that this sequence
could have turned out to be quantity -H> weight in some milieu, and if.it had,
that someone would have found a way to "prove" that it could not logically
have been otherwise. We would do well to verify the sequentiality of at least
certain putative measurement sequences empirically, and even after we
have done that we should continue to ask questions about them. What,
exactly, are the cognitive processes that actually mediate earlier X and later
Y? Why exactly, does Y develop only after X has developed? How well
developed does X have to be before Y can begin its development, and why?
And so on. The discovery of a robust ontogenetic sequence, whether
measurement-like or other, should be the beginning rather than the end of
intensive developmental inquiry. This is true regardless of our belief or dis-
belief in the psychological reality of Piagetian stages.
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Cortical maturation: an antecedent of Piaget's behavioral stages. The
most probable biological antecedent of the behavioral stages described by
Piaget would be the maturational level of the brain, particularly of the neo-
cortex. Extant data on cortical maturation are considerable and they have im-
portant implications for Piaget's theory. In both monkeys and human beings
(Flechsig, 1927; Conel, 1939-63; Gibson 1970, 1977), nearly all areas of the
cerebral cortex contain rudimentary myelin by late infancy, that is, by three
months of age in the rhesus monkey and by six months of age in the human
infant. Cortical myelinization continues throughout childhood and does not
reach a mature stage until puberty or later. Similar maturation patterns have
been described for other cortical histological parameters (Conel, 1939-63).
Maturation patterns are gradual; no postinfantile period of sudden his-
tological change has been identified. Since neurons can function prior to
axonal myelinization (Ulettetal., 1944), these data suggest that each cortical
area possesses incipient function in infancy; no cortical area suddenly
begins functioning in later childhood, but the cortex, nevertheless, continues
to mature functionally throughout childhood.
To the extent that cognitive abilities are determined by cortical function,
cognitive maturation should be characterized by gradual increases of
abilities already in existence in rudimentary form in infancy and not by dra-
matic additions of entirely new modes of cognition. In other words, cortical
maturation data are consistent with Brainerd's view of behavioral develop-
ment as a smooth, gradual process and with Piaget's behavioral descrip-
tions, which posit that each stage develops from and integrates behaviors of
preceding stages through a series of numerous intermediary steps. Neuro-
anatomical data are inconsistent both with the concept that Piaget's stages
can be discretely divided from each other on the basis of cortically de-
termined cognitive capacities wholly unique to each state and with
Brainerd's hypothesis that behaviors that develop in sudden fits and starts
are more likely to have a maturational base than behaviors displaying a
gradual developmental pattern.
The hypothesis that cognitive maturation should be characterized by
gradually increasing capacities based on cortical functions existing from in-
fancy demands the identification of such functions. Preliminary efforts indi-
cate that a number of cortical functions are identifiable and are compatible
with Piaget's behavioral descriptions of the sensorimotor period; these are
rudimentarily present in late infancy and capable of developing increased
efficiency and quantitative capacity with age (Gibson, 1977). Of particular
importance to Brainerd's discussion are the parameters of mobility or flexi-
bility (the ability to inhibit one response, perception, or idea in order to move
on to another), internalization (the ability to evoke images or ideas of per-
ceptual events in the absence of the relevant environmental stimuli), and si-
multaneous and sequential synthesis (the ability to synthesize individual
perceptions, ideas, or actions into new simultaneous or sequential synthetic
wholes). Each of Piaget's stages is characterized by increasing capacities in
each of these dimensions. In passing from overt sensorimotor operations, to
concrete operations, to formal operations, the child is utilizing ever greater
degrees of internalized thought. From the ability to merely find his way home
to the ability to synthesize each step of the process into one coherent map, or
from understanding the behaviors of the snail and of the cardboard indi-
vidually to the ability to comprehend their interrelationships, the^ maturing
child is demonstrating the ability to synthesize ever increasing quantities of
information (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, Piaget, 1972). Indeed, it can be argued
that Piaget's stage of formal operations, characterized as it is by the em-
phasis on ideas and hypotheses and by the capacities of combination and
double reversibility, is basically the maturational culmination of the ca-
pacities of mobility, internalization, and synthesis. Neuroanatomical data are
consistent with the concept that these particular parameters are matura-
tionally based and should be among the latest neurologically based abilities
to reach maturity as they are mediated primarily by the parietal, temporal,
and frontal association areas, which are the latest neuroanatomical areas to
mature (Luria, 1966; Gibson, 1970, 1977).
Piaget's theory is based on the concept that each stage results from and
integrates previous behaviors; as such, it appears, according to Brainerd, to
be a theory of measurement sequences, that is, of behaviors in which "each
item in the sequence consists of the immediately preceding item plus some
new things." Contrary to Brainerd's suggestion, this does not imply that these
behaviors have no maturational basis. Brainerd overlooks certain points. If it
is possible to acquire a behavior in one sequence only, this implies that the
method of behavioral acquisition is determined by brain function.
Frequently, this will be the case even if the behavior is culturally transmitted.
If a culture is to survive as a culture, it cannot transmit information arbitrarily,
but must do so at appropriate maturational stages and in a manner compati-
ble with neural processing mechanisms. Moreover, even though behavior X
may consist of behavior Y plus some new things, this does not mean that
once Y is acquired X automatically follows. The "new things" required by X
may demand still immature abilities. Although knowledge of the alphabet is
a prerequisite to writing, the possession of such knowledge does not assure
comparable maturity of the motor skills essential to writing. Similarly, be-
cause a child can understand the behaviors of both the snail and the card-
board individually does not assure that he possesses the requisite synthetic
capacities essential to understanding the interrelationships between the two.
Many of the measurement sequences described by Brainerd demand
synthetic capacities. As these capacities are mediated by areas of the cere-
bral cortex, which mature slowly over time, it is probable that the ability to ac-
quire many measurement sequences is itself under maturational control. Be-
haviors acquired as measurement sequences should be used as prima facie
evidence neither for nor against maturational control. To demonstrate that a
given measurement sequence cannot be under maturational control, it is
essential to demonstrate that once behavior Y is acquired, behavior X may
follow immediately thereafter with no intervening developmental time lag.
In summary, neurological data suggest that Brainerd is correct in his sug-
gestion that Piaget's behaviors develop smoothly through a series of
measurement sequences, but incorrect in his suggestion that this implies no
maturational control.
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On stage: the importance of being a nonconserver. In response to
Brainerd's paper on the concept of stages in Piagetian theory,1 it seems
inappropriate to reiterate traditional Genevan counterarguments, since the
problem has been amply debated in the past (Tanner & Inhelder, 1956, 1960;
Pinard & Laurendeau op. cit., 1969, etc.). Thus, I shall not embark upon yet
another discussion of the paper's numerous misconceptions of Piagetian
theory. Nor will I go beyond noting in passing the narrow views expressed on
scientific methodology and explanation (Strauss, 1974) and the fact that
Brainerd's version of Piaget's theory is in need of substantial updating. As
Beilin (1977) has stressed, the theory has undergone constant refinement by
Piaget himself (e.g., Piaget et al., 1968a, 1968b; Piaget•& Garcia, 1971;
Piaget 1972, op. cit., 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977; Inhelder et al., 1975). The im-
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portance of Brainerd's paper resides, in my view, in the challenge he offers
as a justification for resuscitating the stage problem, even if he proposes no
alternatives to Piaget.
It is useful to begin by clarifying the role of "stages" in Piaget's theory,
since they are clearly not the core of his constructivist-interactionist episte-
mology, as is so often assumed. The central thread of Piaget's work has
never ceased to be the search for equilibration mechanisms that engender
new behavioral patterns (Inhelder et al., 1977). The concept of stage-like
development was at no time divorced from that main endeavor. Stages were
initially used by Piaget as a heuristic for seeking far from obvious develop-
mental links across widely differing conceptual domains. From the outset,
Piaget's stage distinctions were not based on success or failure per se, but
always pinpointed intermediate, oscillatory levels that Brainerd himself
recognizes as a stage-defining criterion. In all events, a distinction must be
drawn between, on the one hand, the idea that there exist certain funda-
mental qualitative changes that might be described as "stages," and, on the
other hand, the particular mathematical formalization chosen to represent
them. Piaget's formalization (an adaptation of the Bourbaki system) merely
reflects the state of the art in the 1950s. Since then, Piaget and his
colleagues have considered other formalizations (e.g., Piaget, 1977; Piaget
etal., 1968a; Cellerier, 1972;Wermus, 1976). With the shift of emphasis from
logical operations to physical causality and, more recently, to the procedural
aspects of goal-oriented behavior (e.g., Inhelder et al., 1976; Gillieron,
1977), the heuristic value of the stage concept has for some time been
secondary in Genevan theory and research.
It seems inappropriate at this juncture to debate the merits and demerits of
any particular formalization. The central issue appears to be whether or not
slicing development into stages remains heuristically valid on today's
psychological scene. Due to space limitations, I shall not discuss micro-
developmental changes, but shall concentrate only on the macrodevelop-
mental level. Leaving aside arguments based on misunderstandings, there
are two main objections to stages in Brainerd's paper: (1) the problem of
horizontal decalages and (2) the fact that a stage-defining characteristic of
stage n + 1 is already present at stage n. The decalage problem has
justifiably been one of the major criticisms levelled at Piaget's stage concept
for many years. However, Bovet et al. (1975) have recently clearly
demonstrated that conservation of volume, previously situated at roughly
twelve years, exists in one form already at eight years, that is, at the same
time as weight conservation. Moreover, as Piaget and Garcia (1971) had al-
ready shown when one differentiates weight as a quantity and weight as an
action, new difficulties arise regarding another form of weight conservation,
which brings the latter to a level similar to that of the later form of volume con-
servation. Such studies of how complex interactions develop among mass,
energy, density, and so forth, will, when completed (Bovet et al., in prepara-
tion), probably represent an empirical and theoretical challenge to the hori-
zontal decalage issue.
With regard to Brainerd's other objection, that is, the presence of n + 1
defining-behavior at stage n, two counterarguments can be made. First,
deep qualitative differences often underlie superficially analogous behavior.
Thus a seven-year-old can indeed be taught to multiply "weight x distance"
in a balance scale task, and thereby seemingly to perform like the twelve-
year-old. Decenter the fulcrum and allow weights to be hung only at
endpoints, and again both age groups manage to apply the multiplication
procedure to make the arm balance. However, once balance is achieved
with the noncentered fulcrum, the experimenter asks the child to add two
more weights. Unlike the twelve-year-old, the seven-year-old will then add
two identical weights at each end, as if he thought that he was starting from a
state of static equilibrium now (Piaget & Karmiloff-Smith, in press, a.). Thus,
underlying the identical external behavior in the original tasks were totally
different implicit notions as to why one uses the "weight x distance"
procedure. Physical concepts such as "weight" and "length" are filtered by
the seven-year-old through representations of instantiated parameters of ob-
jects simultaneously having other properties; only much later can they ac-
quire different status and become, where necessary, abstract concepts that
have no concrete materialization.
This type of reasoning does not hold only for physical reality; many authors
have claimed that seven-year-olds can cope with propositional logic, for
example, with structures such as "if X then Y" (Joffe-Falmagne, 1977). A
close analysis will show that in such cases the seven-year-old is working on
a concretizable statement represented roughly by "each time X, then most
likely Y," leading to a correct but only "plausible" conclusion. The twelve-
year-old, on the other hand, is working on the noninstantiated proposition
("if") regarding a hypothetical world, leading to a "valid" conclusion
(Johnson-Laird, 1977).
While I believe that Brainerd has misinterpreted the structural operations
inherent in the INRC group, particularly with his one-to-one mapping onto
task parameters in a concrete operational domain, let us accept that there
are indeed stage-defining structures belonging to n+1 that are already
present at the time of stage n. This may hold true at both structural and proce-
dural levels. It has been shown recently, for instance, that seven-year-olds
tend to use several different procedures in a juxtaposed fashion, but among
those procedures there is also the less context-dependent, single procedure
used by much older children (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1976a for examples in
child language acquisition, and Piaget & Karmiloff-Smith, in press, b, for
examples from children's map-reading). Does it necessarily follow that stage
distinctions break down? I would tend to argue to the contrary, based on the
following interpretation: when behavioral pattern X appears at stage n, it may
be elicited by data-driven behavior and thus X is each time recomputed
afresh by the child. The stage-defining feature of stage n + 1 may therefore lie
in the fact that the same behavioral pattern X now has the status of a
hypothesis-driven primitive (a chunk) for the child. Such an interpretation
could offer an account for the apparent paradox of simultaneously invoking
discontinuity and continuity of cognitive growth - a core aspect of the origi-
nality of Piaget's epistemological stand.
Much of the foregoing speaks in favor of slicing development into qualita-
tively different stages or "cognitive Weltanschauungen," irrespective of the
particular formalization one attaches to it. However, I would argue that the
stage concept can only remain a valid heuristic today if the stages described
represent more than an analytical tool for the observer and are shown to be
psychologically functional for the child. In other words, a shift of emphasis is
suggested from conservation-attainment to the psychological function of
conservation-seeking (Karmiloff-Smith, 1976b), from the logical necessity of
final levels to the psychological necessity of the stages leading to them. The
typical "errors" of the nonconserver should be analyzed in terms of whether
they represent powerful heuristics in development or merely shortcomings to
be surmounted later. There are many telling examples in the early literature
that speak to this point. In the infralogical sphere, the construction by small
children of parallel and perpendicular lines (e.g., water level drawn parallel
to the base of a tilted bottle, trees drawn perpendicular to mountain slope,
etc., Piaget et al., 1948) may be considered essential components of the
child's general geometry, even if in particular cases the child must learn to
use interfigural rather than intrafigural referents. Likewise, children under
three years old can be shown seemingly to conserve number because they
make no eye movements towards the endpoints of the spatial display. When
at roughly age four children attend to spatial layouts and then therefore fail
number conservation tasks, surely the attention to spatial parameters can
nonetheless be looked upon as a powerful heuristic they have constructed
for coping with most daily situations of equivalence judgments? The
psychological function of nonconservation behavior (i.e., attending to spatial
layout, to one parameter at a time, the juxtaposition of procedures, etc.) can
be interpreted as stemming from the child's constant endeavor to gain pre-
dictive control over his environments. If the child did not remain for a time at
a given "stage" but was continuously trying to take new information into ac-
count, he would not have the opportunity to consolidate his procedures in the
first place. Similarly, the forging of overly strong theories by children
(Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975), or even the use by the researcher of
stage-defining characteristics, are still further instances of the psychological
need to filter input through a stable referent, even if that referent is partially
wrong. Thus, "being at a stage" allows for both simplification and unification
of otherwise heterogeneous data.
It seems premature to take a firm stand now as to whether development
should be sliced into three or more macrodevelopmental levels, irrespective
of their formalization. Recent functional analyses of child language
(Karmiloff-Smith, in press) suggest that essential developmental changes
take place at around age five and again at eight. Perhaps "procedural explo-
sions" might also be considered as stage-defining candidates. I have in
mind the child's sudden and quite overwhelming tendency to "name the
world," "to count the world," "to classify the world," and so forth. The shift of
emphasis would thus be from the structures inherent in, say, classification
behavior to the function that such classification behavior has for the child in
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gaining a grip on his complex world.
Like Brainerd, I shall conclude on a pedagogical note. If child "errors"
have turned out to be powerful iheuristics for development, then well-
meaning learning theorists who Irain: small (Children to ignore perceptual
cues, to sidestep misconceptions by reciting verbal rules, and so forth, are
doing these children a great disservice. They seem to lose sight of the fact
that there is a profound psychological importance in being a nonconserver.
NOTE
1. This commentary should not be regarded as necessarily representa-
tive of the "Genevan" position, but merely expresses the views of the
author.
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On falsifying descriptions. Brainerd's essay is lively, challenging,
enlightening, and, in view of the current popularity of Piaget's theory, coura-
geous. Many of the criticisms of Piaget's theory are cogent, particularly the
one that raises the question of whether the putative invariance of his stages
represents an empirical or a logical sequence (Gagne", 1968). But when
Brainerd writes that, whereas Piaget's stages are perfectly acceptable as
descriptions of behavior, they have no status as explanatory constructs, he is
making a distinction between description and explanation that is more ap-
parent than real. Such oversimplification should not slip past notice because
it is embedded in the context of an attack on Piaget. In a related vein, when
he brands as circular the statement that a child does not do such and such
because he is at some given stage of cognitive development, he seems to be
attacking the stage concept in general rather than Piaget's usage of it. It is to
the validity of these statements that this commentary is directed because
they seem .to imply that establishing developmental regularities, without be-
ing able to describe the conditions that produce them, is pointless. With this
implication, I take issue.
It is useful, first, to define the subject matter of the developmental
psychologist as age-related behavioral change, or what Wohlwill (1973)
refers to as developmental function. If the change is quantitative, the
developmental function states a relationship between some quantitative
aspect of behavior and time since birth; a proper analogy would be the law of
falling bodies, which states the relationship between time since the body
began to fall and its speed. If the change is qualitative, the developmental
function describes a particular sequence of behaviors as a function of age:
an appropriate analogy would be embryological stages or stages in the evo-
lution of a particular species. True, developmental function is not causal, but
it is explanatory insofar as it subsumes individual events into a general cate-
gory and predicts their behavior over time. Such a descriptive function can
be of a low level, in the sense that it refers to a very limited set of behaviors,
measured under a limited set of conditions, but to be useful at all it must at
least be generalizableto a range of individuals. Therefore, to say that a given
child is doing something at time T because he is in, say, stage two of a three
stage sequence is not meaningless. The statement not only places the child
in his proper category but also it indicates that he was in stage one at time
T_., and will be in stage three at time T+1. It is explanatory in the same sense
that it is explanatory to say that a given baby's heart has started to beat be-
cause he is in the beginning of the foetal stage. Note that such a statement is
not circular, even when you define the stage by the occurrence of the given
behavior because the prediction of the future event that is implicit in the
statement is not logically necessary; it is, in fact, empirically falsifiable.
Actually, even low-order descriptions entail abstractions whose validity
may be measured by whether they reveal regularities. High-order descriptive
functions, such as Piaget uses to describe his postulated stages of develop-
ment, are intended to subsume a number of ostensibly different behaviors in
a wide variety of conditions and are presumably applicable to all normal
human beings. If these descriptions were "acceptable" then, their use as
explanatory statements would surely not be tautological. To say that a child
is in stage two on the basis of one type of behavior in one set of conditions
would specify his behavior in a wide range of other conditions and predict
what the future holds for him. If Piaget's theory fails on this count, it seems to
me that it is not because such a theory has, in principle, no explanatory
power, but rather because there is insufficient coordination between the
theoretical constructs Piaget employs and the behavior they are designed to
explain.
Of course, like Brainerd, we could all wish for the increased explanatory
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power incurred by knowing antecedent conditions. However, we had best be
realistic about this matter, expecially when it comes to human cognitive
development. First, there is little point in seeking antecedents until it is clear
that there are important developmental regularities of some generality; regu-
larities that are age- and not task-determined. Secondly, if such develop-
mental functions can be found, they would presumably reflect changes that
occur in the real world over a very long time period. Such changes would
doubtless be due to some complex interaction between both maturational
and long-term environmental factors, factors that are not celebrated for their
amenability to specification, measurement, or experimental manipulation.
Specifying these antecedents, I fear, will take more time than the talented but
impatient Brainerd wants to allow.
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Maturational succession vs. cumulative learning. Brainerd characterizes
Piagetian stages as a description rather than an explanation of behaviors
that undergo age change, and as essentially constituting measurement se-
quences. This does not do full justice to the implications of Piaget's stage
model for the acquisition of cognitive skill. We will discuss these implica-
tions in principle, rather than in terms of empirical findings.
Brainerd stipulates three criteria that a model has to meet in order to have
explanatory status, and then demonstrates satisfactorily that Piagetian
stages fail to meet these criteria. We are not compelled to accept his criteria.
In fact, they do specify one kind of explanation, but erroneously exclude
another.
A model can be explanatory by either shifting the level of explanation, or
by organizing the phenomena in question at their own level. Coghill's model,
used as illustration by Brainerd, is of the first type. Amblystoma embryos
behave in certain ways at certain ages "because" the Amblystoma nervous
system is in different maturational states at those different ages. This level-
shifting exercise appeals to psychologists because it shifts the burden of
explanation into the arenas of "hard" science-neurophysiology, develop-
mental neuroanatomy, molecular biology, and so forth. But there is no
inherent reason why those models that are explanatory at the same level as
the phenomena they organize and have simplifying and predictive value
should be less valued.
Piaget's stage model claims organizing value. Its generalizations explain
why particular behaviors become available at a given stage- it is because
they are instances of the application of the same cognitive principle. Know-
ing the principle, we can predict which further behaviors should and should
not be available to the child at the stage in question. Whether one can
predict is an empirical question. That one could is a point in principle, and
illustrates the fact that the Piagetian stage model is potentially explanatory.
To think of Piagetian stages as measurement sequences ignores the ob-
vious fact that they conform to a maturational succession of events rather
than to a cumulative learning experience by a fully mature organism. Anyone
who enriches his behavioral repertoire will necessarily begin with the basic
concepts and then continue into increasingly complex refinements of the ap-
plication of these concepts. However, if it is just a matter of acquiring the
necessary information, and if the environment has this to offer, then the rate at
which the material can be learned is the only limiting factor on the rate of ac-
quisition of the additional behavioral skills.
It is quite different with Piagetian stages. The child, at some early stage of
cognitive development, operates at a particular level. No amount of didactic
input will enable him to function at a substantially more complex cognitive
level. Substantial time must elapse before he is ready to use more complex
forms of reasoning. The amount of time that this takes is determined not by
what the environment has to offer, but by the internally programmed matura-
tional characteristics of the organism. Indeed, one may hold the environment
constant and find a great range of individual differences in the time it takes to
move from stage to stage.
With respect to the maturation of any physical or behavioral characteris-
tics, there are three periods: the one preceding the onset of the development,
the one during which the facility develops, and the final one during which its
development has reached asymptote and remains static. It is obvious
enought that this is true of the development of physical characteristics of the
organism. It is also obviously true of such cognitive developments as that of
language. Piaget has shown that the same principles apply to the acquisition
of logical operations.
Brainerd claims that from research on measurement sequences we learn
primarily about measurement procedures. Apply this view to the acquisition
of height by the growing child. The fact that one has to be four feet tall before
one can be five feet tall is obvious from the point of view of measurement se-
quence. But surely we learn more by measuring height than simply informa-
tion about how to measure height.
The same logic applies to Brainerd's claim that horizontal decalage "be-
comes another restatement of the sequencing principle." Within a stage,
development is not arrested. Rather, the mental operation that has become
available finds even more sophisticated application as maturation proceeds.
For instance, some applications of the conservation principle are well known
to become possible before others. Indeed, the same applies to a single type
of conservation. Thus, conservation of number does not suddenly become
available for all sets and all stimulus types. We have found children able to
conserve sets of three stimuli before they could conserve sets of five, and
able to conserve five before seven. Again, for a given set size, children con-
serve earlier if the stimuli are relevant (candy) than if they are neutral (to-
kens). But such phenomena cannot be explained as measurement se-
quences. Otherwise it would be simple to teach the child one form of con-
servation, given understanding of another, conservation of a greater set size,
given ability to conserve a lesser set size, and so forth. But it is not. Time has
to pass and, by implication, brain maturation has to progress before the child
becomes able to solve the more difficult problems.
Piaget has shown that during cognitive growth, children gradually become
capable of more complex mental operations. His descriptions of the types of
operations of which children are capable at various "stages" in their cogni-
tive development have sufficient generality to generate testable predictions
about children's performance on various tasks. This illustrates the explana-
tory value of the Piagetian stage concept.
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Rages over stages. If Brainerd's goal is indeed to have us view his essay
"like something of a Rorschach stimulus," then he has been successful. His
argument embodies the key properties of a Rorschach: vagueness, ambi-
guity, and unresolved themes. Like the good Rorschach that it is, the essay
contains little objective structure of any depth, and it is likely to evoke
responses that tell more about the respondents than about the stimulus.
On the essay. Before I react to the projective demands of Brainerd's essay,
I will give brief examples of three of its curious features: self-contradiction,
misrepresentation, and naivete.
Self-contradiction. At the outset, Brainerd establishes as his goal the
stimulation of "other writers to formulate new proposals about how to identify
discrete changes in cognitive development." But since he believes that the
description of behavior is not a problem for Piaget's stage theory, it is
difficult to see how better identification procedures would solve the problem
he has addressed. Furthermore, the goal is predicated on one of the very
assumptions that Brainerd finds dubious: that discrete changes in cognitive
development occur at all.
Misrepresentation. Piaget is correctly quoted as having said ". . . This
might lead us to assume that some biological factor such as maturation is at
work" (1970 op cit., p. 712). However, in the next sentence, not quoted by
Brainerd, Piaget goes on to say, "But it is certainly not comparable to the
hereditary neurophysiological programming of instincts." And in the same
paragraph: "It would therefore be a mistake to consider the succession of
these stages as the result of an innate predetermination, because there is a
continual construction of novelty during the whole sequence" (p. 712).
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Brainerd's selective quotation provides the basis for his subsequent argu-
ment and implies a maturational "acknowledgement" that Piaget explicitly
denies.
Naivete. In his provocative paper on process-structure distinctions in
developmental psychology, Newell (1972) indicates the arbitrary nature of
our characterizations of stability, change, abruptness, and continuity. What
we see depends upon the grain of our measurement instruments, both in the
level of aggregation - or scope - of our unit of analysis (consider, for
example, the continuum of tasks from conservation of number, to elementary
quantification, to simple reaction times) and the time scale of our observa-
tions (years-days-hours-milliseconds). Explanations are tested by
choosing two different scopes or time frames (or both), and then measuring
the effects of variations in the less aggregate variables on the behavior of the
more aggregate.
Brainerd's essay is insensitive to these distinctions. Either all implied
measurements are at the same global level and hence "a behavioral descrip-
tion is not an explanation," or else we are asked to create a theory capable of
making the immense leap from neurological events to performance on a
logical task.
Even in the "easier" realm of adult cognition, there are no theories that suc-
cessfully span multiple levels. The cognitive sciences are based on the
strategic bet that several intermediate levels of explanation are necessary to
achieve these goals (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Klahr & Siegler, 1977; Simon,
1975). It is naive to imply, as Brainerd does, that we could go from neurology
to formal operations if we would just stop being enamoured of Piaget's
theory.
On the issue: theory in developmental psychology. One productive way to
view the enterprise of theory construction is to characterize it as a search
through a large problem space (Newell & Simon, 1972). Different theorists
make different decisions about how to traverse the many paths available to
them in constructing their theories and in deciding how to gather more in-
formation to help them get to the next state (i.e., the next theoretical state-
ment). As in the search of any complex problem space, there are some states
from which further progress appears to be impossible. Others appear to have
the potential for success, but only at extremely high cost, that is, some
subproblems are harder to solve than the higher order problem that
generated them in the first place. One proceeds through such problem
spaces using a variety of scientific problem-solving strategies, heuristics,
and rules of thumb. The resultant searches exhibit looping and backup, as
well as progress toward the goal.
Given this view, one can evaluate advances in a field in terms of the cu-
mulation of knowledge about the nature of the problem space. Perhaps the
field of developmental psychology has been reluctant to scrap the stage no-
tion because of an apparent contradiction: On the one hand, stage theory is
the most central and the most vulnerable part of Piagetian theory; on the
other hand, Piaget's overall research program has made an immense
contribution (Flavell, 1977, calls it "stupendous") to our current state of
knowledge about cognitive development. But there should be no conflict
here, for as we know from the problem solving literature (Newell & Simon,
1972), unsuccessful solution paths often provide useful information about
how to search effectively for the successful path.
Brainerd's essay appears to be a hasty consolidation of the many
criticisms of Piaget's stage theory that have been voiced over the past five or
ten years. From them, he has fabricated a large stop sign and placed it at the
stages-as-explanation node. He argues that this particular path leads to
either an obvious dead end or a state from which further progress will be very
costly. Perhaps he is right. Unfortunately, he offers no suggestions about the
directions in which we might fruitfully pursue our search for a viable theory of
cognitive development.
Flavell elegantly raised many of these objections several years ago in his
two influential papers (1971, 1972, oper. cit.), and Wallace and I (1976)
started the description of our research program by acknowledging the
difficulties inherent in the stage theory viewpoint. We then proceeded from
an entirely different point of departure in our attempt to formulate a develop-
mental theory, that is, from an information processing orientation. Our at-
tempt to deal with the stage problem is really quite different from the stages-
as-descriptions characterization that Brainerd offers for the information
processing approach. Since Brainerd has set the tone for repetition of old
themes, let me clarify this position by offering my own refrain (1976, pp. 13-
14):
"During the course of cognitive development, the human information-
processing system undergoes a sequence of state changes. Changes occur
in the 'hardware'-in the physical rates and capacities-and in the
'software' - in the content and organization of processes and data structures.
Since we have limited access to these states, we infer them from behavior.
Some of the changes over time in children's performances are so striking, so
qualitatively different from Period 1 to Period 2, and so coherent across tasks
presented during Period 1 or during Period 2 that we usually say the child is
in a stage while within a period, and that he undergoes a transition between
the two periods.
However, . . . the appealing notion of coherent stages does not withstand
careful scrutiny. Performance is generated by interrelated sets of
components, each of whose developmental course may be distributed over
widely differing time periods. Task variations evoke unknown combinations
of such component processes, producing anomalous results for those seek-
ing chronological invariance. One can interpret the observed improvements
in performance from one period to the next as the result of either a revolu-
tionary reorganization of the system or as the completion of an incremental
process of relatively localized state changes. In either case, the task of
developmental psychology is to clarify the nature of both the system that
generates the behavior during each period and the transition process that
moves the system from one state to the next."
Recently there have been both empirical and theoretical refinements in the
analysis of tasks and our understanding of the systems that accomplish
them. It is becoming possible to assess independently the elementary in-
formation processes that generate more global performance (Resnick, 1976;
Siegler, 1976 op. cit., in press op. cit.; Stemberg, 1977). At the same time,
proposals have been formulated that attempt to account for the self-modifica-
tion of the human information processing system (Anderson, 1976; Rychener
& Newell, in press; Klahr & Wallace, 1976). All of these proposals are at a
very rudimentary stage of development. What is most interesting about them,
in our current context, is that none of them attempts to reproduce, account
for, or decry stage theory. Thus they provide apositive alternative to the path
currently obstructed by Brainerd's stop sign. I am convinced that all these
theories will be found to be incorrect in fundamental ways. However, if they
can add as much to our total knowledge about cognitive development as
Piaget's stage theory has, they will have been worth the effort.
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Measurability, description, and explanation: the explanatory adequacy of
stage model. Let me begin by noting that I agree with both the spirit and
substance of Brainerd's critique. Like the author, I feel that the question of the
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explanatory adequacy of stage theories is one that has not received the at-
tention it deserves. I do not, however, entirely agree with Brainerd's view of
why stage theories lack explanatory power and would like briefly to: a)
extend his argument along lines that seem to me to provide the basis for a
more radical and, at the same time, more constructive critique of existing
stage theories, and b) discuss the current status of Piaget's theory in the light
of this formulation. My discussion will be in two parts and organized as
follows: First, I will argue that Brainerd's addition of a measurability criterion
to his definition of an explanatory model is somewhat gratuitous and,
perhaps more importantly, unnecessarily restrictive. Second, I will suggest
that his sharp dichotomy between descriptive and explanatory stage models
tends to be misleading, and that description and explanation might be more
constructively viewed as two distinct but related aspects of the general
phenomena of theory building.
Measurability. On the issue of what constitutes an explanatory stage
model, I would like to raise two points: First, I would like to note that the
author's second criterion (i.e., that a theory posit antecedent variables, which
I take to mean some sort of plausible explanatory variables or causal
mechanism that are at least in principle capable of operational definition)
seems to be a reasonable enough theoretical requirement, and in itself
provides the basis for a potentially powerful critique of most current stage
theories. Second, I would like to argue that the author's third requirement
(i.e., that measurement procedures be specified) is the weaker of the two
possible criticisms. Measurability, I would like to suggest, is a methodo-
logical rather than a theoretical problem, and the requirement that a theory
posit well-defined measurement procedures confuses the logical status of
theoretical terms (e.g., intelligence, reaction time, mass, velocity) and the
experimental procedures whereby the terms are operationalized (e.g., I.Q.
scores, milliseconds, grams, feet-per-second). While it is true that the
specification of procedures for operationalizing theoretical concepts serves
to make the process of theory confirmation (or refutation) simpler, there
seems to be no historical or conceptual justification for making it a manda-
tory theoretical requirement. For example, one would not wish to deny
modern physics the explanatory power of that mysterious entity, the electron;
nor modern biology the explanatory power of that, until recently, equally
inscrutable entity, the gene- if only out of recognition of the fact that the
eventual development and refinement of precise techniques for opera-
tionalizing theoretical concepts depends, more often than not, on
technological or methodological advances (e.g., the development of a
higher energy accelerator or a reliable I.Q. test) rather than on theoretical ad-
vances. Indeed, such activity makes up a large part of what Kuhn (1962)
would call the process of "normal" science. Thus, the requirement that a
theory posit well-defined measurement procedures for an explanatory varia-
ble is unduly restrictive in the sense that such a requirement would tend to
stifle creative theoretical speculation, and the criticism that a stage model
lacks explanatory power because it fails to specify measurable antecedent
variables seems to me to be a weak one.
A more powerful criticism of the current proliferation of stage models, I
would like to suggest, is that they lack explanatory power because they fail to
posit any plausible explanatory variables at all. Piaget's theory, which by
most standards would be considered among the most elaborate and widely
researched of the stage models, provides a case in point. The five criteria by
which Piaget proposes to ascertain the existence of his stages turn out to be,
on close examination, just that - criteria for determining the existence of the
stages and not variables or mechanisms by which the stage-related be-
haviors can be explained. Consider, for purposes of illustration, the two most
important criteria-invariant sequence and cognitive structure. If one ac-
cepts the essential veracity of the data generated by Piagetian research,
then the sequential emergence of structurally unitary stages are phenomena
to be explained, not explanatory variables. The notion of an invariant se-
quence or a cognitive structure, at least in the way Piaget seems to use the
terms, is more like what a philosopher of science might call an explanandum
than an explanans (see Hempel, 1965 and Flavell, this Commentary). In other
words, the existence of an invariant developmental sequence and cognitive
structures cannot be explained by Piaget's stages; they are characteristics of
the stages that have to be explained. Of the five criteria proposed by Piaget,
only the notion of successive-stages of equilibrium appears to provide a
potentially plausible mechanism by which to account for the sequential
emergence of identifiable cognitive structures. And, as Brainerd points out,
the research literature on the existence of successive and identifiable stages
of equilibrium is, at best, equivocal. The criticism that Piaget's theory lacks
explanatory power because it fails to specify well-defined measurement
procedures is thus a weak one, and a potentially more powerful criticism
would be that it fails to specify any plausible explanatory variables (with the
possible exception of equilibrium) at all. More important, such a criticism is
clearly even more applicable to most of the stage models that currently
populate the developmental literature.
It would be an error on the side of excess, however, to deny completely the
theoretical utility of a stage model (particularly Piaget's) simply because it
fails to specify either plausible or measurable mechanisms to account for
developmental changes. Such a criticism, it seems to me, distorts the role of
description and explanation in theory construction, and I would like briefly to
consider this issue next.
Description and explanation. Brainerd's emphasis on the distinction
between descriptive and explanatory stage models tends, I feel, to obscure
the interaction between both in the process of theory building. Scientific
theories, I would like to suggest, are not as static as the author's distinction
implies, and description and explanation are both integral and interrelated
aspects of the scientific enterprise. This view is not without support, and I
feel that it provides a more constructive perspective on the process of theory
building in the sense of suggesting that theories are descriptive and
explanatory rather than descriptive or explanatory. For example, in discuss-
ing the structure of scientific explanation, von Wright (1971) argues that
scientific activity has two broad aspects: one is the ascertaining and dis-
covery of facts, the other the construction of hypotheses and theories.
Scientific activity is, in von Wright's terms, both "descriptive", and
"theoretical." Such a dualistic view of the scientific enterprise emphasizes
the interrelationship between description and explanation in theory construc-
tion. Scientific theories, according to this view, can no more be descriptive
without being explanatory than they can be explanatory without being
descriptive.
Harre and Secord (1973; see also Harre's commentary on Haugeland, this
issue) make the dual role of description and explanation in theory construc-
tion even more explicit. Scientific knowledge, they argue, is the product of
what they term "critical description." Critical description consists of two dis-
tinct but related activities: exploration and experimentation. The role of ex-
ploration is one of extending what is known from common knowledge, and
the role of experimentation is that of critically checking the authenticity of
what is thought to be known. Harre and Secord further point out that while
critical description often takes place with certain assumptions about the na-
ture of the causal mechanism that generates the observed phenomena to be
accounted for, critical description is possible and is sometimes undertaken
with no clear idea as to a causal mechanism. The process of theory construc-
tion thus involves an interaction between description and explanation, with
the role of description being at least as important as that of explanation. In
keeping with the above, I would like to argue that the principal theoretical
value of Piaget's stage model is that he has moved in the direction of specu-
lating on possible explanatory variables and, in the process, the model has
generated a large body of descriptive data. Such data provide a strong em-
pirical foundation for further theoretical speculation concerning the
mechanisms or variables responsible for developmental changes.
In summary, while I agree with the main lines of Brainerd's argument, I do
feel that a more balanced critique of the stage question can be obtained by
recognition of: a) the dual role of description and explanation in theory
construction, and b) the distinction between the requirement that a theory
postulate plausible explanatory variables at least in principle capable of em-
pirical definition and the requirement that a theory specify procedures for
operationalizing explanatory variables. In view of the above, I would like to
suggest that Piaget's theory, while currently lacking in measurable explana-
tory variables, at least has the virtue of suggesting plausible explanatory
variables and has generated a substantial body of descriptive data. Unfortu-
nately, such is not the case for most of the stage models that occupy the
literature. There is at present little recognition of the need to postulate plausi-
ble explanatory variables, let alone measurable ones. As it now stands, most
stage models have felt the need to do little more than claim discovery of a set
of developmental stages.
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"Stages" in developmental psychology. These remarks are taken, with
minimal editing, from an unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation
in a round-table discussion at the meetings of the Eastern Psychological
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, April 6, 1967. The other discussion par-
ticipants were John Flavell, Bernard Kaplan, Lawrence Kohlberg, Joachim
Wohlwill, and Peter Wolff. It will be apparent that my views coincide well with
those of Brainerd on the hidden traps in constructs arising within the context
of a cognitive-structural-stage theory. Hence my commentary has the effect,
and intent, of endorsing the Brainerd critique. Perhaps my own statement
embellishes Brainerd's points in the right way in a couple of places.
It seems to me that concepts of stages in developmental psychology have
served an important purpose in facilitating speculation and theorizing. The
postulation of stages, however, has also tended to becloud important be-
havioral processes and issues that otherwise would have been investigated
earlier had not such "stage" concepts been introduced into our language.
There is no denying that certain kinds of developmental theories have
found the postulation of stages, usually but not always related to age, profit-
able as organizers of data and for abbreviatory purposes. It is admittedly
very useful for communication purposes, if not for the eventual understand-
ing of the underlying behavior processes, to think in terms of the preverbal
versus the verbal child, the nonwalker versus the walking child, the preop-
erational and the concrete operations child. It is also apparent, however,
that while such dichotomizations and categorizations are useful for descrip-
tive and communication ease, they tend to obfuscate the real nature of
development, particularly the importance of transitional periods, which are
seldom sudden. Transitions are themselves, after all, important foci of study,
especially for those of us who are interested in learning processes. While it is
an interesting fact that babies generally creep before they crawl, and crawl
before they walk, the mere documentation of the characteristic sequencing of
such behaviors with increasing age does not tell us much, if anything, about
the processes involved in the achievement of walking behavior. We cannot
explain walking behavior by asserting that the child is in "the walking stage."
Although the age-and-stage orientation to understanding child develop-
ment tends to emphasize constitutional-maturational determinants, and to
belittle learning antecedents, I do not believe that the depreciating of learn-
ing processes has been the only consequence of the adoption of stage con-
cepts in development. Certain important transitional biological processes
are also often slighted by the age-and-stage orientation to human develop-
ment. Hormonal changes that occur in the course of human development and
that give rise to descriptions of human behavior in terms such as
"presexual," "adolescent," "adult," or "mature," do not typically take place in
a step-wise fashion and we may be overlooking important transitional
phenomena, both behavioral and physiological, by adhering to a language
that ascribes jump-wise changes in such functioning. While there is descrip-
tive and abbreviatory value to stage concepts in human development, they
place limitations of conceptualization and verbal restrictions upon us.
Like it or not, stage concepts tend to force our thinking into a certain rather
rigid mold with respect to the influence of cumulative experience on the
development of human behavior. Stage concepts soften inhibit optimism
about the potentialities of humans, especially the educational potential of
children. In the area of infant learning, for example, numerous references of
forty or so years ago suggested that the cortical immaturity of the newborn
human was such as to prevent learning. The cerebral innervation of the child
under three months of age was said to preclude learning. The reasoning was
usually circular and based upon nonmorphological observations, for
example, a feeble attempt at conditioning was made, no learning occurred,
and it was concluded that poorly developed physiological structures pre-
cluded a positive finding.
Another case in point is that of what the educators call "reading-
readiness." Forborne time it has been quite blatantly assumed that reading-
readiness, which'after all is merely a statement as to whether it is possible to
teach a given child a certain behavior at a certain time, is either present or
absent in a child. Now, it is unquestionably true that most children below a
certain age (e.g., one year) probably cannot be taught to read and that most
children beyond a certain age (e.g., eight years) probably can be taught to
read, but it does not follow that children pass a certain momentary point in
the life span beyond which reading is suddenly easy, whereas earlier it was
very difficult or impossible. It should be obvious to us by now that children
can be taught to read earlier than we have previously thought possible. (This
is not to say, by the way, that it is good to teach them to read at those younger
age levels, for that is another empirical question.) We now know a great deal
more about the techniques necessary to facilitate reading in young children
than we did even a decade ago. The important point is that readiness to do
anything af any given time depends not only upon age but also upon the
particular methods, procedures, or techniques that we employ in facilitating
the transition.
As we gain more information about the specific processes involved in go-
ing from one "stage" to another, our understanding of such processes tends,
or should tend, to eliminate the concepts of stages from our thinking. Stages
do have an heuristic value in the history of our understanding of human
development, but when stage explanations are superceded by process
explanations, we ourselves have finally come of age. The more we learn
about development, seemingly the more stages do we require the smaller do
the steps become. We will have arrived when our statements of functional
relationship with respect to developmental processes have become smooth.
In my opinion, stages represent gaps in our information as scientists, not
gaps in the behavior of our subjects.
A more serious objection to concepts of stages is in our tendency to reify
these stages. The empirical hazard is that we come to regard those stages as
real conditions of the organism rather than as artifacts of our observational
procedures and methodologies. It has been my impression, perhaps erro-
neous, that subscription by psychologists to conceptualizations of develop-
ment in terms of stages is usually followed closely by the adoption of a
structural view of the mind. The postulation of structures is usually based
upon behavioral observations, to be sure, but the language quickly becomes
metaphorical. The special words, initially devised merely to abbreviate com-
plex behavioral patterns, now become taskmasters and slaves.
The argument here is against psychological typologies, particularly when
the use of typological vocabularies tends to stifle further search for underly-
ing processes and transitional attributes. Contrary to some views, the learn-
ing-process psychologist has not entirely escaped the lure of the typological
lingo. We have our anxious and nonanxious children, we have our condi-
tioned subjects and those who failed to condition, and we have a peculiar
sort of stage-concept in our use of the term "criterion." Here, no less than in
the stage-type psychologies, steps and stages are artifacts: You can have
learning by fiat simply by requiring that your subjects display 50 percent
conditioned responses on test trials rather than 80 percent, or simply by
adopting a criterion of five successive correct responses in a discrimination
learning task; or you can have twice as many anxious subjects by utilizing
the upper twentieth-percentile scores rather than the upper tenth on an
anxiety scale. The point is that the arbitrary adoption of such criteria for the
designation of subject attributes or behavioral characteristics builds into the
organism's behavior a step or stage that is not really there, but is there only
in our thinking about his behavior. The organism has not really become a
learner at the point where we have, by verbal agreement, decreed him to be a
learner. Nor have his mental structures been at all affected by our verbal
agreements! Some psychological theorists seem more aware of and self-
conscious about the fictional and heuristic character of their hypothetical
constructs than others.
by Ellen M. Markman
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 94305
Problems of logic and evidence. One of the central points of Brainerd's dis-
cussion is that if one is to use the stage concept as an explanation of
children's behavior, then it is mandatory that evidence for the existence of
the stage be independent of the behavior it is to explain. Piaget (1960 op.
cit.) proposed several indirect criteria for establishing the existence of the
stages. According to Brainerd, three of these proposed criteria are subject to
the same criticism: the invariant sequence of behavior needed to fulfill the
criteria could result from "measurement sequences." One point I will make
below is that invariant sequences can be mistakenly identified as measure-
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ment sequences. Measurement sequences might not be as pervasive in Pia-
getian theory as Brainerd suggests. However, if these indirect criteria cannot
be used to establish the explanatory value of stages, one could reexamine
the possibility of discovering direct evidence. The hypothesis that children
fail conservation tasks because they are in the preoperational stage is used
to illustrate the types of problems that one might encounter in searching for
more direct evidence.
Measurement sequences: logic or theory? Brainerd uses "measurement
sequences" to refer to the case where solution of one task logically presup-
poses solution of another task. He argues that it is inappropriate for the order
of acquisition of such tasks to count as evidence for stage theory. This much
is beyond dispute. However, care must be taken in deciding whether or not
two tasks form a measurement sequence. We devise theories (implicit or ex-
plicit) to explain obvious, well-known facts. It may be the familiarity of the
facts together with the assumptions of our theories, rather than logic, that we
use to argue that one task presupposes another. From this perspective, em-
pirical facts can be misjudged to be logical truths. To illustrate that this risk
is more than hypothetical, I will briefly discuss two of Brainerd's purported
examples of measurement sequences.
Brainerd suggests that the order of acquisition of conservation of
substance and conservation of weight comprise a measurement sequence.
Contrary to Brainerd's claim, it is logically possible to conserve weight
before substance. Imagine that children are first able to conserve quantities
for which there exists some objective measure of the quantity independent of
beliefs about conservation. These early conservations could provide a basis
from which the conservation of related quantities would be derived. On this
theory, conservation of liquid and mass, would be acquired relatively late,
since measures of these quantities (e.g., use of a measuring cup) typically
presuppose conservation. The theory explains why number is conserved
very early. At first, children may believe that the number of objects in a row
varies with its length. However, counting provides an independent assess-
ment of numerical quantity that enables children to correct their initial
beliefs. Weight should also be conserved early since the balance scale
provides the needed independent measure. Erroneous beliefs about weight
can be checked against the scale. Conservation of substance could then be
derived from conservation of weight. Since conservation of substance
precedes conservation of weight, I am forced to admit that this theory is
wrong. Brainerd's formulation may be closer to the truth, but I believe it is
closerto empirical than to logical truth.
To take another example, Brainerd claims that two-way classification logi-
cally presupposes one-way classification. In order to take account of two di-
mensions simultaneously, it must be possible to take account of each of them
separately. Is this a logical truth? Suppose we could find two dimensions,
each of which enhances perception of the other. Together, these mutually
facilitory dimensions create a sequence more salient to the child than is
either alone. Given such a perceptual situation, would it not be possible that'
filling a cell in a double classification matrix would be simpler than
(developmentally prior to) filling a cell in a single classification matrix? If so,
then this is not a measurement sequence.
These criticisms of Brainerd's examples are not meant to argue against his
claim that if something is a measurement sequence then it cannot be taken
as evidence for stage theory. They are meant to suggest that we should
exercise caution in dismissing Piagetian evidence as being vacuous or tau-
tological. It may only be our implicit assumptions and theories about how
tasks are solved, rather than logic, that generate the presuppositions.
Operational stage as an explanation for conservation: the problem of ob-
taining direct evidence. Why is it difficult to obtain direct evidence for the
explanatory role of stages? I believe that there are aspects of Piagetian
theory that seriously constrain the possibility of direct empirical test. To
illustrate the problems, I will consider the theory that children fail conserva-
tion because they are in the preoperational stage. This theory appears to
generate the empirically testable hypothesis that in the absence of each of
the relevant operations, conservation should not be possible. For example,
Piaget (1952, p. 12) claimed that a child who cannot compensate, who can-
not "reckon simultaneously with the height and cross section of the liquids he
has to compare" cannot conserve. I will discuss below why such hypotheses
are difficult to test. However, let me first mention that if conservation involved
concrete operations by definition rather than by hypothesis the theory would
be vacuous. Unfortunately, Piaget sometimes writes as though this were the
case. For example (1967, p. 533): "Pseudoconservation is easy to spot . . .
when a child says that there will be the same quantity to drink, one should
ask him to pour the same amount of liquid into two different empty glasses,
one low and wide, and one tall and narrow; in the case of pseudoconserva-
tion the child will pour liquid into both glasses up to the same level. . . which
shows clearly that his (correct) answer was not based on conservation of
quantity."
What was originally an empirically testable hypothesis that compensation
is necessary for conservation has been transformed into a circular argument.
"Real" conservation consists of old (now "pseudo") conservation plus com-
pensation (i.e., the pouring task). Of course, any child who can pass a "real"
conservation task can pass a compensation task, but this has become true
by definition. It has lost its empirical import and no longer qualifies as evi-
dence. Here, all of Brainerd's warnings about measurement sequences are
right to the point.
Perhaps we should treat this response of Piaget's as a lapse and assume
the relationship between concrete operations, for example, compensation,
and conservation, to be empirically testable. To test these hypotheses,
measures of operations are needed. Unfortunately, any measure of an indi-
vidual operation can be criticized: "a single operation is not an operation at
all but only a simple intuitive representation" (Piaget, 1966, p. 34). In order to
devise paradigms that are immune from this criticism, the minimum require-
ment would seem to be that two operations are necessary to solve the tasks.
Assuming this can eventually be accomplished, the next step would be to
discover the relationship between these measures of operations and con-
servation.
Suppose that a newly developed test of operations reveals that conserva-
tion can be acquired before (without) operations. Ordinarily this would be
construed as evidence against the theory. However, it is here that the prob-
lem of horizontal decalages intrudes. Conservation of various quantities, for
example, mass, liquid, weight all require the identical operations for their so-
lution yet they are by no means acquired simultaneously. Piaget does not
take these decalages as evidence against the theory but rather as charac-
teristic of the stage. It is called "concrete" in part because of such variations
in performance. So, in the hypothetical case of conservation without opera-
tions, what is to prevent an investigator from invoking "horizontal decalages"
to explain discrepancies in performance? When is it legitimate to invoke
horizontal decalage as opposed to acknowledging falsifying evidence? At
present, there are no clear criteria for differentiating negative evidence from
decalages. Without such criteria, the prospect of discovering direct tests of
the theory are no greater than those of using the indirect methods that
Brainerd critiques.
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Improper questions cannot be properly answered. Brainerd questions the
value of a concept of stages of development as used, for example, by Piaget,
on the grounds that it does not explain behavior and may even prove to be
empty tautology. His analysis, in my view, reflects a misunderstanding of the
intent of the concept and of the approach to theory construction from which it
derives. Part of his difficulty with the stage concept stems from an unduly
restrictive interpretation of what constitutes explanation (which, in turn,
stems from a different approach to theory construction), and part stems from
his interpretation of the nature of invariant sequences. Although these two
issues are not altogether independent, they will be separated for purposes of
discussion.
The nature of explanation. What Brainerd requires of an adequate explana-
tion is a spelling out of antecedent variables, preferably in the form of a func-
tional relation, to be expressed mathematically wherever possible. His cri-
terion derives from a view of the process of theory construction developed for
the physical sciences (e.g., Bridgman, 1927) and widely espoused by
American psychologists. Its appropriateness for psychology may be ques-
tioned on general grounds as well as on the basis of failures of existing
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exemplars (e.g., Hull, 1952; Hull et al., 1940). Physicists can provide quanti-
tative functions relating a dependent variable to independent variables and
fixed parameters in virtue of the nature of physical phenomena: these
phenomena are clearly identified in terms of measurement conditions and ef-
fective causes. Behavioral phenomena-at least at the current state of
knowledge - are not that orderly. Behavior is characterized by meaning, pur-
pose, and organization. A major problem confronting psychological theorists
attempting to capture the rich variation of manifestations of behavior
possessing these properties has been to establish an adequate unit of
analysis. Psychological theorists who start from a narrowly, but operationally,
defined unit of analysis, such as a motor response or a specific verbal ut-
terance, have then been faced with the problem of accounting for intent or
meaning, a problem typically solved through the device of tacked-on prin-
ciples, processes, or mechanisms having the status of intervening variables.
Perhaps the major contribution of genetic epistemology (and of other
theories employing a functionally defined unit of analysis, e.g., programs,
schemas, TOTEs, etc.) is to start from the defining properties of purpose,
meaning, and organization in constructing the basic unit of analysis. This ap-
proach reflects a biological, rather than a physical, model of theory construc-
tion. It proceeds inductively from extensive field observations of the
organism in its natural activities. The generalizations derived from these
observations are not usually couched in theory-neutral data language.
Rather, they reflect not only a descriptive summary of modal behavior in its
context of occurrence but also an informed best guess as to the appropriate
unit of analysis for the behavior as well as to the nature of its organization and
determinants. This is the approach taken by Piaget, it is an approach that
Brainerd, working from a different orientation, fails to appreciate ("Piaget
theory presents . . . an interesting example of stages that fall somewhere
between pure description and true explanation").
Invariant sequences and structure. Brainerd objects to the use of an in-
variant sequence of stages as a focus of investigation on grounds that it
"smuggles stages into existence before any data are gathered." As I have
tried to show above, his objection derives from his orientation to the enter-
prise of constructing behavioral theory. The assertion that development can
best be characterized in terms of a succession of stages, differing qualita-
tively in the structure of their organization, is in itself a major theoretical
evaluation of the defining properties of observational data (i.e., the basis for
selection of a unit of analysis). How well the resulting theory succeeds in ac-
counting for the organization of units so identified is an independent ques-
tion, which Brainerd shoud be raising. There is no inherent circularity in
definition once one goes beyond classification of similar specific behavioral
instances (e.g., kicking, letting go, the schema of the shakes, and other
manifestations of the third substage of the sensorimotor stage) to specify a
classificatory principle (secondary circular reaction) and to differentiate it
from later classificatory principles (intent to conserve consequences rather
than to provoke them) in terms of manifestations and/or enstating conditions
(stereotypy of behavior in contrast with variation of intensity or of component
movements characteristic of tertiary circular reactions).
Brainerd, if I read him correctly, accepts only two "explanations" of in-
variant sequences: maturational determination, or measurement artifact.
This, again, is a distorting oversimplification. The fact that biological matura-
tion is clearly a contributing factor in behavioral maturation does not mean
that (a) it is the only factor, or (b) that its effects are not also subject to
moderation by environmental influences (as demonstrated, e.g., by White's
(1967) work on the development of grasping). With respect to what Brainerd
calls "measurement sequences," while there is an inherent structure in many
complex skills such that attainment of higher levels presupposes prior
mastery of lower-level component skills, that fact does not ipso facto render
trivial the problem of accounting for attainment of the complex skill (as wit-
ness the epidemic of recent research on reading). Nor does the fact that
development of some behaviors can be described adequately in terms of a
quantitative accumulation of a graded series of components necessarily
imply that all higher behaviors may be so described. There is abundant evi-
dence of qualitative change in the organization of behavior contingent upon
the attainment of a higher level of operation even for such relatively
mechanical skills as telegraphy (Bryan & Harter, 1899) or typing (Book,
1908), or for a variety of forms of learning such as Pavlovian conditioning (the
shift from first to second signal system, see Razran, 1971), discrimination
learning (Osier & Kofsky, 1966, Gholson, Levine, & Phillips, 1972), reversal
shift (Kendler & Kendler, 1962), or learning set (Levinson & Reese, 1967) to
mention but a few of many possible examples.
While one may question the need for, or the utility of, characterizing each
successive stage in precisely the terms Piaget and his associates have
chosen to use, it is hard to deny that they have made a compelling case for
the existence of levels of cognitive behavior differing qualitatively in their
principles of organization. Certainly I know of no other theory of cognitive
development that can encompass so richly varied an array of evidence with a
single set of explanatory principles.
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Structural and developmental explanations: stages in theoretical
development. What role do or should stages play in developmental theory?
Is the stage construct more misleading than useful? In his article, Brainerd
argues that, as set forth by Piaget, it is. Inasmuch as Piaget has put more
substance into the stage construct than any other developmental
psychologist, the argument, if valid, would appear to rule out any
psychological use of the notion. It is important, therefore, to consider the
soundness of Brainerd's case. Space limitations do not permit a point-by-
point analysis; I will concentrate, instead, on what seems to me to be a
central misunderstanding of the issue.
Brainerd's argument founders at the outset on his confusion of an explana-
tion of behaviors specific to a given stage and an explanation of stage
change. Consider his claim that to be explanatory "they [stages] must posit
antecedent variables believed to be responsible for such changes that weld
the stages into distinctive entities." This statement contains a number of
unwarranted assumptions: (1) that stages must somehow contain their own
antecedent conditions; (2) that these antecedent variables are responsible
for stage change; (3) that it is the changes that weld stages into distinctive
entities. Yet in his ensuing discussion, Brainerd switches from an emphasis
on stage change to stage-related behaviors as the phenomena to be
explained. (And in the end he concentrates almost completely on whether or
not stages exist in a Piagetian sense.)
For example, he finds Freud's oral stage theory lacking only because there
are no methods whereby oral behaviors and psychodynamic processes
might be independently measured. The implication is that if we could inde-
pendently determine whether a child was in the oral stage, and thereby
predict thumbsucking and other oral behaviors, then that particular stage
construct would be acceptably explanatory. So far, so good. A similar stan-
dard might be expected to apply to Piaget's stages. That is, if Piaget's model
of cognitive structure can be independently assessed for a given stage and
then used to predict other stage-determined behaviors, this should meet the
standard of explanation implied. Space does not permit discussion of the
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success with which the Genevans have carried out this program; they have
generally concentrated more on description than on testing the model. Lack
of testing, however, does not make the theory any less potentially explana-
tory than any other empirically testable model (e.g., the Basic Stage posited
by Bijou and Baer, which Brainerd seems to find so powerful, despite its
manifest lack of any empirical test). This standard of explanation seems emi-
nently defensible. Clearly, a stage in the sense of a pattern of behaviors
might exist, and an explanatory model might show how and why those be-
haviors cohere and how they differ from earlier or later stages, without show-
ing how they came to differ from those of earlier stages.
However, Brainerd quickly abandons this position and reverts to the de-
mand for explanation in terms of changes in stage, that is, for a develop-
mental explanation. Brainerd's consideration of what constitutes an explana-
tion thus confuses levels of analysis. Piaget does offer an explanation of
stage-related behaviors in terms of underlying cognitive structures; he does
not, however, offer a satisfactory, that is, testable, developmental explana-
tion. Piaget is in the position of the cognitive psychologist who offers an
explanation of human adult information processing in terms of constructs
such as levels of processing or structures of semantic memory without
considering how those structures developed. This level of explanation of be-
havior obviously cuts deeper than pure description but falls short of explain-
ing development. Theories of cognitive development are necessarily more
complex than theories of adult cognition because they must account for
shifts in structural descriptions, in addition to positing a series of such
descriptions (Kessen, 1962 op. cit.). The ideal form of developmental theory-
building utilizing stage constructs might proceed from a description of age-
related behaviors to a stage proposal, to a series of structural principles
proposed to underlie the stages, to the testing of these principles, to a
proposed mechanism of change determining movement from one set of prin-
ciples to the next, and finally to the testing of this mechanism. Indeed, with
the exception of the last step, this describes Piaget's research program fairly
well. His proposed mechanism of developmental change (the accommoda-
tion-assimilation model) has never been sufficiently well-specified to be sub-
jected to empirical testing, except in the most trivial sense.
It is possible, although not so convenient, to describe and theorize about
development without invoking stages. It may indeed be easier to get to the
developmental crux of the matter-explaining change-without them. This
is, however, a question of theoretical preference and success rather than an
a priori criterion of adequacy.
There are to date few testable proposals about developmental change.
Brainerd would like to limit the consideration of acceptable possibilities to
maturation and environmental influence. It is here that he seems most clearly
to misunderstand Piaget's proposals. Heuristically, Piaget's most significant
contribution lies in his proposed model of organism-environment interaction,
a biologically based model fitting his conception of intelligence as a bio-
logical function. Within this conception of developmental change as a func-
tion of the organism-environment system, it is not possible to consider
organism and environment as separable components at any given time.
Rather, organismic complexity is derived from adaptation to environmental
encounters, which in turn leads to qualitatively different encounters with the
objectively unchanged environment. (Contemporary systems theory would
also take into account the effect of the organism on the environment.) That is
to say, change can never be considered as a function of one or the other but
only of the two as an interacting system. Indeed, far from being a secret
maturationist, as Brainerd appears to believe, Piaget systematically neglects
the role of biological maturation in considering development, either within or
between stages, a neglect that is especially notable for the sensorimotor pe-
riod. In fact, if one were to posit an additional contribution of biological matu-
ration to the organization produced by assimilation and accommodation, the
Piagetian account would no doubt be significantly more successful.
Clearly, the stage construct continues to be overused and abused by
developmentalists; clearly Piaget's theory remains untested and no doubt
wrong in many ways; clearly, his account of developmental change is unspe-
cific and inadequate. Nonetheless, the stage notion as invoked by Piaget
cannot be declared illegitimate on the grounds of explanatory inadequacy,
as Brainerd has attempted to do here. It is, rather, one legitimate way of ap-
proaching developmental explanation. Its usefulness is apparent in its hav-
ing revealed more about developmental change and its complexities than
any previous approach. It has indeed revealed much too much to permit our
ever returning to the simple form of the antecedent-consequent paradigm
that Brainerd wishes to reimpose upon us, however wrong the specifics of the
Piagetian theory itself may turn out to be.
by David R. Olson
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A structuralist view of explanation: a critique of Brainerd. In his critique,
Brainerd argues that Piaget has constructed a descriptive theory but failed to
construct an explanatory theory of intellectual development. Specifically, he
focuses upon a few of the considerations that may be relevant to transitions
between stages and tackles the problem of translating Piaget's structuralist
descriptions into a set of independent variables manipulable by a be-
havioristically oriented psychologist. Not surprisingly, the enterprise fails,
and, not surprisingly, Brainerd attributes that failure to Piaget. I, too, regard it
as a failure, but I attribute it to Brainerd, not because he makes a poor
translation but because he naively believes the translation is possible, even
urgent, in cognitive psychology. I shall argue that Brainerd espouses a view
of scientific explanation that the most productive branches of the human
sciences-linguistics, criticism, anthropology and cognitive psychology-
have abandoned. Hence, Brainerd is, I suggest, calling for a retreat rather
than an advance. My brief and somewhat scattered comments are addressed
to the differences between the models of explanation adopted by Piaget (and
other structuralists) and that adopted by Brainerd (and other neobe-
haviorists).
Brainerd adopts, without criticism, both the classical distinction between a
description and an explanation and the view advanced by Hempel (1965;
see also Haugeland, this issue) that all explanations, whether for the natural
or the human sciences, consist of causal relations between antecedent and
consequent events - between independent and dependent variables. (One
could adopt a more liberal view- an explanation is a description of an event
in terms of the structure of the mechanism or system that produces it. To
illustrate, an explanation of a phoneme is given not by specifying a series of
independent variables with a causal link to the phoneme but by characteriz-
ing that phoneme in terms of the structure of the phonological system that
generates it.)
Having adopted a narrow conception of explanation, namely as stating
causal relations between independently specified independent and de-
pendent variables, Brainerd goes on to review Piaget's account of transitions
between developmental stages and concludes that Piaget's is not an
explanatory theory. That is, Piaget does not offer a set of antecedent or inde-
pendent variables that, if manipulated, would yield the consequent, de-
pendent variable, namely, the new stage.
In fact, there is little anywhere in the Piagetian descriptions of stages
specifying the independent variables or their causal relations to dependent
variables. The notion of a schema, for example, specifies both conditions for
activation and forms of behavior that, among other things, alter the stimulus.
With Waddington (1957), Piaget views "the relations between the organism
and its environment as a cybernetic loop such that the organism selects its
environment while being conditioned by it" (Piaget, 1970b, p. 50). Hence it is
not just stage transitions but the descriptions of stages altogether that would
fall under Brainerd's judicial gavel.
That form of criticism is not new to Piagetian theory. American
psychologists raised on an empiricist-positivist view of science-scientific
explanations consist of empirically demonstrated causal relations between
independent and dependent variables-and a behavioristic view of man-
behavior should be described in terms of associated stimulus and response
events - have simply regarded Piaget as nonscientific. The first step in this
program was to ignore Piaget, as was done for thirty years, while the second
step was to reformulate Piaget in terms appropriate to a Behavioristic
epistemology, a step begun by Berlyne (1965) and by Gagne (1962) in his
descriptions of the acquisition of knowledge. In both of these earlier cases,
and in the present case, an attempt was made to recast the types of descrip-
tions that Piaget had given for the associative antecedent-consequent
descriptions favored by the Behaviorists. Piaget deserved better. Piaget was
among the first to begin the task of describing (explaining) intelligent be-
havior in terms of an organized functional system or structure and the first to
succeed in specifying some aspects of the nature of that structure.
The structuralist program is well advanced on several fronts in the human
sciences. Frye (1957) set out to construct "a coherent and comprehensive
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theory of literature, logically and scientifically organized, some of which the
student unconsciously learns as he goes on, but the main principles of which
are as yet unknown to us" (p. 11). Again, "we have to adopt the hypothesis,
then, that just as there is an order of nature behind the natural sciences, so
literature is not a piled aggregate of "works," but an order of words" (p. 17).
Frye's structuralist theory of literary criticism is a clear and productive al-
ternative to those earlier causal theories that would explain a poem by
reference to the poet's upbringing or his disappointments in love.
In anthropology, Levi-Strauss (1968), Geertz (1973), Douglas (1973), and
Leach (1973), among others, have begun to describe cultures in structuralist
terms: "As interworked systems of construable signs (or symbols), culture is
not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or
processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which
they can be intelligbly-that is, thickly-described" (Geertz, 1973, p. 14). Or
"Structuralist social anthropologists start off with the hypotheses that these
codes are 'languages' in the same sense as spoken languages, and hence
they postulate that the kind of linkage between nature and culture that has
lately been emerging from the work of structural linguistics is highly relevant
for social anthropology" (Leach, 1973, p. 39).
The origin of all of these forms of structural analyses arose first within lin-
guistics. Structuralism had its formal beginnings in the Theses presented by
the Prague Linguistic Circle to the first International Congress of Slavic Phi-
lologists held in Prague in 1929. Robey (1973, p. 1) describes these Theses
as follows:
"A radically innovatory programme for the theory and methodology of lin-
guistic study, the Theses introduced the notion of Structure as the key term in
a polemic against the traditional methods of the discipline, overconcerned,
in their authors' view, with problems of linguistic origin, and limited to the
analysis of isolated facts. Under the influence of Saussure and the Russian
linguist Baudouin de Courtenay, the authors of the Theses proposed lan-
guage as a functional system, to be understood in the light of its aim (that of
communication). Structure, in the Theses, is the structure of the system, the
manner in which the individual elements of a particular language are ar-
ranged for this purpose in relations of mutual dependence. Since this differs
from one language to another, it fol lows that the separate components of a
system can only be understood in the light of the system as a whole, and
therefore that the primary object of linguistic study must be the structure of
the system itself rather than the individual linguistic fact."
This problem was applied most successfully to phonology and syntax by
such writers as Trubetzkoy (1933), Jakobson (1972), and Chomsky (1965),
but has also been applied with some success to other aspects of language
ranging from the lexicon (Bierwisch, 1970; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976) to
the structure of speech acts (Searle, 1969), to poetics (Culler, 1975).
It is in this theoretical context that one should consider the stages of in-
telluctual development advanced by Piaget. Structuralism, for Piaget (1968)
is.a mode of inquiry, and the theory construction is characterized by the idea
of wholeness (the whole gives meaning to the parts) transformations (adding
is the inverse of subtracting), and self-regulation (an autonomous system),
which has been applied to mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, lin-
guistics, and anthropology. A piece of intelligent behavior, like a piece of a
sentence, is not to be seen, interpreted, or explained in terms of a response
to a set of independently specified antecedent variables to which it is
causally linked, but rather in terms of a general cognitive structure, the en-
semble of elements and relations, of which it is a particular examplar. To
illustrate, at one point in his life, a child fails to see that active sentences are
logically equivalent to passive ones, that "not more" is logically equivalent to
"less," that an ascending series, or staircase, is simultaneously a descend-
ing one, and so on, because his cognitive structures lack the property of re-
versibility. I have noted (1970) that if a child is asked to construct an "X" pat-
tern with checkers, he is unwilling to allow the center checker to serve si-
multaneously as a part of both the left-oblique and the right-oblique. Simi-
larly, Shotwell (personal communication) has recently observed that if
children are asked to build ascending and descending staircases, they are
unwilling to allow the top block in the ascending series to serve also as the
top block of the descending series; rather they have two top blocks side by
side, one for the top of each of the ascending and descending series.
Bamberger (personal communication) has similarly found that young
children are unwilling to let one bell serve for two notes in producing a tune
like "Ba Ba Black Sheep"-they insist upon one bell for each of the first two
notes. And so on. In a Piagetian scheme, all these forms of intelligent be-
havior would be accounted for by the same underlying cognitive structure.
Indeed, Piaget's theory is one of the few in which they would even be
regarded as comparable. That is, of course, not to say that Piaget has ade-
quately characterized that structure, but rather that he has' defined the
problem appropriately and productively.
More critical to the argument, such an abstract description of structure
would serve at least as part of an explanation of those observed events. The
central criticism of Piaget and the attempt by Brainerd to transform Piaget's
into an explanatory theory therefore collapses. The major point of Piagetian
structuralism is to move away from the conceptual blinders imposed by
seeking explanations only in terms of causal relations between antecedent or
stimulus variables and consequent, response variables. A stimulus variable
cannot be defined independently of the way in which it is interpreted by the
organism, that is, independent of the schema to which it is assimilated, and
the response cannot be interpreted independently of the intention or goal in
the service of which it is organized [cf. Bindra, BBS 1:1]. That whole system of
antecedent independent variables and consequent dependent variables as
a model of explanation is simply abandoned in favor of organized structural
systems.
Cognitive psychologists, particularly those associated with cognitive
science and psycholinguistics, have known this, at least implicitly, fora long
time. For many of them the major enterprise has been to try to characterize
adequately and accurately the functional systems by means of which we play
chess, do mental arithmetic, match sentences to situations, draw inferences,
understand stories, and the like [see Pylyshyn, BBS 1:1]. No particular vari-
able causes any particular response in the system. Rather, by means of ex-
perimental techniques, different aspects of the process making up a
particular structure become visible. The assumption is that enough carefully
sampled observations may be sufficient to construct and validate a
comprehensive model of that set of processes, whether of how conversations
are managed or of how short-term memory is managed. The elaboration of
the elements and their transformation rules, organized into a coherent
system, would serve as an explanation of the whole range of performances
generated or managed by that system.
Others have made a similar point. Chomsky (1975) has argued that any
perception or action on the social and/or physical environment by a human is
"structure dependent." The significance of any stimulus, whether word, ges-
ture, or artifact, is determined by its place in the structure of which it is part.
The paradigm case of this "structure dependence" is that of a phoneme, a
sound difference that signals a meaning difference. But a sound may be
phonemic in one language and not in another. Thus the difference between
"r" and " I " is phonemic in English but not in Chinese; and these therefore
constitute two distinctive stimuli in the former and only one in the latter.
Bruner (1977) adds "The position of a piece on a chessboard, the function of
a word in a sentence, a particular facial expression, the color or placement of
a light, then cannot be interpreted without reference to the person's
internalized rules of chess or language, the conventions he holds concerning
human interaction, the traffic rules in force in his mind" (p. 4). The "inde-
pendent" variables are not independent, but depend upon the structure of
which they are a part.
There are several grounds on which one could disagree with Brainerd. I
have emphasized his overreliance upon explanation in terms of antecedent-
consequent or stimulus-response relations (although these may successfully
characterize some relativelyuninteresting aspects of human behavior such
as reflexes and classical conditioning). But the line could have been drawn,
and perhaps should be drawn, at some other levels. Some writers, such as
Dilthey (1961), Habermas (1971), and Taylor (1971), could insist upon a dis-
tinction between the physical and the human sciences. Some would argue
that Brainerd restricts himself to a form of theory tied to prediction and con-
trol rather than to understanding. Hempel, in his discussion (1965) of expla-
nation as the relation between antecedent and consequent, pointed out that
once such relations are established, knowledge of the antecedent can be
used to predict the consequent; furthermore, the manipulation of the an-
tecedent permits the control of the consequent. Hempel was optimistic that
this was no less true for history than for the physical sciences, a view for
which there is currently no optimism whatsoever. I suggest that Brainerd fails
because he tries to assimilate Piaget to a more or less obsolete Baconian-
Hempelian view of science as the search for antecedent, causal variables,
that, once isolated, may be exploited as a means of control. Instead, he
could have learned from Piaget that a more productive goal for cognitive
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psychology is the construction of abstract and formal descriptions or models
in terms of which any particular perception or action could be interpreted.
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Species-specific acquisition vs. universal sequence of acquisition.
Brainerd argues that Piaget's invariant sequence, integration, and consolida-
tion criteria all take their apparent relevance from the unstated assumption
that invariant sequences that cannot be altered by environmental factors
must be hereditarily controlled. He argues, however, that Piaget's invariant
sequences of development are in many cases simply "measurement se-
quences" whose items appear in a particular order because of the de-
pendence of each new item on the achievement of the preceding one. Al-
though a universal sequence of acquisition of behaviors does not imply
maturation of new abilities, universal acquisition of behaviors (and
universal age norms of acquisition) does suggest such maturation, and
hence an explanatory stage model according to Brainerd's criterion. In
focusing exclusively on sequence of acquisition, the author fails to discuss
the critical issue of the evidence for universal acquisitions and age norms.
Cross-cultural data on Piagetian developmental stages are inadequate and
inconsistent; however, a recent unpublished study by De Avila and Pulos of
10,000 North American children from a range of cultures, using native
speakers and familar materials in testing, revealed universal acquisitions,
age norms, and sequences of acquisition up through formal operations
(Pulos, personal communication). Similar results were obtained in Tanzania
by Nyiti (1976).
These cross-cultural data, in conjunction with comparative data on Pia-
getian developmental sequences in monkey, ape, and human infants
(Parker, 1977a,b;Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1977), reveal species-specific levelsof
behavioral acquisition and suggest species-specific maturational bases for
Piagetian stages. If behavioral acquisitions were simply measurement se-
quences, they would presumably occur in children of all ages, and in indi-
viduals of all species, given proper training. Obviously they do not.
Despite his comments on the importance of proposing and independently
measuring antecedent variables, specifically neurological developmental
variables, Brainerd does not discuss possible neurological correlates of Pia-
getian developmental sequences and acquisitions. Although very little work
has been done in this area, it is obviously critical to settling the issue of the
explanatory power of Piaget's model. Gibson (1977) has correlated species-
specific stages of neurological development in human and macaque infants
with behavioral sequences in the sensorimotor period, providing evidence
for maturational bases for this development period. Monier (1960) has noted
correspondences between EEG developmental stages and Piaget and In-
helder's periods of cognitive development. These EEG stages correspond to
the M (maturation) levels proposed by Pascual-Leone (Ammon, 1977),
suggesting maturational bases for subsequent Piagetian periods and
subperiods of cognitive development.
Brainerd argues that Piaget's criterion of equilibration (stages correspond-
ing to periods of equilibrium with development occuring through sequences
of disequilibrium and establishment of new levelsof equilibrium) implies the
sudden appearance of new behavioral acquisitions. He believes that exten-
sive data suggesting a pattern of gradual appearance of new behavioral ac-
quisitions fail to support Piaget's equilibration model. The extensive data he
invokes are inadequate to support his conclusion, however, because they
are primarily cross-sectional data that by their very nature obscure the rate of
individual development by averaging the rate of all subjects. Hence, this im-
portant empirical issue remains unresolved. Moreover, it is not clear that an
equilibration model would necessarily imply sudden acquisitions, since
developmental rate would depend on the number of neurological factors in-
volved, their interrelations, and their own respective developmental rates.
The strongest claim Brainerd can make is that Piaget's five criteria are not
obviously adequate to support the claim that his model is explanatory. The
question needs to be addressed in terms of culturally universal acquisitions
and stages of acquisition, species-specific patterns of acquisitions, and
neurological correlates of acquisitions, as well as sequences of acquisition.
Piaget himself espouses an epigenetic or constructionist view that he does
not believe is consistent with hereditary programing, and that he believes in-
volves only a component of maturation (1973, 1971).
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Piaget's two main stage criteria: a selective reply to Brainerd. "Piaget's
stages fall somewhat between the poles of true explanation and pure
description." I basically agree with this conclusion of Brainerd's; yet, after
reading his empiricist critique, I realize that we understand that sentence
quite differently. While Brainerd denies that Piaget's research program is
sensible, I believe that it is only in need of improvement in a liberalized or
neo-Piagetian direction. Since lack of space prohibits more detailed com-
ments, I will illustrate my disagreement with Brainerd by discussing his treat-
ment of Piaget's two main stage principles: invariant sequences and general
structures.
Genetic-epistemological sequences and psychological sequences. A
tacit but common method of Piaget's structuralism is to search for genetic-
epistemological sequences of typical performances. These sequences are
such that not only can the performances involved be ordered in terms of their
empirically-obtained developmental traces across age-group samples (call
this empirical ordering of performances a psychogenetic sequence ), but at
the same time the theoretical psycho-Logical models of these performances
can be ordered on the basis of the following rule: the generative process of
performances placed earlier in the theoretical sequence must be included in
the generative process of later performances (call this theoretical ordering
of performances a psycho-Logical sequence ). These Piagetian genetic-
epistemological sequences are called by Brainerd "measurement se-
quences"; yet their distinctive note is not the measurable reliability of their
corresponding psychogenetic sequence, but rather the task-theoretic
models which make possible the conjunct psycho-Logical sequence.
The genetic-epistemological method being as described above, it is clear
that Brainerd's "measurement sequences" are actually congruent pairings of
theoretical psycho-Logical sequences. This is confirmed not only by his
definition of measurement sequences but also by his statement that these se-
quences reflect the construct validity (i.e., the theoretical foundation) of tests.
Performances related in this manner are often expected (in virtue of the dif-
ferentiation/integration principle of rationalist developmental psychology) to
appear developmentally in this sequence, with the proviso that they not ap-
pear at the same age and that the psychological models prescribing the se-
quence be organismically valid. Surprisingly, Brainerd's analysis ignores
the theoretical character of these measurement sequences as well as the
possibility that these performances appear simultaneously (whether or not
they do so could depend on the cognitive resources of the organism relative
to the cognitive difficulty of performances involved). As a result, he
repeatedly writes as if measurement sequences were metaphysically
"logical" and.thus compelling to Nature in some Leibnizian God-given
sense, that is, unfalsifiable by experience (e.g., "the sequence property does
not require explanation in terms of antecedent variables and no research is
needed to verify its universality" or "confirmatory data may be guaranteed so
long as we administer valid tests"). With the same God-given "logic" it could
be asserted that Newton's falling apple did not require an explanation. In
fact, Piaget's approach is a sophisticated extension and application of the
rationalist differentiation/integration principle. He starts with the assumption
(equally adopted by modern information-processing approaches) that the
organism is a psycho-Logical machine of some sort. As such, its perfor-
mance and patterns of growth (development, learning) could, in principle, be
predicted by theoretical task analyses based on a suitable psycho-Logic.
Piaget's research program attempts to infer this organismic psycho-Logic by
means of a two-way psychogenetic method: (1) Use unlearned psy-
chogenetic sequences of tasks, obtained from many different content areas,
infer a psycho-Logic that generates sequences identical to observed psy-
chogenetic sequences. (2) Verify the thus obtained psycho-Logic by
constructing new tasks and predicting their psychogenetic sequence. By
"unlearned" I mean a psychogenetic sequence that is cross-sectionally re-
liable, using concept-attainment or problem-solving tasks avoiding intratask
or prior learning of the solution for any of the tasks. The measurement se-
quences thus obtained were often considered unsound fifteen years ago.
Even those tasks whose sequencing can be regarded as commonsensical
(e.g., counting versus addition versus multiplication or "free recall uncate-
gorized" versus "free recall categorized") could not, without experience or
without Piaget's theory, be assigned the average chronological age in which
they can in principle be handled (i.e., by cognitively-superior children of a
given subculture) without external facilitation (Pascual-Leone, 1976c). In this
respect, Piaget has weakened his case by not asserting, as he should, that
his theory predicts much more than a psychogenetic order; it predicts, for a
given cultural environment and type of subject, a constant average passing
age (if any) for any given task within the scope of the theory. (The prediction
of order, however, could suffice for testing a stage theory.) Brainerd's im-
pression that Piaget's measurement sequences cannot be empirically
contradicted, shows to what extent Piaget's operational structuralism has be-
come part and parcel of psychologists' common sense.
Piaget's models and his method of task analysis can be challenged
(Beilin, 1977; Pascual-Leone, 1976a, b, c, 1977); but to conclude as some
readers of Brainerd can, that Piaget's research program is unsound or
scientifically trivial, is to throw out the baby with the bath water.
The principle of general state structures. Brainerd's sophisticated but mis-
taken theoretical view of Piaget's method is also illustrated by his remarks
about general structures. He rightly points out that "structures are at most
abstractions from behaviour" but does not consider that they are constructive
abstractions, that is, invented theoretical descriptions that define, in a
content-free manner, types of task. The types are such that they turn out to be
psychogenetically ordered and such that; for a given cultural environment
and type of subject, every type of task is mastered at a given constant
average chronological age (call this characteristic "psychogenetic anchor-
ing").
Brainerd's first objection against structures as stage criteria says that task
descriptions may not be relevantly related to behaviour. But in Piaget's
psycho-Logical structures, the relevance to behaviour is ensured by their be-
ing constructive abstractions derived from Piaget's two-way psychogenetic
method and by their being psychogenetically anchored. Brainerd's second
objection, that behavioural descriptions (i.e., psycho-Logical structures) do
not explain how the behaviours in question originate, is unfair, given the his-
torical relativity of "descriptions" and "explanations"; for what was explana-
tion for a given good theory often becomes description for the theory
superseding it. The point to be retained, however, is that, now in the sev-
enties, Piaget's pioneering psycho-Logic, although still heuristically useful,
is no longer sufficient, a fact that Geneva now recognizes (Inhelder, Sin-
clair, & Bovet, 1974; Piaget, 1975).
Brainerd's third objection to psycho-Logical structures as stage criteria, is
based on a misunderstanding of Piaget's stage principles. Since in Piaget's
theory the integration principle ensures that higher (i.e., later-stage) struc-
tures contain the possibilities of lower ones, it is not correct to say, as
Brainerd does, that higher structures should not be applicable to tasks
solved in lower (i.e., earlier-age) stages. Rather, what Piaget's theory implies
is that: (1) tasks solved exclusively in higher stages do not have solution
strategies which, under ordinary testing conditions, require only lower struc-
tures. (2) Tasks which can be solved in lower stages must offer a simplistic
solution strategy which, under ordinary conditions, requires only lower struc-
tures. All the Piagetian tasks I know (including propositional connectors)
conform to these prescriptions.
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Agnostic gauges and Genevan stages. Brainerd has vigorously indicted the
explanatory value of "stage" constructs in cognitive development and he
makes some telling points. Because of the great influence of Piaget's writ-
ings, stage has become a highly salient category of thought; it is a fashion-
able and often used term, but it may obscure more than inform. In its descrip-
tive sense, a stage implies that a child now has available certain abilities, as
shown by skill or lack of skill in performing, for example, on some intellectual
task such as conservation. To the extent that reaching, say, Stage X (as
measured by performance on task 1) will also effectively predict competence
on other tasks, 2, 3, 4 . . . n, there may be some summary value in speaking of
stages, but their meaning remains anchored in the matrix of intercorrelations
among tasks 1 . . . n. In such terms, it would be remarkable if Stage X (or
score on task 1) were a perfect or nearly perfect index of success on the other
tasks. Behavioral variables usually relate to one another imperfectly, so that
positive functions, but not total concordance, are found. Yet as currently
used, descriptive stages often connote a sudden or discontinuous threshold:
Before Stage X, none of these tasks is understood, but afterward, a broad
family of tasks is grasped with virtually perfect finesse. In fact, empirical data
often depart from such all-or-none, quantum leap, stage conceptions, and
evidence of this kind calls descriptive stages of cognitive development into
question, as discussed elsewhere (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). For
example, in some subcultural milieus, adolescents and even adults may
rarely reason in the ways expected (formal operations) by Piagetian
premises about universal stages (Gholson & Beilin, 1978; Peleg & Adler,
1977).
Brainerd's major quarrel is with stages as explanatory constructs. He notes
the lack of detailed specification of how variables operate within Piaget's
stages, as well as the dearth of measures that are not intertwined with the
very responses the theory seeks to explain. Perhaps more generally, a Pia-
getian stance would gain considerably in explanatory value (1) if the ex-
pected relationships among variables were better specified in a form that
allowed more clear-cut tests, (2) if the conditions that would need to be met
in order to force major changes in the theory were spelled out (i.e., what em-
pirical evidence would be required to refute which key premises?), and (3) if
uncertainties about potential choice-points in the theory were ac-
knowledged, for example: Which suppositions are regarded as pivotal?
Which are less secure? And how might empirical data of a defined sort shift
the interpretive balance toward different working assumptions? As things
stand, there is too much latitude for subjective interpretations about
precisely what Piagetian stage theory proposes, how it can be tested fairly,
and what weight to assign various types of "disconfirming" results.
Brainerd shows that a constant sequence in attaining successive skills
need not count as support for maturational views. Serial skill dependencies
(and the measurement sequences they create) are more often the rule than
the exception: If a baby crawls, then walks, then learns to ride a bike, and
only then learns to dance, one need not assume that the crawling-walking-
biking-dancing sequence results from maturation. Nor does a fixed order of
steps in developing the skills of a composer require maturational assump-
tions. Yet one learns to listen to music, then to read musical notation, then to
understand chord and harmonic structures, and then to apply them in com-
posing symphonies. Such serially-dependent chains of skills necessarily
build in progressive steps but demand neither innate maturation nor a stage
construct to account for their regular, stepwise pattern of attainment.
Psychologists of whatever conceptual allegiance may acknowledge that too
little attention has been given to carefully studying the hierarchial "layering"
of skill families without having to subscribe to a stage view of the layering
process. Other cogent caveats concerning consecutive cognitive configura-
tions are raised in Brainerd's scrutiny of the logic of stage assumptions in
Piagetian developmental theory. Put most conservatively, he concludes that
major features of Piagetian theory are not proved in the light of evidence and
epistemology, and that plausible alternative interpretations remain alive and
well.
It has elsewhere been noted that Piagetian theory does not require some of
the burdens it has placed on itself; for example, its main impact and
contributions would not suffer if it were revised to better address questions of
methodology and interpretation raised by contemporary research on in-
formation-processing (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). The larger impetus of
Brainerd's contribution is to invite serious reevaluation of stage constructs
now current in cognitive development. At the present time, "behaviorism" is
in lively ferment; it appears to be actively undergoing reformulation in more
symbolic, cognitive terms. It is not also timely for Genevan thought to come
to grips with the leaks in its systematic plumbing? With the actual gap nar-
rowing between "behavioral" and "organismic" viewpoints, there is now the
potential for a Stage of Rapproachment (or at least Detente) if earnest conci-
liatory efforts were initiated.
REFERENCES
Gholson, B., and Beilin, H. A developmental model of human learning.
In: H. W. Reese and L. P. Lipsett (eds.), Advances in child develop-
ment and behavior, vol. 13. New York, Academic Press, 1978.
Peleg, R., and Adler, C. Compensatory education in Israel: Conceptions,
attitudes, and trends. American Psychologist. 32:945-58. 1977.
Rosenthal, T. L. and Zimmerman, B. J. Social learning and cognition.
New York, Academic Press, 1978.
by Joseph i . ScartcSyra
Graduate School of Education, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penna.
19174
"Measurement sequences," Piagetian structures, and high-order rules.
Let me say first off that I have worked with Brainerd on a number of projects
and that I consider him to be a good friend. I also share many of his reserva-
tions concerning the currently widespread and often unthinking acceptance
of the Piagetian point of view. In some ways, such blind acceptance is almost
as sad a commentary on American behavioral science as was the fact that it
took us approximately forty years to appreciate the really important contribu-
tions made by Piaget and his collaborators. On the other hand, friends do not
always agree, and this is partially the case with the present critique of
Brainerd's paper.
The general thrust of Brainerd's paper is that Piaget's stages have no
explanatory power, that they are operationally circular. One of Piaget's main
contentions, for example, is that the particular invariant sequences that he
postulates will necessarily be invariant in all environmental settings. This
would seem to be a theoretical statement that could be supported or refuted
by empirical evidence.
Brainerd, however, essentially argues that the tasks associated with
Piaget's preliminary stages are logical prerequisites of those tasks
associated with subsequent stages. Brainerd calls these "measurement se-
quences," which occur "whenever each item in the sequence consistes of
the immediately preceding item plus some additional things."
To illustrate the notion of a measurement sequence, Brainerd states, "To
multiply, children must know how to add" because "multiplication is defined
in terms of addition." True, it is almost always the case that children acquire
these skills in the indicated order. I would propose, however, that this is a
result of how our educational system (broadly defined) is organized. In
general, the contention is false. A person can be taught successfully how to
multiply before knowing anything about addition. The product 3 x 2 , for
example, is simply the numer of pairs of the two-dimensional array
1 2 3
1 (1,1) (1,2) (1,3)
2 (2,1) (2,2) (2,3)
or 6. Notice that all one has to do is to count and the the procedure is
perfectly general.
In like manner, students can be taught how to differentiate such things as
Sin x and ax3 + bx without knowing anything at all about how to multiply —
thus, contradicting a second of Brainerd's contentions. For example,
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d (ax3 + bx)
dx
= 3ax2 + b
can be learned as strictly formal symbolic manipulations with no reference
whatsoever to multiplication.
More to the point, there is a basic flaw in the Brainerd argument since it im-
plicitly assumes that there is a unique basis for solving any given class of
tasks. He argues, for example, that successful performance on tasks
associated with the stage of concrete operations can be achieved only where
children have first acquired the capability of performing successfully on
tasks associated with the preoperational stage. This type of argument simply
does not follow; it is impossible to define so-called measurement sequences
independently of the structures/processes that underlie them. There are any
number of different ways (structures/processes) by which a given class of
tasks might be solved (Scandura, 1964, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1977). Al-
though subordinate/superordinate relationships may exist among various
structures/processes, this is not true in general of tasks that may be solved
by using them.
In his article Brainerd emphasizes (possibly in an attempt to circumvent
earlier criticisms) that he is not suggesting that all behaviors associated with
the various Piagetian stages are related by means of measurement se-
quences, but that this is often the case. He concludes, nonetheless, "The fact
that any sequences of this sort can be identified entails that the invariant se-
quence criterion cannot be accepted as prima facie evidence that 'objec-
tively certain stages exist.'"
If Brainerd means here that Piaget has not adequately operationized his
stages then, of course, we would probably all agree. However, Brainerd
clearly seems to be implying that there are such things as measurement se-
quences independent of the structures/procedures underlying task perfor-
mance. As emphasized above, this assumption is patently false. Tasks
themselves cannot be logically interdependent, only structures/processes
for achieving them can be, and then only in the sense that using one struc-
ture/process involves using the other as a component.
Here, then, is the source of a major difference between North American
empiricism and Genevan structuralism. Clearly, Piaget intends for the struc-
tures associated with his various stages to be hierarchically related. The be-
haviors that these structures make possible, however, may be generated in
any number of ways (i.e., by any number of processes/structures). (It is a
mathematical fact that if there is one rule/procedure for solving a given class
of tasks, then there must be an infinitude of others that will do the same
thing.) There is no guarantee, just because particular solution rules
associated with different classes of tasks are hierarchically related, that this
same relationship will exist between arbitrary solution rules associated with
these classes. Moreover, it is impossible to determine whether or not such
relationships exist in the absence of rigorous rule based analyses of the
respective tasks (Scandura, 1977). In short, Brainerd's measurement se-
quences are a myth. Such sequences cannot be defined independently of
the underlying structure/processes that generate them.
The same general misunderstanding seems to underlie the author's argu-
ments regarding cognitive structures. For example, Brainerd argues: "It
should never happen that problem classes with the representations of later
stages are solved during earlier stages. Under such conditions, the
structural distinction between stages breaks down completely."
This is not necessarily the case, for the reasons indicated above. In
particular, problem classes associated with later stages do not have unique
bases for solution. The relatively simple prescriptions preferred in North
American training studies, for example, are surely not identical with the
structures postulated by Piaget. Learning a structure of the latter type and
successful performance on associated problem classes are not necessarily
the same thing. Thus, successful performance on problems in such classes
does not necessarily imply that a Piagetian-type structure has been learned.
The following seriation task illustrates this fact. In the task, a child is shown
a set of sticks seriated by length, but with the relevant end of the sticks hid-
den by a screen. The child is given a new stick, " x," and is asked to insert it
in the right position. To accomplish this, the child is allowed to ask the ex-
perimenter how the length of " x" compares with any of the seriated sticks
(one at a time). According to Piaget, if one is to avoid redundant com-
parisons, success on this task requires the transitivity concept (structure).
That is, the child must know that a > b and b > c necessarily entails a > c.
(Such knowledge would avoid redundant comparisons because, given the
results of any one comparison, the child would be able to eliminate other
possible comparisons as logically dependent.) Nonetheless, the child could
also succeed on the task by applying the following rule: Compare " x" with
the first seriated stick. If" x" is shorter, put " x" before the stick and stop. If
" x " is longer, compare " x" to the next stick and test " x " as above. This
example also illustrates why most successful North American training
studies are not directly relevant to the structure of Piagetian theory. In the
example, transitivity corresponds more to the construction of solution rules
(like the above) than to the a priori knowledge of such rules or their applica-
tion. (This example was suggested by one of my doctoral students, Roland
Schneider, after reading a draft of my commentary. His commentary on mine
is gratefully acknowledged).
More generally, Piagetian structures appear to be related more to the
construction and the choice of solution rules than to solution rules
themselves (or their application). To illustrate this difference, consider an
analogy between the teacher as a programmer (i.e., a constructor of solution
rules) and the child as a computer (i.e., a user of solution rules). It is evident
that the programmer and the computer do not need the same "cognitive"
structures to succeed on a given task. Moreover, it would appear that the only
kind of training experiments that could be relevant to Piagetian structure
would be experiments where the child is taught how to construct and select
solution rules (i.e., not only howto use given ones).
Presumably, of course, one would want a precise operational (behavioral)
definition of just what a structure is. To my knowledge, Piaget has not done
this, and this is an important limitation that Brainerd has reemphasized. As I
have shown above, however, the arguments advanced, in themselves, are
not especially damaging to Piaget's theory. Piaget's formulation is an
idealization; it is a theory of what behavior would be like under certain
"idealized conditions." Unfortunately, Genevan psychologists have not ade-
quately specified just what those idealized conditions might be. Until they
do, the theory will necessarily remain nonoperational. [The nature of
idealized theories, and their relationship to normative ones, is discussed in
Scandura, 1971, 1977, especially Chs. 1, 5, 7, 10, and 11.]) I am also in-
clined to agree with Brainerd that the formalism introduced by Piaget to
represent knowledge is not a particularly useful one. While it may have been
the best available at the time Piaget initially developed this theory, I do not
believe that that is any longer the case. Indeed, if Piaget himself had had ac-
cess to some of the modern tools that are presently available for representing
cognitive structures-and processes, I suspect that his theory might have
taken a quite different turn.
More to the point, and this may come as no surprise, I suspect that the
structural learning formalism (Scandura, 1971, 1973, 1977) may be espe-
cially useful in this regard. The notion of higher-order rules, or rules that
operate on other rules and select and/or construct new ones, seems espe-
cially relevant. We have recently begun work in this direction and so far our
results appear promising. In this regard, I do not view the Structural Learning
Theory as necessarily contradictory to the mass of descriptive data compiled
by Piaget and his collaborators over the years. Rather, it has the potential of
providing a far more precise way to deal with developmental phenomena.
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Is Piaget a Pied Piper? Brainerd's paper provides a detailed summary of the
criticisms that Piaget's stage theory has attracted over the past ten years.
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Three of the arguments seem particularly worthy of reiteration. First is the
point concerning measurement sequences. As Brainerd notes, a consistent
developmental sequence does not necessarily indicate any psychologically
meaningful relationship; instead, the sequence may be guaranteed by the
logical connections among the concepts (Flavell, 1971, 1972; Flavell &
Wohlwill, 1969, oper. cit.). The second point concerns the vagueness and
ambiguity of Piaget's logical structures; there seems to be widespread
agreement among developmental psychologists that these structures often
have little or no direct mapping onto the behaviors they are said to explain.
Third is the lack of any independent assessment procedures for the explana-
tory constructs within Piaget's system; as Case (1974), Siegler (1976), and
Trabasso (in press) have pointed out, Piaget has not provided any way of
measuring disequilibrium, the INRC group, and other explanatory variables
that he proposes.
These criticisms raise an interesting question. If Piaget's stage theory is so
woefully deficient along so many dimensions, why does it continue to be the
dominant approach within developmental psychology? One possibility is
that developmental psychologists are like rats following the Pied Piper, and
that we are all well on our way out of town. This view does not explain,
however, why Piaget's theory has so long outlived those of his contem-
poraries - Gesell, Guthrie, Hull, Tolman, and Spence-or why it has at-
tracted such interest in disciplines as diverse as psychology, biology,
physics, philosophy, and education. The remainder of this critique will be
devoted to examining some reasons for the superior endurance of Piaget's
approach.
Perhaps the most basic reason for the theory's staying power is the
inherently interesting topics that it focuses on: children's concepts of time,
speed, distance, number, causation, ordering, classification, probability,
proportionality, perspective, morality, and so forth. The research program
conveys a strong impression of a scientist sitting down, asking himself what
the truly basic intellectual acquisition of man are, and then spending half a
century systematically studying their development. Even if Piaget's stage
theory were entirely worthless, its introducing these topics to developmental
study might explain its prominence.
But there is more. Piaget's empirical descriptions, particularly those deal-
ing with the sensorimotor, preoperational, and concrete operational stages,
are impressively reliable and replicable; for as long as subsequent investi-
gators have come even moderately close to matching Piaget's original ex-
perimental procedures, they have generally duplicated his results. This
statement may seem like faint praise to those in the physical and life
sciences where replicability is often taken for granted, but those in
psychology will recognize it as a meaningful tribute. In psychological experi-
ments, seemingly trivial variations in the wording of instructions, the stimulus
materials used and the types of questions asked often profoundly influence
the results. This is much less true of Piaget's work than of that of most other
investigators. For example, across broad variations in instructions and
procedures, five-year-olds have been found to say that the glass with the
taller liquid column must have the greater amount of liquid, that the side of
the balance scale with more weight must go down, that the longer row always
contains more objects, that the longer bar must cast the longer shadow, and
so on (Siegler, 1977).
How can we account for the superior replicability of Piaget's findings? One
possibility is that he is simply an unusually careful and astute observer. An
alternative, however, is that Piaget has discovered something basic about
children that allows him to make accurate predictions about a wide variety of
their behaviors, thus making replicability less dependent on the particulars
of the experimental situation. As Brainerd notes, five-year-old (preopera-
tional stage) children are generally said to focus on only a single dimension
in making judgements, ten-year-olds (concrete operational stage) are said to
consider two or more dimensions but not to know how to combine them, and
fifteen-year-olds (formal operational stage) are said to consider all relevant
dimensions and to know the relevant combination rules. What is intriguing to
me is not whether these approaches occur in the predicted order (for, of
course, if they occur at all, the order must be the predicted one), but the fact
that on so many tasks, the approaches, particularly the imperfect ones, show
up at approximately the same ages. Whether or not one chooses to refer to
this consistent behavioral pattern as stage, there clearly is an important
phenomenon to be explained.
This brings us to the topic of explanation. Brainerd is certainly correct in
his criticism that Piaget has failed to provide any means for measuring the
explanatory constructs within his system. The criticism is overstated,
however, to the extent that it implies that such independent assessment is
impossible. One need look no further than to Brainerd's own work to
disconfirm it. Brainerd (1976, 1977) has demonstrated ways of inde-
pendently measuring three of Piaget's most prominent explanatory
constructs: compensation, identity, and reversibility. Similarly, a number of
other investigators have demonstrated that encoding, an explanatory
construct that resembles Piaget's equilibrium/disequilibrium notion in im-
portant ways, can be independently assessed and used to explain a variety
of cognitive-developmental phenomena: Trabasso (in press) used it to
explain developmental differences in performance on the class inclusion
task; Sternberg (1977) used it to explain developmental differences on the
transitivity task; and I (1977; in press) used it to explain developmental dif-
ferences on the balance scale and projection of shadows tasks. These
studies indicate that it is possible to meet reasonable explanatory standards
with constructs quite similartothe Piagetian ones.
In conclusion, Brainerd has accurately:identified the least satisfactory part
of the Piagetian system, its efforts at explanation. It seems, however, that this
may not be an "in principle" difficulty; recent work, including Brainerd's own,
suggests that Piaget's explanatory constructs can be measured independent
of the behavior they are said to explain. Part of the continuing allure of
Piaget's theory may be just this capacity to incorporate methodological
improvements while maintaining its basic conceptual coherence.
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Measurement sequences, logical necessity, and common sense. In my
comment I shall focus exclusively on Brainerd's discussion of measurement
sequences, since I believe these have a significance far transcending the
area of developmental research. I have no comments on Brainerd's other
main points. They seem to be compatible with my own current evaluation of
Piaget's theory (1977).
Brainerd introduces the term "measurement sequence" to describe
developmental sequences that result "from definitional connections between
the behaviors being measured." He also writes: "A measurement sequence
occurs whenever each item in the sequence consists of the immediately
preceding item plus some new things. When behaviors are related in this
manner, the only way that they can be acquired is in an invariant sequence.
This is because, logically, it is impossible to devise valid tests of later items
that do not measure earlier items." I have three comments on this:
First, what Brainerd calls measurement sequences are only a special case
of relationships that are logically necessary because they follow from the
definitions of the concepts involved. For example, stinginess is inversely re-
lated to generosity, not as an empirically testable fact, but because the con-
cepts are opposites. The entire field of psychology is permeated by such
relationships (Smedslund, 1972, 1976).
A recent, widely influential, theory consists almost entirely of logically
necessary propositions, without empirically testable content (Smedslund,
1978).
Second, the very existence of measurement sequences, and, more
generally, logically necessary relationships means that, for every postulated
relationship, the psychologist must ask whether it is logical or empirical. This
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can be answered only by means of a careful logical analysis of the rela-
tionships between the concepts involved. A relationship is empirically test-
able only when the concepts involved are logically independent.
Psychologists in all fields have generally neglected this aspect of their work.
The result is that much research must be regarded as pseudo-empirical, in
the sense that it involves attempts to establish logical relationships by em-
pirical methods. This is equivalent to trying to demonstrate the Pythagorean
Theorem experimentally. (See the references given above.)
Third, we may seriously ask the following question: Do there exist
psychological regularities that are not logically necessary, given the defini-
tions of the concepts involved, and that are supported by data showing that
they may be universally valid? My position is that there may exist no such
regularities. If I am right, the entire project of psychological research must be
revised. We must recognize that, in our theorizing and in our data-gathering,
we are bound by the conceptual framework embedded in our natural lan-
guage and in our extra-linguistic culturally defined patterns of communica-
tion. This framework, which may be called common sense, was acquired
while we were being socialized into adult "normal" members of society, and,
hence, is anterior to and organizes our observations and our thinking as
psychologists. For descriptions of common sense psychology, see particu-
larly Heider (1958), Smedslund (1972), and Laucken (1974). Common-sense
formulations are logically necessary and hence, not empirically testable.
In the new paradigm, psychological theory will be a formal discipline,
similar for example, to geometry, stating explicitly our basic conceptual
framework. It may be of great help to the practitioner in the same way the
geometry is of help to the topographer or navigator. Since there are no
universal psychological regularities, empirical work will focus on practical
problems, including practically relevant local regularities. "Local" is here
meant as "limited to cultural/technological conditions and subject to change
as culture/technology changes." Recognition that observed regularities may
be local rather than universal is apparent in the recent discussion of cohort
changes in developmental studies (Baltes & Nesselroade, 1972). This also
means that the affinity between psychology and history becomes prominent
(Smedslund, 1973; Gergen, 1973, 1976).
In conclusion, the reader is asked to consider whether he knows any
universally valid relationships between logically independent variables
(psychological "laws"). If he finds only measurement sequences and other
logically necessary relationships, he may find the time ripe for a true revolu-
tion in our conception of psychology.
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Holistic aspects of the stage notion. Assuming that psychology is not in a
looking glass world, it may not rely on Humpty Dumpty's straightforward
method for establishing the legitimate meaning of its major concepts. It is
necessary to review from time to time the meanings accrued by concepts
through usage as well as those bestowed upon them by the theoretical
system from which they come. Brainerd's discussion of the concept of stage
in Piaget's theory continues a long series of probings into the status of this
notion and is welcome for attempting to stimulate further reflection on the im-
plications of a stage conception of cognitive development. My comments
will be directed to a few aspects of the question that may have received
insufficient consideration in the paper.
First of all, it seems to me important to separate consideration of the
theoretical implications of the concept of stage from consideration of any
empirical evidence bearing on those implications. It makes considerable dif-
ference whether a notion is rejected because it is empty or because it is
false. It is the theoretical implications of the stage concept that need
clarification, and Brainerd's discussion stays mostly at the theoretical level,
although in a few instances he short-circuits the argument by bringing in em-
pirical findings. Thus, in the discussion of equilibration, the data on the
continuous acquisition of concrete-operational behaviors are used to ques-
tion the equilibration criterion. Yet the notion of equilibration is so central to
Piaget's theory, and the relations between the notions of equilibration and of
developmental stages so much in need of explication that, at this point, it
seems premature to judge the equilibration criterion on the basis of empir-
ical data. The same point holds for the criterion of structure. Once the im-
plications of the notion of stage are clarified, it is likely that the need for
studies different from those already available will become apparent and the
task of collecting significant evidence can get underway.
In discussing Piaget's five criteria for establishing stages in cognitive
development, Brainerd considers each of them individually. It seems to me
that they have to be taken conjointly, since each gains clarity from being
considered in relation to the others. What does invariant sequence refer to
without the notion of cognitive structures? What meaning does integration
and consolidation have without the notion of sequence? How is equilibration
to be discussed without the notion of cognitive structure? Taking these cri-
teria as a totality does not amount to bringing in stages through the back
door, but it does suggest certain issues that may merit brief mention.
One issue has to do with the relation between any given task performance
and cognitive structure; no one-to-one relation seems to be assumed by
Piaget. This being the case, we face the problem of determining when an in-
dividual can be said to have constructed certain cognitive structures. I have
raised this problem previously (1976a, b). It seems to me that it is related to
several points made by Brainerd in his paper.
The question of circularity with respect to the explanatory use of the stage
concept is clearly related to this issue. If a task performance is used to de-
termine stage level and then stage level is used to explain the task perfor-
mance, the circularity is obvious. The case is no better when chronological
age is used to determine stage level and it is in turn used to explain task
performance. However, theoretically, stage level can be determined inde-
pendently of a specific task performance by evaluating performance on a
number of other tasks. This is the course followed in more sophisticated Pia-
getian research (e.g., Inhelder et al., 1974). The problem is deciding what
constitutes an acceptable procedure for establishing the stage level in
cognitive functioning.
The fact that many sequences described by Piaget fit what Brainerd calls a
"measurement sequence" is taken to be a major limitation of the invariant se-
quence as well as of the integration criterion. The argument holds if perfor-
mance in one task is taken as diagnostic of the level of a cognitive structure.
However, if we consider performance in a number of tasks related to that
cognitive structure, then expectations for sequence acquisition need not be
confounded with the measurement operation. For me, the crux of the problem
has to do with establishing the realm of a cognitive structure and determining
the tasks relevant to it. Given horizontal decalage, it is certainly to be ex-
pected that a cognitive structure would be manifest in some task but not
others. What should not happen in view of the invariant sequence criterion is
that evidence for a higher level cognitive structure be obtained prior to any
evidence of the lower level structure within the same realm. And there's the
rub. The chore of establishing, through logical analysis, the domain of tasks
relevant to various cognitive structures remains to be accomplished.
Moreover, even the so-called measurement sequences may be important if
one considers them not only from the standpoint of sequence, but also in
terms of the criterion of integration. Brainerd states that "a measurement se-
quence occurs whenever each item in the sequence consists of the im-
mediately preceding item plus some new things." This statement creates the
impression of an additive sequence. However, with respect to stages the
critical matter is that the understanding of A changes onceB is acquired and
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integrates A. Maybe the question should not be whether B can be seen
without A, but whether an understanding of A changes once B is acquired.
Another issue relates to the specification of the set of cognitive structures
characterizing a stage. When the criterion of structure is considered singly, it
seems very serious that structures may not be uniquely related to stages.
However, when the criteria of integration and consolidation are considered
as well, it seems that some evidence for higher level structures should be
found at earlier stages and remnants of lower level structures should be
found prior to consolidation of the higher stage. The problem consists of
specifying when the shift from a lower to a higher stage has taken place.
Piaget has stated: "since the preparation of later acquisitions can involve
more than a stage (with various overlappings among certain preparations,
some shorter and others longer), and since there are various degrees of
stability in the completions, in any series of stages there must be a distinc-
tion between the process of formation, or of birth, and the final forms of equi-
librium (in the relative sense). Only the latter constitute the whole structures"
(1974, pp. 52-53, italics in the original). It is these structures of the whole
(structure d'ensemble) that are said to characterize a stage. The evidence
that is required seems to pertain to the formation of this structure of the whole
and not to the presence of constituent cognitive structures. Thus, specifica-
tion of the structures needed to constitute the whole becomes a serious task.
Finally, in view of Piaget's structural-constructivist theory of development,
it seems to me that the question that might merit discussion is whether a no-
tion of invariant stages in cognitive development is crucial for the theory. The
alternative position is not necessarily either lack of organization or of se-
quence. If the interplay of biological factors, social factors, and self-
regulatory factors in development is to be taken seriously, the possibility of
certain alternative constructions must be entertained. Proposing a system of
stages with some possible alternatives would not make the stages any more
arbitrary, but would demand even more work to conceptualize clearly such a
system.
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In defence of circularity. Sydney Smith is said once to have observed two
women carrying on a heated argument from windows on opposite sides of a
street and remarked to a companion, "These women will never agree, they
are arguing from different premises." A similar comment may be made on the
continuing argument between Piaget and his collaborators and psychol-
ogists of the American school, carried on from laboratories on opposite sides
of the Atlantic!
Brainerd seems to me to typify the American approach according to which
what Piaget is doing is not merely wrong but wrong a priori (i.e., "un-
scientific"). He has not simply failed to find satisfactory explanations on
cognitive development, but has in effect adopted methods that preclude suc-
cess. For Brainerd, explanation requires "procedures whereby the an-
tecedent variables can be measured independently of behavioral changes";
Coghill (1929 op. cit.) explained the developing behaviour patterns of tad-
poles in terms of independently observable neurological changes; Bijou
(1975 op. cit.) explained the behaviour of children in his basic stage in terms
of independently observable contingencies of reinforcement; these count as
explanations. Piaget, however, observes only behaviour, and the structures
he proposes can therefore be "at most abstractions from behavior," not
explanations.
Piaget does not believe that his stages are the consequence of inde-
pendently observable antecedent behavioural variables. If they are the con-
sequence of age-related neurophysiological changes, these are certainly not
independently observable in the present state of the art. He is therefore pre-
cluded from offering "explanations" in Brainerd's sense and offers, instead,
"criteria." Brainerd's arguments purport to rule out Piaget's first four criteria a
priori and the fifth on empirical grounds. According to Brainerd's conception
of science, Piaget cannot hope to succeed in doing what he is trying to do.
What worries me is that Brainerd seems wholly unaware that his conception
of science might be challenged. It amounts to a version of Humean em-
piricism that asserts that we are wholly dependent on our observations ("im-
pressions of sense"), having no grounds for supposing that there may be a
reality beyond our observations that is causally responsible for them. Em-
piricism holds that it is illegitimate to speculate on what kind of a thing it
might be that could be causally responsible for the fact that what we observe
occurs in the manner in which we observe it to occur, with one set of observa-
tions regularly preceding another, and so forth. Instead, we must limit
ourselves to deriving laws from the "constant conjunctions" we encounter in
our sequences of observations.
Psychology was the first science to attempt consciously to model itself on
the practice of other established sciences. It adopted empiricism because
this was said to codify the practice of these other sciences. Unfortunately the
other sciences paid only lip service to empiricism out of respect for the
philosophers of the time. The actual practice of scientists was "realist" not
"empiricist." They "speculated on what kind of a thing it might be . . . etc.,"
which is what Piaget does. It is ironic that Piaget appears to be doing more or
less successfully what physical and biological scientists do and have al-
ways done, whereas Brainerd is doing only what scientists said they were
doing when psychology first established itself as an independent discipline.
Bhaskar (1975) has shown that the successful practice of experimental
science is in fact inconsistent with empiricist assumptions. The scientists' in-
stinct proved more reliable than philosophical analysis. I have elsewhere
(1977) tried to show why it was that the misconception had no serious conse-
quences for any science except psychology, where it resulted in the method-
ological behaviourism to which Brainerd appears to subscribe.
Space does not permit any attempt to explain here why empiricism proved
so fatally attractive to psychologists. In part, the cause was a simple verbal
error; it was assumed (wrongly) that empiricism must be the appropriate
theoretical basis for an empirical science. The conclusions I wish to draw in
the present context are that Brainerd's arguments will rightly cut no ice with
Piaget because Piaget is not trying to do what Brainerd thinks he ought to be
trying to do and that Brainerd ought to consider carefully whether anything
useful can be done in the conceptual straight jacket within which he has
chosen to confine himself. Psychology has at present all the trappings of a
genuine experimental science but little of the real content; perhaps the fault
lies in a mistaken conception of the nature of scientific activity.
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Which comes first - describing or explaining? Current data show that there
is something wrong with Piaget's stage hypotheses and with the general idea
that cognitive development takes place in reorganizations of competence
expressed through coordinated changes in performance. But I am not
satisfied with this picture of the problem, which says that Piaget is simply of-
fering descriptions. Furthermore, I believe the Piagetian stage hypotheses
have some scientific value and some value for educators even though there
is something wrong about them and even though they do not prescribe
causal explanations.
The heart of the argument here is that Piaget's stages "fall somewhere
between the poles of true explanation and pure description" or, even more
serious they may be "purely descriptive." Consider two purely descriptive
hypotheses about a set of phenomena, neither of them offering a causal
explanation. Must the two be equal and empty, or is there a chance that one
description might be superior to the other? If there are better and worse
descriptions, then it might be a scientific achievement to find a better
description, and it is even conceivable that that better description might be
of practical value for such people as educators. How might one description
be better than another?
It seems useful to approach this question indirectly. There is evidence that
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one does not need much scientific description of children in order to come
up with nuclear ideas in Piagetian theory.
Romanes (1889) argues that human mental life goes through a receptual
stage, a wisdom of action that man shares with the animals, a preconceptual
stage, an imagistic kind of ideation built by reflection upon actions, and a
conceptual stage, in which a formal kind of thinking is built by reflections
upon images. Sechenov's (1935) Essentials of Thought intended to integrate
the theoretical writings of Helmholtz and Spencer. He argued that a child's
mental development goes from automatic sensory thinking to concrete ob-
ject thinking to abstract thinking. Baldwin (1895) proposed "three great
stages of adaptation": biological adaptations, reflex attention, and con-
scious selection of ends and their pursuit by adaptation. Baldwin proposed
later (1906-15) a hierarchical series of nine genetic "modes" and "objects"
of thought. These were then construed as an ascending series of five logical
forms of thought, from the "pre-logical" to the "extra-logical." The first three
logics look like the Piagetian stages and the last two, perhaps, like adult
stages of thought.
The developmental stage theories of Romanes, Sechenov, and Baldwin
have significant contemporary parallels in the writings of Herbert Spencer,
John Hughlings Jackson, Sigmund Freud, and G. Stanley Hall. But perhaps
enough has been set forth to offer an argument about the Piagetian stages.
The resemblance of Piaget's theory to these early stage theories seems ob-
vious. There is much that he says that the early theorists are not saying. They
are not saying that there are across-the-board reorganizations of children's
competence. They do not propose age boundaries. Nevertheless, they are
with Piaget in asserting that there are several alternative organizations of
human knowledge, and that children will show these organizations in a
regular sequence as they develop. These anticipations are not casual. The
authors are a distributed set of the more creative and original men of their
time. They write at some length about the stages of children's thought. It is
clear that the subject interests them, they feel they have something to say
about it, and they are concerned to work out their ideas in some detail.
At the time when these formulations were produced, there was very little or-
ganized empirical research on children. Miscellaneous observations and
writings on childhood did exist, and these were collected together by Hall
under the umbrella of the Child Study Movement (Wilson, 1975). These
authors make no appeal to that kind of data base. Baldwin did do some
observations of infancy, and these were important in organizing his point of
view, but his theory goes far beyond his observations in scope. Whatever
these authors were doing, they were not describing children in any simple
sense. They knew a lot about children, as any human being knows a lot about
children. But they proceeded without regard to that elaborate body of
observations and experiments associated with Piaget's writings. How could
they produce scientific theories about childhood in advance of any formal
observations? They seem to be writing from a mass of late 19th-century in-
formation about evolution, the organization of the brain, comparative linguis-
tics, embryology, biology, and anthropology. These, together with the work of
analytic philosophy, seemed to dictate some hypotheses about the structure
of human knowledge. In their writings about children, these authors seem to
be trying to invent a description of the development of children's thought that
would bring that body of phenomena into alignment with a body of evolu-
tionary thinking about the nature of the human mind.
None of these historic authors tells you when and how to look at children in
order to see the stage processes they write about. Piaget tries to do that, and
many of the problems with his theory seem to arise from the fact that he is
forcing his descriptions, overinterpreting his observations to bring them into
conformity with an expected pattern. If this analysis is sound, there is a
"deep structure" to Piagetian theory that does not rest first and entirely on
direct observations of children. That deep structure rests in some broad bio-
logical and philosophical conceptions of thinking that form the point of view.
Piaget is not simply trying to explain cognitive development. He is trying to
describe it. He is working back and forth between a body of assumptions and
a body of empirical phenomena, trying to create a detailed correspondence
between theory and phenomena. He is, in a sense, trying to work si-
multaneously on the creation of description and explanation.
The critique offered here assumes the traditional philosophy of science as
applied to psychology, which assumes that empirical and immediate proof is
the only touchstone of adequate scientific theorizing. The organization of
scientific work is toward the maximization of the "principles of proof." That
kind of philosophy of science works best when theory arises out of one data
base and makes reference to causal explanations that may be perceived and
tested within the unique data base. But psychological knowledge seems to
arise out of disparate data bases distributed within and without the discipline
of Psychology. Psychology is multiparadigmatic (White, 1976, 1977). Sooner
or later, a philosophy of science appropriate for Psychology is going to have
to account for the continuing importance of Darwin and Freud and the clearly
growing importance of Piagetian theory. It is not so sure that the "principle of
proof" is the only thing that guides scientific work; there is a "principles of
consistency" as well. Some theories align phenomena with a fairly narrow
body of other scientific data, others align phenomena with a broader body of
other scientific phenomena. Other things being equal, a descriptive form that
brings more data into consistency may be superior to one that takes a nar-
rower view of a body of phenomena. It aligns phenomena with a broader
body of data bases within which one can search for, if not immediate expla-
nations, then reductions of uncertainty about where explanations can be
found. In that sense, one scientific description can be superior to another.
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Conjoint construct validation. We see two limitations of Brainerd's ap-
proach. First, his concept of testing for the presence of a theoretical
construct is too narrow. Piaget's theoretical construct, stages, does not
purport to link factors that bring about a stage (Brainerd's "antecedent vari-
ables") with the behavior characteristic of the stage. However, in general, it
is not true that in order to be explanatory a theoretical construct must relate
the factors that cause it to the consequences of its presence. Psychology is
replete with such constructs as "intelligence" and "schizophrenia." Of
course, it is essential to Piaget's theory that stages appear sequentially. But
the failure of this theory to explain what brings about a stage does not render
the construct inadequate as an explanation.
Second, Brainerd finds Piaget's five criteria for existence of stages indi-
vidually inadequate. He considers the criterion of "constant order of suc-
cession" inadequate on the grounds that this constant order could be due to
the nature of the tests, that is, the tests form a "measurement sequence."
Brainerd has not addressed the possibility that Piaget's criteria, even if indi-
vidually inadequate, might be adequate in combination. In particular, he has
not considered the combination of the criteria of "constant order" and of
"cognitive structure." A minimal implication of the notion of cognitive struc-
ture is that the structures characteristic of one stage would predict, across a
wide variety of tasks, a different set of behaviors than would the structures of
another stage. Even if we assume that the sequence of acquisition of skills on
each of these tasks is logically necessary, consistency in the age at which an
individual advances in the predicted way would provide convincing evi-
dence that a change in a common underlying process is at work. Converging
operations in this way could be used to validate the reality of the construct.
Whether this has been accomplished for Piaget's construct is certainly open
to question.
Finally, the problem with the notion of stage, as used by Piaget, is not that
such a construct is an inadequate explanatory vehicle without the inde-
pendent specification of antecedent variables, but, rather, that the theory is
overly abstract and that the links between the construct and the observed be-
haviors are too loose. This makes it difficult to establish whether a stage
construct is even an adequate description of a piece of behavior.
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Author's Response
by Charles J. Bralnerci
Invariant sequences, explanation, and other stage criteria:
reflections and replies
Although the commentaries published in this issue deal with a
myriad of matters, three themes recur with sufficient regularity
to be called categories within which comments can be grouped:
(a) culturally universal sequences in cognitive development; (b)
the logic of scientific explanation; (c) additional criteria for
stages. Since invariant sequences have long been viewed as the
main phenomena on which stages must stand or fall, it is not
surprising that the largest number of criticisms and addenda
seem to be in category (a). Here are some examples: Rosenthal
notes that measurement sequences are not unique to cognitive
development and that they can be found in most other areas of
behavioral development; Markman observes that the decision as
to whether two concepts are linked by a measurement sequence
is often difficult to make in practice and that we must scru-
pulously avoid classifying true invariant sequences as measure-
ment sequences; Baldwin & Baldwin discuss a possible in-
variant sequence in primate social behavior; Smedslund argues
that measurement sequences are a special case of psychological
theorists' tendency to rely on predictions that may be logically
guaranteed by the nature of our measurement operations; Parker
reviews evidence that suggests that it is sometimes difficult to
confirm invariant sequence predictions in cross-cultural studies.
The many comments in category (a) have prompted a few new
thoughts on invariant sequence research. Since the existence of
culturally universal invariant sequences seems to be the key em-
pirical issue and since these ideas take some space to develop,
the first section of this paper deals exclusively with the invariant
sequence question. I argue that, measurement sequences aside,
there may be no empirical datum that could convince us that in-
variant sequences do or do not exist. Some selected points from
categories (b) and (c) are considered in the other two sections.
Measuring invariant sequences
Most comments in category (a) are concerned, in one way or
another, with whether any of the invariant sequences predicted
by Piaget have been confirmed, and with whether measurement
sequences invalidate the invariant sequences criterion for
stages. All these comments seem to presuppose that the
existence of culturally universal sequences in concept develop-
ment is an empirical question answerable by data. I do not
believe that invariant sequence data are interpretable, however.
By this I mean that we cannot use such data to make the sorts of
theoretical inferences required by the invariant sequences
criterion. Data on invariant sequences are so thoroughly con-
founded with measurement error that positive findings are inca-
pable of convincing us that concept sequences exist in the popu-
lation, and negative findings are incapable of convincing us that
they do not. Thanks to measurement error, the invariant se-
quence criterion does not appear to make predictions that can be
confirmed or discontinued by data. The main evidence for this
statement is contained in a technical appendix to this response
(Brainerd, 1978a) and consists of a few equations summarizing
the effects of measurement error on the probability distributions
of the random variables used to test null hypotheses in concept
development studies.
The interpretability dilemma. Recall that the invariant se-
quence criterion stipulates that concepts from earlier stages
should always develop before concepts from later stages. Take a
well-worn example: children should acquire the identity con-
cept (preoperational stage) before they acquire the conservation
concept (concrete-operational stage) (Piaget, 1968, op. cit.). Sup-
pose that we have two concepts, A and B, from different stages,
and we are interested in testing the prediction that they develop
in a fixed order. Three types of designs have been used in studies
conducted to date: cross-sectional, longitudinal, and training ex-
periments. In cross-sectional studies (Kofsky, 1966), which in-
clude cross-cultural studies as a special Case, concept tests are
administered once to subjects from the age range corresponding
to when the concepts are believed to emerge. Longitudinal
studies (Achenbach & Weisz, 1975; Kramer et al., 1975) begin
with the low end of the age range; concept tests are administered
repeatedly as subjects pass through the range. In training experi-
ments (Brainerd, 1974; Litrownik et al., 1978), concept tests are
administered from the low end of the age range. Subjects who
fail all or nearly all the items are retained for training. They are
assigned to training conditions, one for each pretested concept,
and a treatment of some sort is administered. The subjects in
each condition are then posttested for the trained concept and,
perhaps, for others as well.
In all three designs, invariant sequence predictions are
evaluated by testing null hypotheses about the relative difficulty
of the concept tests at given assessment points. That is, (1)
sample estimates of the expectation of some random variable of
total test performance are computed, (2) significance tests are
performed to determine whether or not the estimates for dif-
ferent tests differ significantly, and (3) easier tests are said to
measure earlier-emerging concepts while equally difficult tests
are said to measure synchronously emerging ones. I do not
believe that the inferences involved in (3) are ever sound. To
show why this is so, we shall have to examine the implications of
such inferences in detail.
Consider two concepts, A and B. Let P (A) be the unconditional
probability that any subject from some well-defined population
(i.e., age range) has concept A, and let P(B ) be the unconditional
probability that any subject from the same population has con-
cept B. Statements to the effect that A develops before B or B
develops before A or the two concepts do not develop
sequentially are statements about these unconditional
probabilities. Specifically, they imply P(A) > P(B) or P(B) >
P(A) or P (A) = P(B ) in the population. (The converse of this im-
plication does not hold—i.e., the inference that F(A) ^ P(B)
does not imply sequentiality and the inference that P(A) = P(B)
does not imply synchrony.) The problem with basing inferences
of this sort on evidence about comparative performance on con-
cept tests is that test performance will normally be infected by
false positive and false negative measurement errors. Sample
statistics of overall test performance are biased estimators of the
population parameters, P(A) and P(B ), about which the invariant
sequence criterion requires us to make inferences, and the bias-
ing factors are measurement errors.
Let A and B be concept tests. For simplicity, assume that there
are k items per test. The sample space consists of all possible se-
quences of correct and incorrect responses on each test. (The
exact definitions of "correct response" and "incorrect response"
are unimportant in the present context.) Let a\, ai,. . . ay. be a se-
quence of response random variables defined over the sample
space such that ai = 0 if a protocol shows a correct response for
theith item on test A and a* = 1 otherwise. Let£>i,£>2,. . .b^bea.
sequence of response random variables defined over the sample
space such that bi = 0 if a protocol shows a correct response for
the ith item on test B and bi = 1 otherwise. Let P (at = 0) and P
(bi = 0) be the unconditional probabilities of a correct response
on the ith items of tests A and B, respectively. Assuming that test
A is a valid measure of concept A, F (at = 0) is a function of three
variables: the unconditional probability that any subject has con-
cept A, P(A); the conditional probability that any subject who
does not have concept A gives a correct response on the ith item,
Pi (01A); and the conditional probability that any subject who has
concept A gives an incorrect response on the ith item, P^  (11A).
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The exact expression is
P(at = 0) = P(A) + P(A)Pt(0\A) - P(A)Pi(l\A), (1)
where P(A) = 1 - P(A). The conditional probabilities PJ(Q|A)
and Pi (11A) are, respectively, the false positive and false nega-
tive error rates for the ith item on test A. These values will
increase with increases in the number of ways a subject can give
a correct response without having concept A or an incorrect
response despite having concept A. Similarly, the unconditional
probability of a correct response on the ith item of test B is
P(bi = O)=P(B)+P(B)P.(O\B)-P(B)Pi(l\B), (2)
where P (0|B) and P (l |B) are, respectively, the false positive
and false negative error rates for the ith item on testB. Since the
expectation of any random variable is the sum of the products of
its possible values and their respective unconditional
probabilities, equations 1 and 2 give the expectations of the
response random variables a i , . . . dp. and hi,. . . b^.
To compare subjects' performance on A and B, we would first
need to define some statistic of test performance so that we could
compute sample values from data. The exact statistic chosen will
depend on our assumptions about the underlying scale of
measurement. If we assume that the underlying scale is ratio or
interval, we shall undoubtedly use expected total correct
responses or expected proportion of correct responses. In a
study, we would compute mean total corrects or mean proportion
correct for tests A and B and test the null hypothesis that the
means do not differ significantly (Brainerd & Hooper, 1975;
Elkind & Schoenfeld, 1972). If we assume an ordinal or a
nominal scale, the statistic will probably be an expected
number of subjects who equal or exceed some arbitrarily high
number or proportion of correct responses. In a study, we would
classify subjects as "pass" or "fail" on each test according to
some criterion of total test performance and test the null
hypothesis that the observed numbers of passes on the two tests
do not differ significantly (Kofsky, 1966; Wohlwill, 1960).
Whatever statistic we decide to use, it will have to be a mo-
ment of the probability distribution of some random variable
defined over the sample space. In other words, the random vari-
able will be some method of grouping possible outcomes of the
sequences ai, . . . a^ and bi, . . . frfcinto equivalence classes. This
means that the rule that defines the random variable's
probability distribution will be derived from equations 1 and 2.
But this fact has an unfortunate consequence from the standpoint
of the invariant sequence criterion. Observed differences
between test A and test B performance on sample estimates of
expectations can be explained in at least four ways: (a) P(A) i=
P(B); (b) the false positive error rates differ for the two tests; (c)
the false negative error rates differ for the two tests; (d) some
combination of a-c. (I am excluding sampling error for the sake
of simplicity.) A formal proof of this statement for the statistics
mentioned earlier is given in the technical appendix to this
response (Brainerd, 1978a).
In the first section of the technical appendix, I prove the state-
ment for the first class of studies in which invariant sequence
hypotheses have been tested, namely, studies in which an in-
terval or ratio metric is assumed. In such studies, concept tests
are administered to subjects and the mean total number of cor-
rect items is computed for each test. The concepts measured by
the tests are said to develop sequentially if differences in mean
performance are observed. It is shown that this datum does not
justify the inference of sequentiality and, worse, that it does not
lead to any theoretically interesting inferences at all. The proof
turns on three points. First, the sequentiality inference for two
concepts A and B implies P(A) =j=P(B) in the population. Second,
this latter inference is sound only if the observed proportion of
responses for given items on Test A and TestB are unbiased esti-
mates of P(A) and P(B), respectively. Third, observed propor-
tions of correct responses per item are actually biased estimators
of P(A) and P(B ), and the biasing factors are measurement errors.
Therefore, when statistics such as mean total correct items are
used, P (A) ^ P(B) is not a plausible inference when means are
observed to differ, and P (A) = P(B ) is not a plausible inference
when means are the same.
In the second section of the technical appendix, the proof is
repeated for the second class of studies in which invariant se-
quence hypotheses have been tested, namely, studies in which
an ordinal or a nominal metric is assumed. The difference
between the first class of studies and the second is that the total
number of correct items on any given test is used to assign sub-
jects to discrete performance categories. Concepts are said to
develop sequentially when, differences in the distributions of
subjects in the performance categories are observed.
Specifically, tests that result in larger numbers of subjects in
higher categories are said to measure earlier-emerging concepts.
By repeating the proof for appropriate random variables, this in-
ference is also shown to be unjustified. It follows that the
measurement error problem cannot be avoided by switching to
statistics that presuppose different scales of measurement.
Now, let us turn to the question of how these proofs make
contact with the observations on invariant sequences made by
the commentators. For the most part, these observations assume
that the invariant sequence criterion makes predictions that can
be submitted to empirical tests. The assumption is explicitly
stated by Scandura when he notes that an invariant sequence
prediction is "a theoretical statement that could be supported or
refuted by empirical evidence." But this view is not supported
by the formal analysis. When a line of investigation fails to
produce evidence of a predicted sequence, a theory-saving
explanation based on measurement error can immediately be de-
vised. Alternatively, when evidence supporting a predicted se-
quence is obtained, a theory-contradictory explanation based on
measurement error is immediately available. An unfortunate
consequence of this situation is that it appears to negate most of
the statements made by the commentators about invariant se-
quence research:
Fischer claims that predictions of same-stage Synchrony have
been consistently refuted, but the findings in question can be
dismissed by proponents of the predictions on the grounds that
the tests used to generate the findings involve different rates of
measurement error. Rosenthal makes a similar claim, and it is
subject to the same objection. When Markman warns us against
mistaking true invariant sequences for measurement sequences,
she assumes that after measurement sequences have been set
aside there are some sequences left over that can be examined
empirically. However, measurement errors make the resulting
data uninterpretable. Similarly, when Neimark argues that
measurement sequences and maturational sequences do not
exhaust the list of invariant sequences, she makes the same
assumption as does Markman. Pascual-Leone argues that even
measurement sequences can be empirically disconfirmed. But
the putative disconfirmations that he mentions are themselves
subject to measurement error confounds. In fact, the only re-
marks about invariant sequence research by the commentators
that find support in the analysis of measurement error confounds
are Smedslund's conjectures.
Unworkable solutions. Evidently, comparing subjects' concept
test performance via statistics of the sort we have considered
does not provide any basis for making inferences about the
developmental ordering of concepts. In fact, we can formulate an
algorithm for proving that any statistic of the type that has tradi-
tionally been used to test invariant sequence predictions is a
biased estimator of the relevant theoretical parameters. First,
define a random variable of concept test performance over the
outcome space. Second, derive the expectation of this random
variable. Third, show that the expectation may be expressed as a
function of equations like 1 and 2.
If we are going to test invariant sequence predictions, it is ob-
vious that we shall have to find some method of obtaining un-
biased estimates of parameters such as P(A) and P(B ). Unfortu-
nately, there is no guarantee that such methods exist. As a rule,
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the problem of biased estimators is resolved either by using
some other statistic of the data or by obtaining independent esti-
mates of the biasing factors and correcting statistics currently in
use. It does not appear that either of these strategies will work in
the present case.
According to the first strategy, it might be possible to test pre-
dictions about concept ordering by using other moments of the
probability distributions of test performance random variables.
So far, we have only considered predictions about expectations.
Although these are the only predictions that have been investi-
gated to date, we might be able to show that the invariant se-
quence criterion makes predictions about other moments as
well, for example, variance or skewness or kurtosis. The problem
with this approach is that other moments are just as sensitive to
measurement error as are expectations. This is due to a fact men-
tioned earlier, namely, the probability distribution of any test
performance random variable will be a function of equations like
1 and 2. This is easily seen in the case of the random variables
considered in the preceding section. For example, the function
rules for total errors are shown in the third section of the
technical appendix (Brainerd, 1978a). Note that these rules are
defined by equations 1 and 2, respectively. Since the function
rules for total errors are defined in terms of equations 1 and 2, it
is apparent that the expressions for any of their respective mo-
ments will contain terms that refer to the probabilities of making
false positive and false negative errors. Consequently, sample
estimates of such statistics must necessarily be contaminated by
measurement error. Similar statements can be made about the
probability distributions of other random variables of concept
test performance.
According to the second strategy, we might be able to correct
observed values of the expectations of random variables such as
total correct, proportion correct, and so on, for the effects of
measurement error. Of course, this would require independent
estimates of the false positive and false negative rates for indi-
vidual concept tests. It is difficult to see how such estimates
could be obtained. If only one type of measurement error were
operating, one could administer parallel forms of differential
difficulty to the same subjects. It would be reasonable to assume
that performance differences between the forms were attributa-
ble to that particular measurement error. In the present case,
however, there are two types of measurement error to contend
with. What is more, they operate in opposite directions.
Therefore, it is impossible to say whether observed differences
between parallel forms are the result of differences between
false positive rates or differences between false negative rates or
both.
Remark. It seems, therefore, that we cannot interpret concept
development data in theoretically meaningful ways. Although
such data may tell us something about the relative difficulty of
tests, they do not tell us anything about invariant sequences in
the concepts that the tests profess to measure. As suggested
above, whenever we fail to confirm a sequence that is predicted
by the theory (see Parker's paper for some cases in point), it can
always be argued that our tests are prone to measurement error.
Whenever we find a sequence that is proscribed by the theory
(see Fischer's paper for illustrations), it can likewise be argued
that our tests are prone to measurement error. The fact that auto-
matic, theory-saving explanations exist for disconfirmatory data
is bound to provoke much fruitless controversy over the "cor-
rect" interpretation of concept development data. Interestingly,
such controversies already exist in the literature. For example,
the theory-contradictory sequences in same-stage concepts cited
by Fischer are known to be less visible with the conservative
tests used by Genevan researchers than with the more liberal
tests used by many North American investigators (e.g., Brainerd
& Brainerd, 1972; Brainerd & Hooper, 1975; Hooper & Toniolo,
1977; Rybash et al , 1975). I have interpreted (1975, 1977b) this
finding as implying that the sequences in question exist, but it is
hard to find them with Genevan methods because these methods
are prone to false negative error. Larsen (1977) has countered
with the interpretation that the sequences do not exist, and the
data produced by non-Genevan methods are the result of false
positive error. On the basis of the reasoning in the appendix,
there may not be any way to decide between these interpreta-
tions with concept development data.
This brings us back to measurement sequences. Despite the
demonstrable noninterpretability of invariant sequence data,
common sense suggests that some things invariably precede
others during development. Measurement error confounds
notwithstanding, who would argue that crawling does not
precede walking? Or, more to the point, who would argue that
the concept of object permanence does not precede the concept
of conservation? Since we appear to know these things quite in-
dependently of data, we might ask ourselves what the basis for
our knowledge is. We are evidently applying an external, non-
empirical criterion of some sort. If we asked working develop-
mentalists to describe such a criterion, the answer would
probably be, "I am most confident that one thing invariably
precedes another when the later thing is vastly more complex
than the earlier thing." For "vastly more complex," read "linked
by a measurement sequence."
The logic of scientific explanation
Perhaps the most intersting and thought-provoking points raised
by the commentators are those in category (b). These points are
essentially matters of philosophy of science, not data, and some
of them are as old as philosophy itself (see Buss's* and Bates's*
papers). Since the chances of obtaining closure on any of these
issues are remote, it might have been prudent to avoid them
altogether in this reply. However, I should like to add some
follow-up remarks on three points that are especially relevant to
evaluating the theoretical adequacy of the stage construct,
namely, the measurability criterion, explanation versus descrip-
tion, and the so-called "structuralist" approach to explanation.
Measurability. To a large extent, my paper was prompted by
the possibility that the stage explanations of cognitive develop-
ment that have been emanating from Geneva for many years may
be circular statements cloaked in obscure language. I noted that
a developmental construct, to be viewed as presumptively
explanatory, should be concerned with real age changes in be-
havior, should specify some antecedent variables that are
believed to cause these changes, and should provide methods
whereby these variables can be measured independently of the
changes they purport to explain. I also claimed that the third cri-
terion, measurability, is necessary to ensure that stage explana-
tions are not circular. Only one commentator, Wetherick, does
not appear to be bothered by circular explanations.
Some commentators, especially Kurtines and Ennis, feel that
the measurability criterion for explanatory stages is too severe.
Before replying, I shall try to summarize the points at issue. An
explanation, at least as I understand the term, is a proposition
that asserts a lawful relationship between two sets of entities.
One set (sometimes called the explanans) is said to explain
the other (the explanandum). (This characterization might not be
' accepted by those who advocate "structural" explanation, but
more on this later.) My original argument was that explanatory
processes and explananda should be independently measurable
to preclude the possibility of circularity. That is, without
procedures for independently measuring explanatory variables
and explananda, we lack the means of critically testing the
hypothesized relationship and, hence, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the explanatory variables are merely paraphrases
of the explananda. The basic (and familiar) counterargument is
that science often uses explanatory constructs that are not
measurable in any strict sense: "most scientific theories contain
explanatory components (e.g., electron, space curvature, waves,
etc.) which, for either practical or theoretical reasons, lack overt
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procedures for empirical operationalization" (Kurtines). And
"the explanatory factors, atom, molecule, and gene, were in-
vented by physicists, chemists, and biologists before there were
independent ways of identifying and measuring these factors"
(Ennis). These entities do not seem to pose a circularity problem,
and we do not seem to be any the worse off for having used them.
Indeed, all of them have led to new programs of research that
have produced important advances in our understanding of
physical and biological phenomena. The essential claim,
therefore, is that explanatory constructs often serve a heuristic
function that the measurability criterion would tend to suppress.
I am in complete agreement with the spirit of this claim. Who
could disagree? Theory construction is a creative process that
should not be hampered by artificial rules and arbitrary dicta.
Concepts that fail to meet rigid criteria of measurability, but
produce fruitful new lines of research, are not to be scorned.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that these statements nullify
either the circularity criticism of Piagetian stage explanations or
the relevance of the measurability criterion to such explanations.
To maintain otherwise is to suggest that the stage-behavior rela-
tionship posited in Piaget's theory is equivalent, from a logical
point of view, to the relationship between atoms, genes, and so
on, and the facts they profess to explain. There are important dif-
ferences. First, the circularity problem is less evident with genes
and atoms because these concepts represent levels of analysis
that are clearly different from the things they explain.
Specifically, they seem to be more fundamental and penetrating
levels of analysis. The problem with the stage construct, on the
other hand, is that it does not seem to be a more fundamental
level of analysis than behavior. In fact, it can be argued that
stages are a more superficial level of analysis, that is, stages are
behaviors with the fine detail erased. There does not seem to be
any compelling evidence, either logical or empirical, that Pia-
getian stages do more than paraphrase conceptual behavior.
Given such admittedly special circumstances, I think it is both
reasonable and prudent to invoke the measurability criterion. I
also think that the criterion is applicable to some of the illustra-
tions presented by the commentators. For example, Ennis's illus-
tration that "birds fly south in the winter . . . because they have a
south-flying instinct" comes perilously close to circularity. On its
face, it is a circular statement resembling explanations of human
behavior that were once favored by faculty psychologists.
"South-flying instinct" does not seem to be a more basic level of
analysis than "birds fly south." Nowadays, however, the state-
ment can be saved from circularity if we are allowed to substitute
the ethologists' definition of south-flying instinct for "south-
flying instinct." It is in situations such as these that the
measurability criterion can be most useful.
A second and more important difference between Piaget's
stages and concepts such as molecule, gene, atom, and so on, is
that the latter were clearly intended by their originators to be
potentially measurable entities. By "potentially measurable" I
mean only this. Although it is true that direct measurement
procedures did not exist when these constructs were first used, it
is also true that investigators believed that these entities could
be measured and, more important, that their eventual measure-
ment was a question of technology, not of theory. A gene, for
example, had specifiable biochemical properties. The task was to
find a molecule with the appropriate properties. Similarly, an
electron had specifiable physical properties (e.g., a negative
charge, a mass). The task was to find a particle with such
properties. I think it can be reasonably argued that the property
of potential measurability may be the chief reason that "un-
measurable" entities such as electrons are often powerful stimuli
to new research. By developing the appropriate technology or by
modifying existing technology, there is hope of making
substantial new discoveries. The same hope does not exist with
concepts that are not potentially measurable. In this connection,
it is instructive to consider a truly unmeasurable construct that
was introduced about the same time as the notion of an atom:
Maxwell's Demon. Maxwell's Demon was proposed to explain
some properties of gas molecules. By definition, however, the
Demon was not subject to the laws of physics and, consequently,
could not be measured independently of the effects he allegedly
produced.History records that, unlike the electron and the gene,
Maxwell's Demon was not a major impetus to new research.
Returning to Piaget's stages, it is not clear what one could con-
ceivably measure, apart for the conceptual behaviors that the
stages are supposed to explain, to confirm their existence. Cu-
riously, Piaget has resisted attempts to equate his stages with
phenomena at more basic levels of analysis. Chevalier-
Skolnikoff,* for example, notes Piaget's long-standing resistance
to grounding his stages in neurophysiological substrata. The
ostensive reason for this resistance is that neurophysiological
definitions of stages smack of maturationism, but it has never
been clear why maturationism is to be avoided (Beilin, 1971, op.
cit.). In any event, it is not clear that Piagetian stages are even
potentially measurable. It seems that their measurement is not
simply a matter of technology but, rather, will require large
amounts of theoretical reformulation.
The how and the why of it (description and explanation). Some
commentators (e.g., Fischer, Kinsboiime9 Kurtines, Neimark,
Olson, and White) have lodged objections to my emphasis on
explanatory power as a means of evaluating the adequacy of
Piaget's stages. Although many points are raised, there seem to
be two underlying themes. First, the emphasis on explanatory
power underplays the descriptive function of theories. Second, it
may be that descriptions are explanations, that is, it may be that
explanation consists in answering the question "how," not the
question "why." The first theme is central to some of Kurtines's
remarks and to all of White's paper. The second theme is most
clearly evident in Olsons' and Fischer's observations on the
structuralist mode of explanation, but I sense that Neimark and
White have something similar in mind.
The first theme is easily disposed of. It was not my intention to
imply that precise description is not an important trait of theories
or that description is, somehow, less important than explanation.
Good descriptions are obviously essential to good explanations
because they anchor theories in the data of experience. If the
earlier definition of an explanation is accepted, then it is clear
that both the explanatory variables and the explananda are, at
bottom, descriptive variables. On this view, an explanation is a
proposition that asserts a lawful relationship between two sets of
entities. The more precise our descriptions of these entities are,
the greater is the probability that our explanations can be
confirmed or disconfirmed in data. Clearly, then, we cannot have
sound explanations without good descriptions. However this
may be, it is important to recognize that being a systematic body
of explanatory processes is often taken to be the hallmark of
theories. It is probably the chief thing that distinguishes
scientific theories from articulate common sense. While common
sense is capable of precisely describing a set of facts (e.g., how
many days the moon is full, the flow of the tides, the time of
sunrise), theories aim at explaining why the facts are as they are
and what their relations are to each other.
The second and more radical criticism of my emphasis on the
explanatory adequacy of stages is that I may have adopted an in-
valid definition of explanation. Specifically, I failed to consider
the possibility that descriptions are explanations. The question
of whether description equals explanation or whether theories
do more than simply describe has long been debated by
philosophers of science. The "description equals explanation"
position is typified by some remarks that E. W. Hobson made in
1923:
"The very common idea that it is the function of Natural Science
to explain . . . cannot be accepted as true unless the word
'explain' is used in a very limited sense. The notions of efficient
causation, and of logical necessity, not being applicable to the
world of physical phenomena, the function of natural Science is
to describe conceptually the sequences of events which are to be
observed in Nature; but Natural Science cannot account for the
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existence of such sequences, and therefore cannot explain the
phenomena in the physical world, in the strictest sense in which
the term explanation can be used. Thus Natural Science
describes, so far as it can, how, or in accordance with what rules,
phenomena happen, but it is wholly incompetent to answer the
question why they happen (quoted from Nagel, 1961, pp. 26-
27)."
If it is true that good theories are .simply well-articulated
descriptions, then explanatory power may not be an appropriate
measure of the stage constructs adequacy. However, it is not
clear that the "description equals explanation" view is correct.
There are two main objections. First, this view seems to be partly
based on a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of what the
question ''why" is all about. Hobson's observations are founded
on a very restrictive definition of what it means to answer the
question "why." The specific definition seems to be one of
logical necessity, that is, the question has not been satisfactorily
answered unless the explanatory variables confer the status of
logical necessity on the explananda. But this assumes that logical
necessity is what most theorists have in mind, and that only
logical necessity produces answers to "why" that most of us
would regard as satisfactory. Neither assumption is warranted.
Concerning the former, few theorists since Hume have assumed
that the laws of science do more than make explananda highly
probable. Concerning the latter, there are many examples of
explanatory statements that, to most of us, would seem to be
perfectly acceptable answers to "why" despite the fact that they
do not confer logical necessity. Consider: "My chairman is
grouchy today because the dean cut his budget." This statement
certainly appears to do more than describe the dean's pecuniary
behavior and the chairman's emotional behavior. It says that a
lawful relationship obtains between the two that is probably ca-
pable of empirical confirmation. Nevertheless, grouchiness is not
an invariable concomitant of budget cutting. It may not even be a
frequent concomitant of budget cutting if the dean announces
budget cuts only after dispensing tranquilizers.
The second objection to the "description equals explanation"
view is more profound. The view presumes that putatively
explanatory statements can always be translated into purely
descriptive terminology, that is, a "why" answer can always be
translated into a "how" answer. There is no evidence that this
translation can invariably (or even usually) be done. Such
translations would require parallel descriptive languages for
scientific theories that do not exist. Several examples of explana-
tory statements that evidently cannot be translated into parallel
descriptive terminology can be found in Nagel (1961, pp. 117—
29). Readers interested in the "how" versus "why" issue are
directed to Nagel's excellent technical discussion. The essential
obstacle to translation is that the explanations of science are
idealizations. Explanatory processes and explananda are
indefinitely large classes of similar events, not singular
phenomena. It is difficult to delineate the membership of such
classes in descriptive language. What seems to be required is a
function of some sort that maps the set of explanatory variables
onto the set of explananda. It is in just this sense that explana-
tions are more than answers to the question "how." It is the
formulation of a functional relationship, often exceedingly
abstract, that makes the explanations of science relevant to the
question "why."
Note on structuralist explanation. It has been proposed in
certain commentaries (e.g., Olson's and Fischer's) that Piaget
subscribes to a species of explanation different from the one we
have been considering. The species in question is one associated
with the structuralist movement in linguistics and some social
sciences. The most eloquent presentation of the structuralist ap-
proach appears in Olson's paper: "Structuralism . . . is a mode of
. . . theory construction characterized by the idea of wholeness
. . . transformations . . . and self-regulation. . . . A piece of in-
telligent behavior, like a piece of a sentence, is not to be seen, in-
terpreted, or explained in terms of a response to a set of inde-
pendently specified antecedent variables to which it is causally
linked, but rather in terms of a general cognitive structure . . . of
which it is a particular exemplar."
I have four replies. First: It is not all that clear that Piaget is an
uncompromising advocate of structuralist explanation or that his
theory is a product of conscious adherence to this approach. His
major work on the subject, he Structuralisme, was written many
years after his theory was well-developed. What is more, the
book contains much criticism of the structuralist movement, es-
pecially linguistic structuralism. Second: I argued in my paper
that Piagetian cognitive structures are at most descriptions of be-
havior and, frequently, are only task descriptions. If this argu-
ment is valid, then in those instances when they can be mapped
onto behavior, Piaget's "general cognitive structures" are
superfluous descriptions, and when they can be mapped only
onto tasks, they are irrelevant. Third: The structuralist mode of
explanation obviously assumes the correctness of the "descrip-
tion equals explanation" hypothesis. The emphasis is entirely on
describing common attributes of tasks and behaviors. No attempt
is made to say where the behaviors themselves come from. Al-
though this approach might be justified if the "description equals
explanation" hypothesis were correct, we have seen that it
probably is not.
The fourth reply is, for me, the most important. I think it not
unlikely that "structuralist explanation" is an ex post facto at-
tempt to rationalize bad theory and thereby avoid having to
change it. (Certainly, there can be no doubt in the case of
Piaget's theory that the theory came before the rationalization, or
that the theory resists change.) This seems a poor strategy. It is
most improbable that such explanations will be regarded as satis-
factory by working scientists. Developmentalists, for example,
want to know why behavior develops as it does and when it does.
It is unlikely that they will be satisfied by structural descriptions
of behavior, no matter how abstract or opaque. Consider a
randomly chosen example. It is known that during the ele-
mentary school years children become progressively more likely
to solve discrimination-learning problems on the basis of abstract
attributes (dimensions) and progressively less likely to solve
them on the basis of perceptible attributes (values of dimen-
sions). In the present state of our knowledge, this fact seems to
have important implications for both cognitive development and
instruction. What we should like to know is why this trend exists.
Is it a consequence of advances in verbal mediation, as Kendler
and Kendler (1962) maintain? Is it a consequence of improve-
ments in selective attention, as Zeaman and House (1963) main-
tain? Is it a consequence of improvements in hypothesis testing
skills, as Levine (1975) maintains? Clearly, we want to know the
antecedent variables responsible for children's increasing
reliance on abstract attributes in discrimination learning. Judg-
ing from the many advances in our knowledge of children's
learning that have accrued from research prompted by the desire
to isolate antecedent variables, this desire generates productive
lines of research that eventuate in theoretical hypotheses ap-
parently providing satisfactory answers to "why."
Other stage criteria
Although Piaget's major stage criteria were examined in my
paper, it might be that other valid criteria could be given. That is,
there might be verifiable properties of cognitive development,
other than the ones I considered, that do call for a stage
viewpoint. Some additional criteria are described by certain
commentators, but I do not see too much promise in these; they
tend to be either nonempirical or contradicted by extant data.
Fischer's suggestion that qualitative change and "cognitive ceil-
ings" imply stages may be used as a case in point. The idea of
qualitative change is a notoriously slippery one. No one seems to
be able to say what a qualitative behavioral change is. When
specific examples are put forward, they invariably pose the "how
much more is different" dilemma. I have discussed this dilemma
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at length elsewhere (Brainerd, 1978b). It is concerned with the
fact that there are no rules for deciding how big a change must be
before it equals a change in kind rather than amount. Concerning
"cognitive ceilings," this is the old readiness-to-learn doctrine in
new language. The main idea is that we cannot teach children
concepts that are substantially beyond their current cognitive
stage. In the case of Piaget's theory, however, there is an exten-
sive data base on the learning of concrete-operational concepts
that, to say the least, does not tend to confirm this idea.
Children's ability to learn conservation concepts, for example,
has not been found to depend on their pretraining stage
classifications (Brainerd, 1977a, Table 1). Further, conservation
learning has been demonstrated with children far below the
nominal age range for the concrete-operational stage (Brainerd,
1977a, pp. 931-34).
There is one criterion, however, that is often associated with
stages and about which I am extremely optimistic, namely, the
idea that developmental changes in conceptual behavior occur in
an abrupt, discontinuous manner. Since the appearance of two
influential papers by Flavell (1971, op. cit.; Flavell & Wohlwill,
1969, op. cit.), it has become fashionable to dismiss the possi-
bility of discontinuous change and to assert that cognitive
development is a smooth, continuous process. In the earlier of
these papers, for example, Flavell and Wohlwill conclude that
"The recent Piagetian literature strongly suggests that develop-
ment is normally gradual rather than abrupt. . . The conservation
concepts, to take everyone's favorite example of a cognitive form,
seem to show a rather extended interval between first-in-
competence and always-in-performance. The process of stabi-
lization and generalization of these and perhaps all competence
items appears to be a relatively slow one" (p. 79). A reiteration of
this conclusion may be found in Fischer's commentary.
There are two remarkable things about the widespread accep-
tance of the hypothesis that concept development is a gradual
process. First, contrary to the above quotation, there is no sound
empirical basis for the hypothesis. There have been no attempts
to test models that assume discontinuous acquisition of concepts
against models that assume continuous acquisition, although
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969, op. cit.) have proposed a model of
the latter sort, resembling the linear difference equation of
stimulus sampling theory. The evidence mentioned in the quota-
tion shows that it requires several years to acquire most of the
concepts associated with Piaget's concrete-operational stage. But
this could simply be a case, similar to familiar examples from
physics and biology, where large-scale continuity masks small-
scale discontinuity; the macropicture may be the result of strictly
discontinous changes at the level of individual concepts. Large-
scale continuity is not inconsistent with the view that individual
concepts are acquired in an all-or-none manner. Second, a
technology, namely, Markov models, already exists for putting
the gradual change hypothesis to the test. Twenty years ago,
learning theorists were confronted with a very similar question.
They wanted to know whether college students learned paired-
associate items, affirmation rules, and so on, gradually or in a
sudden, all-or-none manner. Finite Markov models were
vigorously developed to allow this question to be investigated. It
is not difficult to apply these models to the question of whether
or not children acquire concepts gradually. The only assumption
that needs to be made is that concept acquisition can be equated
with changes in the probability of a correct response on some
test. An elaborate mathematical development and theoretical ra-
tionale for the applicability of Markov models to the question at
hand can be found in Brainerd (1979).
Piaget often speaks of the acquisition of specific concrete-
operational concepts as consisting of three discrete stages. To
illustrate, development in the classificatory, relational, and
number areas is described as a three-stage process (Beth &
Piaget, 1966). For any given concept (e.g., class-inclusion, seria-
tion, number conservation), the Stage I probability of a correct
response on the appropriate concept test is zero. During Stage
III, the probability of a correct response on the same test is one.
During Stage II, the probability of a correct response is
somewhere between zero and one. Let S1,S2, and S3 denote the
three stages. Let S2% denote an error on the appropriate concept
test while the subject is in Stage II, and let S2Q denote a correct
response on the test while the subject is in Stage III. (Recall that
only errors and corrects occur in Stage I and Stage II, respec-
tively.) Now, suppose that, for any given concept test, these three
stages are not arbitrary slices of a continuous stream. Explicitly,
suppose that (a) subjects can occupy only these three perfor-
mance states, (b) the probability of a correct response in State S2
is some constant p, and (c) transitions between states occur in an
abrupt, all-or-nothing manner. These assumptions imply that
changes in the probability of a correct response on the test in
question can be described by a three-state Markov process
whose starting vector and transition matrix are:
P-{S3(1),S2£(1),S2C(1),S2(1))
= { M 1 ~s ~t)r,(l -s -t)(l -r),s\;
S3(n + 1) S2E(n + 1) S2c(n + 1) SI (n + 1)





( l - c ) ( l - p ) ( l - c ) p
a(l-b)p
0
All the parameters of equation 3 are probabilities. The starting
vector gives the probability of beginning in each of the possible
states of the process for some subject population. The values in
the transition matrix are conditional probabilities. Each cell
gives the probability that the process is in some state Sj on trial
n + 1 given that it was in some state S, on trial n. The model in
equation 3 turns out to be quite mathematically tractable. It is
relatively easy to derive numerical predictions that can be used
to test the model's fit to performance data (Greeno, 1968). It is
also possible to derive interesting theoretical hypotheses about
relationships between parameters in the transition matrix
(Brainerd, 1979).
Equation 3 has a total of eight free parameters that need to be
estimated before the model's fit to a set of performance data can
be assessed. Since models analogous to equation 3 have proved
to be important in many simple learning situations (e.g., paired-
associate learning, discrimination reversal, classical condition-
ing), much work has been done on parameter estimation
schemes. Procedures for obtaining maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the parameters of equation 3 may be found in Greeno
(1968), Halff (1976), and Brainerd (1979).
Since parameter estimation is not problematical, equation 3
can easily be applied to a set of performance data to decide
whether or not those data can be described by three discrete
states. The model is perhaps most readily applicable to the data
of training experiments and longitudinal studies. Suppose we are
training children on some concrete-operational concept (for
example, conservation), and we train them to a fairly strict cri-
terion of learning (for example, eight to ten correct responses in a
row). We are now in a position to determine whether or not the
change in correct response probability as a function of training
consists of three discrete stages. The training trials data are used
to estimate the parameters of equation 3. These parameter esti-
mates are then used to compute values of observable statistics of
training trials data such as total errors to criterion, trial number of
last error, number of errors before the first correct response,
number of errorless protocols, and so on. Finally, standard good-
ness-of-tests (x2 or Kolmogorov-Smirnov) can be used to decide
whether or not the predicted values of these stastistics differ
significantly from the observed values. Much the same
procedure can be used when applying equation 3 to longitudinal
data. About the only change in the usual longitudinal design that
seems to be required is that subjects should be followed until
they have met a strict criterion of concept acquisition (for
example, one testing session without any errors).
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I have already reported some preliminary findings suggesting
that the process of learning a conservation concept consists of
three discrete stages (Brainerd, 1979, Table 1), and more exten-
sive data will be reported in the near future. However, the main
point is that by virtue of the existence of a well-articulated litera-
ture on Markov models, developmental researchers can begin to
come to grips with the question of gradual versus abrupt change.
Since these models are readily adapted to certain kinds of
developmental data, especially the data of learning experiments
and longitudinal studies, all that remains is to run the experi-
ments and fit the models. I believe, therefore, that there is reason
to be optimistic about our prospects for determining whether or
not children's acquisition of concepts is normally a stage-like
process. The chances are good that this question will be resolved
during the next few years. I find this an exciting prospect.
EDITOR'S NOTE
Asterisks indicate that these commentaries will appear in the Continuing
Commentary section of a later issue.
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